

KONSTANTIN PREOBRAZHENSKY



147

FSB'S

NEW TROJAN HORSE:

AMERICANS OF RUSSIAN DESCENT



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DEDICATION:

I dedicate this book to my American friends who have helped me
in the first years of immigration.

I express the most heartfelt gratitude to Ms. Maria Nekludoff
who has kindly contributed the translation of this book.

Thanks are also due to those who kindly contributed
to make this publication possible:

Dr. Eugene L. Magerovsky

Michael Alexander

Gerard Group International

and many others who prefer to remain anonymous

As the 9-11 attack brought home to all of us, the threat to and within our nation is real. Our borders and shores are no longer the impenetrable fortresses of the past. We live in times where anything is possible, where dissidents are poisoned with nuclear substances in downtown London and journalists can be executed outside their homes in Moscow and around the world for merely pursuing their vocation. These are dangerous and uncertain times.

Consider Russia today. In the eight years following Putin's rise to power, Russia has returned to the tyranny of its Chekist/KGB past. This is no surprise to me. On January 5, 2000 in *The Daily Report on Russia and the Former Soviet Republics*, I described the resignation of Yeltsin and appointment of Putin as a silent coup. I concluded, "As time goes by, realization will increase that Putin's rise and Russia's future will be to turn away from Western values and return to its non-democratic traditions, as security and defense élites consolidate their takeover of the Russian state."

Unfortunately this has occurred in ways that continue to shock the Western world. This unprecedented takeover of the Russian government by the security élite has deep troubling implications for all of us.

This book addresses one of the unforeseen developments of the consolidation within the Russian Orthodox Churches that can have significant counter-intelligence implications for the United States and the Western world. It goes to the heart of a question that has become much more difficult to sort out. The profile of current Russian intelligence personnel is characterized by their lack of internal discipline, and widespread corruption throughout the Russian government today. This environment makes it possible for intelligence officers to pursue personal interests in business or through criminal enterprises simultaneously with their intelligence work. Some would maintain that this is their true duty since the threat of a world war is past.

Today, Russia is consumed by the clannish struggle among rival and competing security and business élites which operate like an organized criminal syndicate. This creates a very unstable system. While appearing strong and in control, it is actually brittle and burdened by this constant struggle. Murder has become the norm for resolving property disputes and silencing political

critics. The tax police are a means of seizing private companies to divide the spoils among the Kremlin's favorites and themselves, and serves as a potent method of political retribution. Putin's principal role remains, not to lead the country, but to play the balancing act that manages these rivalries while projecting a strong and tough image at home and abroad.

To protect their enormous accumulated wealth (Putin is said to have over \$15 billion himself), the élite use their positions to penetrate foreign governments and their own domestic structures, by buying agents for cash and using other traditional intelligence tradecraft to obtain insider information for advantage. They now have access to foreign citizenship, which enables them to buy foreign businesses, establish joint ventures, join and support political parties, and even run for office in targeted countries. These methods of political influence are merged with economic penetration and consolidated by organized crime. Many of their acquisition targets are outside of Russia. Their ability to move in and out of the international financial and political environments makes the counter-intelligence challenge a daunting task. We can now add Russian Orthodox clergymen to the mix of counter-intelligence confusion.

Traditionally, counter-intelligence is described as a focused, detailed understanding of the activities of the foreign intelligence service of another country. But today we are up against forces that blend government structures, intelligence acumen, businesses and financial entities with criminal ruthlessness. This requires detailed knowledge of their varied and blended activities.

In late February 2007, I appeared on NBC's Dateline special on the Litvenenko polonium poisoning, in which I accused the Russian government of directing his brutal murder. Four days later, on March 1st, I was shot outside my home by two men waiting for me in the darkness and rain. To this day that crime has gone unsolved, but the lack of similar crimes having ever occurred in my neighborhood keeps many of us wondering about the Kremlin's hand in the attack that almost took my life. Only a combination of factors saved me that dreadful night. Again the question remains open: Who were these attackers and was my attack perpetrated by those who killed Litvenenko? This is a legitimate counter-intelligence issue with implications for our national security.

There is much that masks the reality of what Russia and its apparatus is today. For this reason strong counter-intelligence analysis is needed to fully appreciate the Potemkin village* of what Russia is today. It is not incredible to contemplate how cynically Russian intelligence can use even Russian priests to implement its intelligence agenda.

When I saw the photographs of President Putin fishing in Maine with President George W. Bush and his father after Litvenenko's murder and my shooting in 2007, I could only wonder how President Putin could be invited into such an intimate setting with the current and former US Presidents. As we look back over the Bush-Putin relationship, we may recall what two famous Russian human rights activists, Elena Bonner and Vladimir Bukovsky, wrote in their open letter to President George W. Bush in March 2003:

"The danger of partnership with criminal régimes is that they never stop until they make you an accomplice of their crimes." This was a telling warning; it reveals this book as important and timely.

Paul M. Joyal
Washington, DC

Paul Joyal is a prominent intelligence expert who specializes in Russia, Georgia, and the former Soviet Union. He has been an outspoken critic of the Putin regime. Immediately following the attempt on his life in 2007, police rushed to the conclusion that this was a 'street crime', dismissing terrorism and the sinister implications of Putin's retaliation.

Joyal holds a master's degree in international relations from The Catholic University of America. His published works include the books Fifteen Years of Espionage and Singling out Arab-Americans.

* "Potemkin village" is frequently used to describe the attempts of the Soviet government to fool foreign observers of Russia. The government displays select villages, factories, schools, stores, or neighborhoods, and presents them as if they were typical, rather than exceptional. Given the strict limitations on the movement of foreigners in the USSR, it was often impossible for these visitors to see any other examples and thus drew conclusions from false examples. (From *Europe: A History*, Norman Davies, (London: Pimlico, 1997), 658.)

Before leaving the KGB in 1991, I heard they were planning to put emphasis on recruiting Russian emigrants abroad instead of pro-Communist Western intellectuals. After the collapse of Communism in Russia in December 2001, their plans were put into practice. The most recent KGB/SVR defector, Colonel Sergei Tretyakov, who defected in New York in 2000, has confirmed this. The book *Comrade J*, based on Tretyakov's information, says: "The Center ranked the targets according to their importance." Included on their list were Russian and Jewish immigrant groups, especially Russian immigrants who still had some ties to Russia or showed sympathy to their former homeland.¹

In 2003, I was forced to flee Russia, where I was living under the threat of arrest because of my articles and books exposing the KGB. I came to the United States, where I received political asylum. When I joined the Russian émigré community in America, I was shocked to discover the impunity with which Putin's secret agents operate among them. The Kremlin is using the Russian émigré community as an instrument for exerting pressure on the West. In Soviet times this was the domain of foreign Communists, but today they are trying to unify ROCOR with the MP, which is controlled by agents of the KGB and is under the power of the government.

Russian immigrants are still under threat of being recruited by the FSB in Lubyanka. I felt sorry for my new compatriots, and decided to write this book to help them sort things out and keep them from being recruited, by helping them to recognize an agent when they meet one.

Several of these chapters have already appeared in print, and have caused quite a stir in Moscow.

Putin's successes in infiltrating the Russian Orthodox Church in America, and America's inability to recognize or effectively stop his political progress abroad, inspired him to take direct military actions in order to restore the Soviet Union.

Pro-American Georgia was selected to be the first conquest, and in August 2008, Putin unleashed the military invasion of Georgia. He showed little concern for the consequences, knowing that the West would forgive him everything for the sake of the

Russian gas and oil supply. In fact, Putin's invasion of Georgia went so easily because of America's exaggerated tolerance for his previous actions. Had America's reaction been stronger and more negative, Putin might well have refrained from so bold an intrusion into Georgia.

I would like to thank the Russian immigrants themselves, and the priests and laity all over the world from whom I received much help. They supplied me with revealing materials, for which I am extremely grateful.

Konstantin Preobrazhensky

**JUST AS THIS BOOK GOES TO PRESS,
FROM AGENCE-PRESSE-FRANCE, AUGUST 31, 2008:**

The founder of a website that has criticized the Kremlin's policies in the Caucasus was found dead today in the Russian republic of Ingushetia, according to prosecutors quoted by Interfax.

Prosecutors have opened a preliminary investigation into the death of Magomed Yevloyev, who ran the website ingushetia.ru, said the news agency. The website reported that Yevloyev was killed while in police custody.

"Magomed Yevloyev was arrested today in Ingushetia and was killed," said a report posted on his website www.ingushetia.ru.

Interfax quoted spokesman Vladimir Markin of the prosecutor's office as saying that "an incident" took place after he was taken into a police car "resulting in a shooting injury to the head and he later died in hospital."

The website is among the most visited for news on Ingushetia, a republic bordering Chechnya, and was openly opposed to Ingush president Murat Zyazikov, who had more than once threatened to shut it down.

Ekho Moskvyy radio separately quoted local opposition activist Magomad Khazbiyev as saying that the website founder was arrested at gunpoint after his arrival in Narzan.

Yevloyev arrived on a flight that was also carrying the Ingush president. "Yevloyev was arrested as he stepped off the plane," Khazbiyev said.

USED IN THIS BOOK

- APN – Agency Press “Novosti”. From 1991 – Russian Informational Agency Novosti. The KGB-founded agency for spreading an adorned image of Russia in the West.
- Chekists** – the KGB officers
- CC CPSU – the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The top Soviet ruling body, never envisaged by the Constitution.
- CIA – Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S.A.
- Department “EM” (“emigrants”) – the Department of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, SVR, recruiting Russian emigrants all over the world.
- Directorate “K” – Counter-Intelligence within Intelligence
- Directorate “M” – Dedicated to emigrant activities
- Directorate “T” – the Department of Scientific and Technical Intelligence of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, SVR.
- FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S.A.
- Gestapo** – the Nazi Germany secret political police.
- GRU – Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry.
- ITAR-TASS - the Russian governmental informational agency.
- KRO OGPU - the Counter-Intelligence Department of the United Chief Political Agency (the name of the KGB in 1923-34).
- LDPR – Russian Liberal-Democratic Party, backed by the KGB.
- MP – Moscow Patriarchate, the main office of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church.
- MVD – Ministry of Interior Affairs; Russian police.
- NKVD - (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) - Soviet secret police founded in 1934 and the precursor of the KGB.
- NTS – National Toil Union, the Russian émigrés’ anti-Communist organization, founded in 1930, also known as Union of Russian Solidarists.
- NTV -Independent Russian television, one of the Russia TV channels.
- OMON – militarized riot police.
- ORT – Public Russian Television, the 1st channel of Russian TV.
- OVCS – Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate.
- POW - prisoner of war
- ROC – Russian Orthodox Church
- ROCOR – Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia.
- PR – Political Intelligence, a KGB term.
- SVR –Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.
- WCC – the World Council of Churches.

The KGB, the notorious Russian political police, has changed its name 15 times! The changes were always made in order to symbolize renovation, reforms, abandoning the criminal past; but, in fact, the only thing that really changed was the name.

- In 1917, it was founded as “*Cheka*”, the “Extraordinary Commission for Fighting Counter-Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage”. The word “*chekist*” came to mean any KGB officer and the term is still in use today.
- In 1922, the name was changed to GPU, or the “Chief Political Directorate”.
- In 1923, the letter “O” was added: it became OGPU, or “United Chief Political Directorate”.
- In 1934, the OGPU became a part of NKVD, the “People’s Commissariat of Interior Affairs”.
- In 1941 it was separated from the NKVD and became NKGB, the “People’s Commissariat of State Security”, but within a few months of the same year it was merged with NKVD once again.
- In 1943, the NKGB was restored as an independent ministry once again.
- In 1956, NKGB became MGB, the “Ministry of State Security”.
- In 1953 it was merged with the MVD, Ministry of Interior Affairs.
- In 1954, the KGB, or “Committee of State Security” was finally established. It existed until 1991, and became well-known as a primary tool of the Communist dictatorship.
- After the collapse of the Soviet Union and some sporadic reforms, it was renamed the “AFB, Agency for Federal Security”, for a short time, a change that was accompanied by some internal adjustments. In order to reduce the monstrous power of the KGB, the following services were withdrawn from it and became independent ministries:

1. Intelligence. Later it was called SVR, the Foreign Intelligence Service, which still exists today.
2. Secret technical divisions. They became FAPSI, the Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information, until 2004.

PROLOGUE

THE MURDER OF LITVENENKO:

A SYMBOL OF PUTIN'S RUSSIA

The text of my book KGB in the Russian Émigré Community was all ready for printing, when Alexander Litvenenko, a former Colonel of the FSB living in London, was poisoned. The publisher requested more material on this topic. In light of these events and for editorial reasons, the book has been significantly revised to bring it up to date.

Many years of working for the KGB and then fighting them have sharpened my instincts for danger. In November 2006, when I stopped receiving regular e-mails from Alexander Litvenenko, I began to experience a sense of foreboding. And then I received news of his poisoning and death.

Litvenenko's e-mails used to come almost daily. He would send me his articles in which he criticized Putin's regime. He also sent articles and stories written by other like-minded individuals, and he even sent me his adolescent son's wonderful poetry, written in English. We were friends, even though we never met.

In 2001, when Sasha's² book, *Blowing Up Russia*³ was published, a *Moscow Times* correspondent asked me whether the events described in that book could actually have occurred in a normal democratic society. I told him that, although there are many in the West who still consider present-day Russia to be a democratic state, Litvenenko's allegations were not only possible, they were absolutely true.

Litvenenko did not have access to the documents that could have properly validated his information, because he had fled the country and been forced to leave everything behind. But everything that he reported was correct.

There are times in this strange world of political intrigue when full documentation is not available, and we must depend on the words of those who have been on the inside.

An excellent example of this is Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who was not able to refer to any documents when he showed the bare truth about the gulag and opened the whole world's eyes to what was really happening in the labor camps of the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, the release of this book will probably not create a change in the Russia of today. In 2001, I said that even "if the

3. Presidential bodyguards, later named as FSO, Federal Guard Service.

4. Border Guards, which in fact used to be the 200,000 people's KGB Armed Forces. They were made an independent ministry until 2004.

5. The remaining part of the former KGB was concentrated mostly on counter-intelligence. It was renamed three times:

- a. in 1991 as MB, (Ministry of Security);
- b. in 1993 as FSK, (Federal Counter-Intelligence Service);
- c. in 1995 as FSB (Federal Security Service). This name

has been retained until today.

In 2004, President Vladimir Putin put FAPSI and the Border Guards back under FSB control, thus in fact reconstructing the former KGB. While the SVR and FSO are independent on paper, they are closely connected with the FSB, and they exchange their personnel between the agencies. All their officers proudly call themselves "*chekists*", in memory of the Communist *Cheka*, and celebrate their professional holiday on December 20, the date of its founding in 1917.



POISONING VICTIM ALEXANDER LITVENENKO SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEATH

State Duma creates a commission to study the facts, it will be filled with FSB-controlled people who will ultimately sabotage the work. There will be no results whatsoever." ⁴

As an example of how the FSB operates in 'democratic' Russia, one has only to look at a ten day period during September 1999, when five fully occupied apartment buildings were bombed in Moscow and two other Russian towns. It was clear to me at the time that these buildings were not blown up by terrorists, but by the FSB itself. It was not necessarily FSB officers who did the killing, but their agents who, having no direct connection to the FSB, gave the agency deniability. Such groups of murderers have existed in Russia for a long time. Litvenenko's accusations about high level complicity in the bombings were not unfounded.

Chechen rebels were blamed, but would have been incapable of organizing such a series of bombings without help from high-ranking Moscow officials. ⁵

I later heard from Litvenenko that Vladimir Bukovsky, a former Russian dissident who now lives in London, reacted to my comments supporting Litvenenko this way: "Our numbers are growing! Soon this Preobrazhensky will find himself in the West."

And that is exactly what happened. I was persecuted with renewed vengeance, and feeling the increasing gravity of my situation, I fled to the United States. Litvenenko phoned me here, and thanked me for my support. We spoke for a couple of hours, two *chekist*⁶ lieutenant-colonels, both with complicated lives. That is how our friendship began.

LIFE AS A CHEKIST

When I served in Intelligence, there was no talk of poisons. This was not because it was a taboo subject, but because the Scientific-Technological Intelligence Agency, of which I was a part, was engaged in industrial espionage. It was not involved in the liquidation of political opponents. Besides, there are many other ways of murdering or otherwise having an impact on people. For instance, if here in the United States a Soviet agent turned himself in to the Americans, the resident KGB boss would gather up his subordinate officers in the Embassy in Washington and order them to eliminate the traitor with a "hit-and-run accident." If he is ever seen crossing a street or even conveniently walking on the sidewalk, that is where the accident would take place.

A psychotropic preparation or "truth serum" was used much more frequently. It untied one's tongue, and was used to test the sincerity of foreign agents. Sometimes use of this serum resulted in the most curious episodes.

In the late 1980s, the manager of our eastern unit, Victor Papushin, went on a business trip to Burma to test the loyalty of a Chinese agent. While the northern Chinese are powerfully built and tall, like Russians, southern Chinese have smaller physiques. The chemists at the KGB were either uninformed about the proper doses for agents with smaller body types, or the information on the identity of the target was confidential. In any case, Papushin delivered the standard Russian dosage to the unsuspecting, slightly-built, Chinese agent. He emptied the powder imperceptibly into the agent's tea during their friendly dinner chat. The next morning the Chinese agent limped into Colonel Papushin's hotel room screaming:

"Yesterday I dined with you, and today my legs are paralyzed! How am I supposed to interpret this?!"

The portly Papushin paled as fear gripped him. He hurried off to the airport and bought a return ticket on the first outgoing plane to Moscow. Luckily, there were no local repercussions. It is chilling to think what type of spy scandal, tinged with attempted murder charges, could have resulted. Had this taken place in the West, the implications could have led to a critical international situation.

This information came to me by accident, piece by piece. In the KGB, you never ask questions. If you do, you are viewed with suspicion. For example, on one occasion I accidentally discovered the dramatic story of how one of the young officers of our Directorate "T," whose wife had died of cancer, swore he would find a cure for it, and it seems he found one. There were many scientists in this section. Unfortunately this cure did not become the property of many, but was stamped "confidential".

Once, this young officer came to see one of his buddies, with whom I shared an office. He used his friend's operative network telephone to reach Admiral Usatov, the deputy head of the Intelligence Service. His voice expressed great joy when he reported that he was in the process of working out a "military application" for his medication. How could that be? A cancer cure

for our soldiers? The army does not yet draft cancer patients! The military application must be something different, such as making people who "need to be eradicated" sick with cancer.

On another occasion, as I sat in the waiting room of the clinic for the Intelligence Service, I met a woman officer. Her face was covered with red patches of eczema.

"It is because I am forced to examine concentrations of different substances under the microscope," she complained to me.

One learned early on never to ask any questions. How could it be that such substances were located here, in the holiest of holies, frequented by the head of the State? It seems that they could be.

Since Directorate T⁷ is involved in medical espionage, there is a microbiology wing in the information department. Where other departments receive paper reports from their agents and details of secret mechanisms, this department would receive tightly-shut glass jars from the whole world.

Once an officer, newly transferred to our department, took out such a jar from a parcel and was about to place it in the refrigerator.

"Do not touch it with your bare hands," warned his co-worker. "You know it's from Africa!"

But the novice had previously worked in a provincial Regional Committee Party, and like most party members, was not well educated. His colleague's warning, he decided, was an "intellectual's squeamishness," and grabbed the jar. He was later diagnosed with leukemia. Why would Scientific-Technological Intelligence have residences in Africa? There are no leading technologies there, but there is a lot of raw material for poisons.

We, as Soviet intelligence agents, however, thought little of it. We knew that the poisons had, at least for the time being, receded into the past. They were characteristic of Stalin's epoch, back when the opinions of the West did not interest the Soviet government. In Brezhnev's Russia, it was considered important to raise the prestige of the "land of the Soviets" in the eyes of the world. Therefore poisons were rarely used.

Today, Putin has returned to the use of toxins as one of many elements of Stalinism which are being resurrected in Russia.

Putin, like his idol Stalin, is not afraid of the West. If Stalin could destroy the West with an atomic blast, then Putin is capable

of shutting down the West's oil pipelines. All the leaders of the West now consider it essential to maintain friendly relations with Putin. He has many of them in his pocket.

TARGETED MURDERS

When the FSB murdered the famous Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, in October 2006, Putin was visiting Germany. At a press conference, he was asked about her murder. In his usual mocking and caddish manner, he commented that she had it coming to her. Had Bush or Blair said something similar about a journalist, a woman who was shot dead in the line of duty, public opinion would have destroyed him. But Putin is forgiven everything. Even German Chancellor Angela Merckel humbly lowered her eyes instead of telling him off.

Putin instinctively sensed the atmosphere was right for his next political murder.

Not long before his poisoning, Alexander Litvenenko received British citizenship. After that my phone stopped working properly. It became more difficult to phone my old Moscow friends. I could not hear them well. I was not surprised at all. The KGB becomes irritated when its former collaborators accept Western citizenships. The *chekists* were aware of my friendship with Litvenenko from the press, and no doubt from wiretapping phone lines and listening in on our conversations between London and Washington, DC.

Why did Putin decide to poison a citizen of the British Queen in her own capital? London is not Chechnya, where one can do what one likes with people. Scotland Yard soon found Russia's Special Services' signature on this killing. Nobody will be able to order Scotland Yard to close the case, as so often happens in Russia. But what did Blair do in response to this murder? He made it clear that the oil pipeline that supplies fuel to Britain was more important than public opinion or the murder of a British subject on British soil by Russia.

It proved to Putin that he could act beyond Russia's borders, with impunity and without recrimination. It was a perfect time to put the plan to unite ROCOR⁸ with the Soviet church into action.



**FELIX DZERZHINSKY,
FOUNDER OF THE KGB ⁹**



KGB AGENT PUTIN



PUTIN THE "STATESMAN"

PART I RUSSIA AND THE CHURCH

Chapter 1

THE INSIDIOUS MOTHERLAND

1. FROM DZERZHINSKY TO PUTIN

In the center of Moscow near Lubyanka,¹⁰ there is a quiet, narrow little alley, called Varsanofyev Pereulok. When you enter it, it is as though you've returned to the distant past. On the left rise nineteenth century apartment houses, and on the right is the gloomy gray building of the KGB polyclinic and several ancient homes now used as garages for the MVD (Ministry of the Interior, i.e. the police). In the 1920s, the Varsonofyev Monastery stood here. It served as one of the first Soviet concentration camps. That is where the VCHK (Lenin's first KGB in 1917) murdered all of Tsarist Russia's social classes. The monastery was subsequently demolished.

OPERATION TRUST

I used to love bringing foreign journalists to this spot in the 1990s for secret "*chekist* Moscow" tours, as I called them. After Putin came to power, this was no longer safe to do.

Back in 1971, as a first year student of the Moscow University, I came to the KGB polyclinic to see a dentist. As the son of a general, I was allowed that privilege. It was a rather dubious privilege, however, because the doctors there were lazy and worked poorly. However, the patients dared not complain because all of the dentists were either wives or daughters of big KGB bosses. And so it was on that day. Instead of taking care of patients, the dental personnel gathered around a little old fat man, who was reclining in a dentist's chair, telling stories about the exploits of KGB agents. He was so flattered by all the attention that it was obvious he had no plans to leave the dentist's office any time soon.

"I also took part in Operation Trust!" he said in a self-satisfied voice. "I hope you've heard of it." All the people around him started to "oh" and "ah" in admiration. I cringed, I hoped, imperceptibly. A very successful film by that same name had just been shown across the country. Suddenly, I felt very strongly that the past, which I thought was behind us, was still with us.

"Did you see the young man twitch?" smirked the old man. His back had been to me the whole time. It seemed that he had eyes in the back of the head.

Operation Trust was an immense provocation, a cynical, fictitious "White guard organization" created by the *chekists*. It lured former White Guard Officers into anti-Soviet activity both in the Soviet Union and abroad, and then betrayed them to the KGB.

Operation Trust also exposed the readiness of many of the former Whites to collaborate with the Bolsheviks whom they had just fought so fiercely at the civil war front. Suddenly they did an about face, recognizing the Bolsheviks as a legitimate continuation of ancient Russia's imperial traditions. I think that this delusion had the same reasoning at its core as that which made the Russian Revolution itself successful — the departure of the educated class from religion and church, loss of moral stabilizers, and the inability to differentiate between good and evil.

Later on, teachers of the KGB Intelligence School proudly told the students that their agents provided audio or written records of every meeting of the Operation Trust organization.

"You can imagine how difficult that would have been in the 1920s! Nowadays you can insert a listening device into the wall or bring a tiny recorder to a meeting. But in those days you needed a gramophone with a horn, and the recording was done with the aid of a needle, onto a vinyl record. The needle could start scratching at any minute. Nonetheless, our Agency managed to record every single meeting!" they exclaimed proudly.

RUSSIAN ESPIONAGE TODAY

In the Russian émigré community today, there are whole dynasties of KGB agents. The grandfather helped Soviet Intelligence agents kidnap White generals; the son explained the charm of Soviet life to Western readers; and the grandson is fighting for the subjugation of ROCOR to the *chekist* MP. Everybody believes that he is helping Russia, although, in reality, he is helping only the Communists. Even now, when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is no longer in power, this is true, because over time, the KGB has been reborn with yet another name — the FSB.

Contrary to what many in the West believe, the FSB is not equivalent to the CIA or the British Secret Intelligence Services. It is a department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In Soviet times, *chekists* proudly called themselves "the armed unit of the Communist Party" and were paid much more than any other military personnel. Overfed and rotten to the core, the Communist party apparatus was unable to survive the 1991 restructuring, and faded into history. Its "armed unit", however, did survive. The FSB and the Communist Party share the same ideas.

Our teachers in the KGB School also taught us that although the Soviet Union, as a whole, was not ready for war, its Intelligence Service was well prepared. Furthermore, it had collected all the names and addresses of anti-Soviet activists among the Russian emigrants, in order to arrest them as soon as the Red Army would occupy the foreign cities. One could deduce from this that the Soviet Union was, in fact, preparing to attack Europe.

The *chekists'* plans came to fruition in the spring of 1945, when the Red armies occupied Prague, Berlin, and Budapest. Those emigrants who knew of these plans, fled without delay.

In June of 1941, Count Aleksei Grabbe, the future Bishop Anthony, was a student in the Russian Cadet School in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. He told me how, when the Germans attacked the USSR, immediately one of the emigrants in the Cadet School issued a war-cry: "Let's go to our Homeland to fight Marxism!"

The youths became impassioned with this noble goal. Only the young Count Grabbe and two other fellows, who had heard about the Bolsheviks' insidiousness from their parents, refused to go. The rest of the naïve boys were parachuted by the Germans into Soviet territory, where the NKVD¹¹ police battalions awaited them. Nothing was ever heard of them again. That is how the *chekists* managed to lure romantic youths into their trap and destroy them.

Still, the old émigrés were eager to return in the early years following the war. Their children told me that the decisive argument was the "election" of a patriarch. The Russian émigrés were convinced that the persecution of the Church had ceased in the Soviet Union. Everything had come full circle; therefore, one could return.

They failed to understand that there was no one left in the Soviet Union to elect a patriarch, and that he was simply appointed by Stalin. No one wanted to delve into the details. In the West, where many émigrés lived in poverty, and sometimes experienced discrimination, a return to their homeland gave them the hope of gaining solid ground again.

The NKVD-directed Soviet propaganda machine was never idle. I remember I once saw a poster of those years in the Museum of the History of the Intelligence Service, where outsiders are not permitted. An elderly peasant woman with a wise face, holding her arms open invitingly, stood out larger than life.

"Dear compatriots, come home!" the poster said. At her feet flowed an inviting river, the sand on its banks glistened softly. It would have felt so wonderful to dive into the cool water of that Russian river after the long trek home! Even I, an advisor to the Head of the Scientific-Technological Intelligence Service, was deeply touched by the scene. How much more must the war-weary, nostalgic emigrant have felt!

Sometimes, rumors of Soviet betrayals and atrocities managed to reach the émigrés. They heard, for instance, that when émigrés returned to their homeland, all were arrested and sent off to concentration camps. But it is hard to convince someone of facts he chooses not to believe! A group of Russian emigrants in Harbin, China gathered to discuss whether this rumor could be true. They decided that it could not be trusted. Yes, they decided, someone could have been arrested, but only because he has been guilty in the eyes of his homeland. So he deserved his fate! But everyone could not possibly be arrested! Because each person would have to face charges, each person would need an attorney. This would be impossible from a practical standpoint. And so the group decided to return.

The mental anguish of Russian emigrants in Harbin is poignantly depicted in a novel by Natalia Ilyina, *Vozrozhdeniye* ("Rebirth"). She herself was one of the few people who managed to avoid repressions herself after returning to the USSR. I believe that Natalia Ilyina's father was a Soviet agent sent to Harbin in the 1920s to corrupt the Russian émigré community. She also was suspected of collaborating with the KGB.

Stalin viewed émigrés as military opponents. He baited them, in order to sap their strength, leaving them anemic and weak, unable to fight in any future wars.

Stalin's methods are still in use today by the Russian Intelligence Service. One of its more recent victims was a retired Colonel of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Alexander Zaporozhskiy in 2003, who had relocated to the USA not long before. This is how it was done:

His old friends invited him to Moscow to a *chekist* holiday. When he landed at the Sheremetevo Airport outside of Moscow, he was arrested and sent to prison for 18 years. He was accused of betraying Robert Hanson, a KGB agent and deputy Director of the Soviet Section of the Intelligence Department of the FBI, to the Americans.

I do not believe this to be true, because had that been the case Zaporozhskiy would not have risked going to Moscow. Most probably his arrest served as a *galochka*, meaning that an item has been checked off as a completed task, to close the case and satisfy the superiors. This is often done in Russian law enforcement ministries. In Russia, after all, there is still no independent court system, although people in the West assume there is one.

The *chekists'* work in the émigré community was characterized by discourtesy and crudeness, as though they were recruiting from the prison population in the Russian prison system. Apparently, in their hearts, the *chekists* are positive that the émigrés will forgive them any transgressions out of some patriotic feelings.

Recently I acquired some correspondence between some old emigrants, regarding *N*, a Soviet agent in their midst who had ingratiated himself into their community. To this day, it is dangerous to name him because he is still one of the pillars of the Russian émigré community, even though he himself appeared in the West under very strange circumstances.

THE STORY OF *N*

In 1941, at the beginning of the Second World War, NTS (an anti-Soviet Russian émigré organization, "Nationalist Toil Union of the New Generation"), transported one of its agents (with the aid of German Intelligence Services) over the front line to somewhere in the vicinity of Pskov, Russia. As frequently happens, this agent disappeared because the NKVD knew of the plan in advance.

Through the German security net, however, an unknown young man who called himself *N* successfully came over in his place. His story was that the NTS agent was taken away by the *chekists*, but prior to his arrest had managed to recruit *N*, instructing him to go directly to the Germans.

Despite such suspicious circumstances, and a totally unconvincing cover story, *N* immediately found work in the Gestapo (the Nazi-German "Secret State Police). His job was not as a free-lance

informant, but as an experienced officer, who immediately received the rank of colonel. Russians were only accepted with great caution during that period. The Germans even refused the former White officers; and yet for an unknown young deserter from the USSR with a cloudy biography, they made an exception. This can only be explained as the work of the Soviet Intelligence Agency in collaboration with the German underground Communists. This type of invisible support has followed *N* constantly.

Once he became an officer of the Gestapo, *N* began to persecute White émigrés fighting on the German side. One of them managed to survive a concentration camp and return to France, where he told his acquaintances about *N*, whom everyone seemed to know. However, *N*'s position within the émigré community did not suffer from this revelation.

In the meantime *N* was busy with other activities. After the war, he frequented the Italian camps of former Soviet prisoners of war. Many of them were intending to stay in the West because their camps were located in the English occupied zone of Germany. *N* managed to convince a detachment of some 500 POWs from the mountainous regions of the northern Caucasus to stop passing themselves off as Turks and to admit their Soviet citizenship. *N* promised them that the English would enlist them into an anti-communist regiment. But instead, they were turned over to the *chekists*. It was later reported that approximately 500 men from the northern Caucasus committed "mass suicide".

Moving to postwar Paris, *N* began working with the French political police. He would inform on the most fervent anti-Soviets among the White emigrants, making them out to be agents of Moscow. It was common knowledge that *N* was being aided by the French Communist Party, whose cells were legally active within the French police force. Yet he was allowed to continue his activities without interference.

Finally one of the Russian Parisian women recognized *N* as an officer from the NKVD with whom she had been acquainted in prewar Riga, Latvia. She openly confronted him. *N* made a joke about it. "Yes, I served there and I even executed people! What's so strange about that?" Even the brashness of this revelation failed to sully his reputation.

In exasperation, a group of Russian émigrés demanded that the NTS investigate him. But they were met with a decisive refusal.

The NTS had been a very active White immigrant organization in the early years, but was later infiltrated by KGB agents. It was no surprise, therefore, that they refused to investigate *N*.

Moscow helped *N* with his cover by publishing articles about him, accusing him of being a traitor and a fascist lackey. Today they openly adore *N*. It is superfluous to say that *N* is an ardent supporter of Putin. Unfortunately, there are too many like *N* in the émigré community.

RUSSIAN OPERATIONS THROUGH THE RUSSIAN CHURCH

The Russian Intelligence Service, just as self-confidently and ruthlessly, without even pretending otherwise, is moving toward appropriating the Russian Church Abroad. It is allowed to do this with perfect impunity. Many of the old émigrés, in private conversations, have condemned the absorption of ROCOR by Putin's government, but in public discourse they support it. "How can I go against Russia?" they shrug.

After World War II, the Soviet Intelligence managed to castrate the most militant of White guard organizations, transforming them from ardent anti-Soviet to pro-Soviet, as happened with the NTS. Veterans of surviving anti-Soviet organizations have told me that the KGB has frequently tried to infiltrate them as well. The agents would impersonate individuals from White émigré families, but their Soviet accent always seemed to give them away.

Just the same, they would rudely push their way into the White émigré organizations and instigate quarrels among the members until the anti-Soviet spirit would all but evaporate. Some of the time the infiltrators would be successful, since the young generation of emigrants was weak in recognizing undercover work. They had never had any experience with Soviets in the past. Moreover, their parents had taught them to help every Russian immigrant, and not to interrogate him. To try to fish out a new arrival's past was considered improper in Russian émigré society. Nonetheless, some KGB agents were discovered, and labeled "imposters".

These imposters were indeed sent over by the 4th Section of the "K" Directorate: Counter-Intelligence within Intelligence. This section neutralized the enemies of the KGB, recruiting foreign spies and seeking out traitors in their own midst. The 4th Section worked on the hostile Russian émigrés and their organizations.

In 1978, the head of Soviet Intelligence, Vladimir Kriuchkov, suggested creating the 19th Section for work on the Russian emigrants. This department would no longer be within Directorate "K" but would operate within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. It was now supposed to recruit friends of the Soviet Union.

General Oleg Kalugin, who headed Directorate "K", was surprised. "Why is a new department necessary, when we've already been involved in the émigré community since 1917?" he wanted to know.

"For expanding the number of our supporters and creating a 'Russian lobby' in the West!" countered Kriuchkov. He got his way.

Not long before that, Kriuchkov had visited San Francisco, where he was warmly welcomed by the Russian emigrants. Then he returned to Russia where he thanked them for their hospitality by creating a special KGB department just for them.

"Why would the KGB want to recruit us, if we are already friends of Russia?" émigrés frequently ask.

"Because the 19th Section is crying for you!" I answer.

Today the 19th Section has evolved into an enormous Directorate. Putin has announced that the activities related to the Russian emigrants is a priority for Russian Intelligence. It is called "Directorate M (for emigrant)".

With the crash of the Soviet ideology, its recruitment base abroad narrowed sharply. Today's Service of Foreign Intelligence can no longer attract agents based on their ideological support of the USSR or staunch Communism. This used to be called "recruitment on the ideological-political basis." The FSB is not able to offer a Westerner an ideology for which he would be willing to risk his life, since money is not a motivator for everyone.

Although the *chekists* even now remain Communists in their hearts, they cannot risk asking a Western intellectual liberal to fight for Lenin's ideal. Since the Westerner truly believes that Russia has finished with Communism, he would be confused by the double-talk. Therefore, the chekists lay out recruitment material a bit differently. They say: "Let's fight together against America's hegemony in the world!" Many would agree to that.

Putin's Intelligence Service is placing bets on two contingents: on America's enemies, and on Russian patriots. It approaches foreigners with a "request" to spy for Moscow out of love for Russia, as a government, not for the Land of the Soviets, as it did in the

past. Who in the West could possibly experience feelings of filial love toward Russia if not Russian émigrés.

Ironically, their sheer numbers have created a headache for Putin. There are several million of them, and their numbers keep growing. It is an entire Russian country that is not under Kremlin control. What if these Russian emigrants start criticizing their historical homeland, especially since there are more and more reasons for doing so?

This Russian nation outside of Russia (and outside the Kremlin's control) is being nurtured in great measure by ROCOR, which could condemn the lies and untruths coming from Russia, and once again raise the voice of Christian conscience, as it did in the Soviet times. But the Church today is divided, and her voices do not sing in unison. So on May 17, 2007, a considerable part of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad merged with the Moscow Patriarchate, while the remaining part retained its independence.

ROCOR has preserved an amazing atmosphere of old Tsarist Russia, and of the White Movement. I remember how, the first time I entered a ROCOR church, I was struck by the sense of history that surrounded me. It was as though I had returned to my past, although it was a past I had never known. Suddenly I remembered the grandmothers' stories of the amazing pre-revolutionary Russian life. I had longed since childhood to immerse myself into this Christmas fairy tale. And now, my dream had come true. I sensed the fragrance of days long gone by.

In Russia this atmosphere has not survived. It disappeared together with the émigrés. That is why it is so important for Putin to dishonor ROCOR by attaching it to his governmental machine, just like the Moscow Patriarchate.

That is what Directorate "M" is all about. Among its activities, it holds congresses for the foreign compatriots. Putin gladly speaks at these congresses, as a sort of patron of all Russians, not only for his own citizens, but also for those Russians outside of Russia, who are citizens of Western countries. Having conquered the Russian Federation, Putin is now tackling Tsarist Russia, which he has discovered has not disappeared, but has spread to all of the most desirable countries of the globe. He wants to be hailed as their co-ruler. He is using the transformed ROCOR, which will now be receiving its instructions from Moscow, and his pet Russian émigrés, well-trained and conditioned by the FSB.

2. HOW TO RECOGNIZE AN AGENT

The Russian émigré community has been flooded with KGB agents since the time of the Russian civil war. After the breakup of the USSR in 1991 the number of agents has not decreased as one would expect, but has actually increased.

A great number of Soviet scientists have relocated to the West, among whom the number of KGB agents was always especially high. Alas, that is how Russia's sciences institutions were structured — if you do not get recruited to the official "party line", you'll never escape overseas nor will you become head of the laboratory. Only loner-geniuses were permitted to be beyond this. But they were under constant surveillance by their own colleagues.

The humanities more frequently had agents from the ideological Fifth Directorate, who fished out dissidents in their midst. Leaving for foreign business trips, they fell under the control of the political intelligence. Prominent scholars of the natural sciences were used in industrial espionage, the area in which Directorate "T" was involved. It was the first chief directorate of the KGB. Most of its departments were directed toward work overseas, but the 3rd and 7th sections were engaged in scientific-technological intelligence right at home, in Soviet Russia.

Officers of the 3rd section recruited Moscow scientists. It was they who, disguised as clerks of the Foreign Section of the Academy of Sciences, held the power to file the necessary paperwork for the Soviet scientists, giving them, or withholding from them, access to the longed-for business trips abroad. There was only one condition for going — recruitment. I remember how I could not hold back my laughter, seeing the list of the members of the Soviet delegation of scientists put together for the leadership of Directorate "T". It was a list of the agency's code-names. Even famous academicians were agents of the KGB.

The 7th Section of Directorate "T" recruited scientists in provincial institutes. It had branches in all KGB offices of the republics of the Soviet Union. There was no getting away from it.

The mass collaboration with the KGB was not only the fault of the Soviet scientists, but it was a great personal tragedy. They were embarrassed by it, and tried desperately to conceal it. They also hid their coöperation with the KGB from the United States government, where many emigrated in the 1990s. They thought

that their collaboration remained in their Soviet past, with which they were finished forever. But this past has come back to life and returned to Russia. And now many of these scientists are petrified of picking up their phones, half expecting to hear the eerily familiar voice: "Greetings from Ivan Petrovich!" That is the code phrase with which the KGB picks up the thread with an inactive agent. The name of one of the supervisors, with whom he had been coöperating, would be mentioned. That is all that would be necessary.

Many Soviet Intelligence officers have settled in the West under the guise of businessmen. The seed money came from the "gold of the Party", about which, not so long ago, Russian journalists had been squawking, and then suddenly stopped. These agents make money for their bosses in Moscow, they protect the Russian mafia, but they also do not abandon their most important duties.

Many real entrepreneurs have moved to the West, because in Russia, an honest business is choked by taxes. But the Russian government "tickles" them even in the West. That is where the Foreign Intelligence Service comes in.

The method used for recruiting an entrepreneur is direct. The businessman is accosted in the street with the suggestion that he become a spy. He, of course, declines. Then the agent says to him, with a sly smile:

"Well then, we will put out a search for you on Interpol. We'll lie to them about your being a member of the Russian mafia. We'll see what happens to your business then!"

The unfortunate businessman gives in. He already knows how pitilessly his colleagues are treated in Russia, and that Putin does, indeed, use Interpol in his fight with his political enemies.

Today it is fashionable for Russian embassies to hold holiday receptions on special occasions, such as for *Maslenitsa* (the festive week prior to the Great Lent), with the traditional *blini* (pancakes) served with caviar and vodka.

It is not difficult to guess that the FSB is also behind these receptions. These receptions fall under the category "Operation ROCOR". A priest-agent can easily be led into a room, protected from microphones, and handed a pack of money which is not taxable. There also, the agents get to meet émigrés worthy of their attention. They invite them to restaurants.

"Where did you meet this Russian diplomat?" colleagues will ask him at work.

"At the Embassy, at a church reception!" they would proudly tell him.

It sounds so reputable that you cannot be suspicious. Had the KGB agent phoned the émigré at home and asked to meet him in a restaurant, *that* would look like espionage.

How could it be that all of these nice young men, who had smiled so sincerely at you at the Embassy reception, and who are now offering you their friendship, are officers of the Intelligence Service? Indeed, it is true, for a true diplomat has no need of you. What if you are collaborating with the local counter-intelligence, and contacting you may damage his career?

A staff diplomat has to watch for unnecessary acquaintances. His job is to shuffle the papers in his office from nine until six, and then to run home to his TV. He could attend a diplomatic reception in the evening, but then he would have to be careful to adhere strictly to protocol so as not to be taken for a spy. For a real diplomat, the worst fate possible is to be mistaken for a spy. Because if an agent has made a transgression, the KGB will come to his rescue; but they would not rescue a non-agent diplomat.

Real diplomats also work with Russian émigrés, however, only generally and as a group, in meetings and work groups, without ever getting personal. Only agents try to get close by forming personal relationships. If he invites you to a restaurant during non-work hours, and spends his weekends entertaining you, you can be sure that this is a military person, whose work hours are not normal. Now you are in the process of being recruited. You need to break off this relationship immediately. But how?

Putin's Intelligence Service is operating openly and brazenly. It is no longer afraid of the West because all Western leaders want to be Putin's friends. No wonder he is trying to get entrance without visas to Europe for "certain categories" of Russian citizens. It is impossible to stir up a controversy over anything. No one is even interested in the topic of Russian espionage. Russia, they think, is an ally of the West in the battle against terrorism. Using this battle as a pretext, Putin has activated his Intelligence against the West.

Can you get rid of this new spy-friend's unwelcome advances? Can he be told something like this: "I have come to understand

that you are some sort of.... But I do not know any State secrets, and you are wasting your time on me. Let's forget about ever having met." You may feel better, but it won't work.

You may be guided by the most honorable of patriotic emotions, trying to avoid a scandal so as not to damage the reputation of Russia. But with this phrase, if you utter it, you signal your willingness to cooperate. You have announced your readiness to conceal your contact with an agent of the Russian government. That is the most important demand that the agent will make on you.

A reference to you will be sent to Moscow immediately: "The object of recruitment, "Emigrant" on his own initiative proclaimed his readiness to keep his relationship with our agent secret." And your recruitment will take off at an accelerated pace.

Many Russian emigrants say: "Why would the Russian Intelligence Service want me? I have a peaceful profession!"

You are needed only because you are American, Canadian, Italian, English, or French.

Recruitment of citizens of leading Western countries is considered a great success. It brings a promotion in rank or a medal.

Moreover, it is much easier to recruit citizens of Russian ancestry than native citizens. This is because the Russians cry noble tears at just the sound of the magical phrase: "Help Russia!" You can be sure, however, that the help is not for Russia, but for the career of the KGB/FSB agent.

The reason for your recruitment can be presented on paper in any manner you wish: an agent of influence for the dissemination of rumors within the émigré community, or a "long-term" agent. In other words, the scope of your service is still unfocused. However, a reward for having recruited you may already have been received.

No one truly controls the Intelligence Agency. There is absolutely no mention of any civilian controls. The CC of CPSU, which used to audit the agency's work in Soviet times, no longer exists. But even a "fictitious" recruitment could be dangerous for you because any deserter from the KGB can hand over your file to the West. Then the local counter-intelligence will go after you.

At any rate, even this type of recruitment is not without its use for Russia. It makes you a cog in the government machine. You will not be so quick to criticize Putin then.

Many emigrants are convinced that Russia considers them native Russians because they are Russians by blood. And it seems that life itself bears this out. When they visit their historic homeland, they are welcomed warmly, and praised for their Russianness.

But this happens only because they are Americans or English or French or some such nationality. One can extract hard currency from them, or use them for propaganda purposes, or for recruitment. Russians from poor countries, such as Tajikistan, however, are treated by the government quite differently. I witnessed once a *militia* (police) officer at a passport window say the following: "And where did you ever get the idea that you are Russian? You are Tajik because it is where you were born. Go on back to your Tajikistan!" The person only saved himself from being deported by giving a bribe.

The Russian government uses its foreign compatriots to further its own political interests. It is quite understandable. If the government does not concern itself with citizens of its own country, why would it be concerned about its emigrants? Each year Russia loses approximately one million people; yet the government accepts this with Olympian calm. Apparently it has other, more pressing, matters.

Moscow is now in the process of bringing its White Russian military relics back from the West. A queue of coffins of White émigré activists have already been returned to Russia for burial, as though bringing their post-death penance to the KGB Generals who are ruling today's Russia. Putin is bringing our past to heel by neutralizing it, repainting it red.

Notwithstanding Western disbelief, Russia still supports the Bolsheviks, and has still not bestowed equality between the Whites and the Reds. The honorary title of "Participant of the Civil War," which carries certain privileges, still is only bestowed upon those who fought on the side of the Communists.

In the fall of 2005, the remains of two prominent emigrants, White General Anton Denikin, a central figure in the White Guard resistance to the Communist Revolution in Russia in 1917-1920, and Ivan Ilyin, the leading philosopher of the Russian White movement, were returned from the United States and

Switzerland, and reburied in Moscow's Donskoy Monastery. They are no longer dangerous to the Bolsheviks. They can no longer fight the Red army with either weapons or words, but now lie in peace under her honorary guard.

Putin simultaneously returned the red star to the cockade of the Russian military caps, and removed the two-headed eagle from it. The message is quite clear. There never was a White Russia. It has always been Red.

A new generation of repatriated emigrants will graduate from Putin's simplified schools. They will have learned that it is impossible to be Russian and to stand up against the Russian government, which will even come get you after you've been dead and buried for many years, and bring you back to Mother Russia.

We who wish to remain Russian without the control of the *chekists* do not have time to wait until they return the government to us. We will establish our Russia Abroad ourselves, since in our Homeland an Ice Age has again taken hold. Our new Russia Abroad will be a free Russia, without bosses with unclean hands, without frightened and sold-out judges, without brazenness of officials and bad manners. It will be what Russia should have, but did not, become.

It hardly matters, then, who heads the empire, whether it is the pious, God's Anointed One, or a gang of nihilists who denounce all moral norms. This idea was expressed most poignantly in Vasilii V. Shulgin's book, 1920; he wrote that "The Reds only think that they fought for the glory of the International.... In reality, even though unconsciously, they only spill blood in order to resurrect 'The God-protected Russian Empire.'" ¹²

V. V. Shulgin was writing during the same year that the Bolsheviks barbarically murdered massive numbers of priests. Their tactics included using snipers to pick off the priests as they carried crosses during religious processions. These acts of savagery were never hidden; on the contrary, they were widely publicized. Shulgin simply chose to ignore it.



ARCHBISHOP MARK OF BERLIN & GERMANY

Chapter 2

OPERATION ROCOR

TWO SECRETS OF ARCHBISHOP MARK

ROCOR's Archbishop of Germany and Great Britain has been the key figure in unifying ROCOR with the Moscow Patriarchate. Who can explain why a non-Russian could achieve such a high position in the Russian Church Abroad? Who ordered him to do it? Or was it just his "voluntary social obligation" as they used to say in Soviet times?

There is no answer, just as there are no answers to some of the significant gaps in his biography. How did he wind up in the West? And why did the KGB release him after he was arrested in 1979? Archbishop Mark's biography reminds me of the biography of Soviet Patriarch Pimen,¹³ which also had some interesting episodes erased from it.

THE KGB NEVER RELEASED PEOPLE LIKE HIM

In 1979, Mark Arndt was arrested for smuggling anti-Soviet literature into the USSR. No one knows the date, nor how long they kept him in the KGB. Was it a day, or was it longer? There seems to be no record at all.

At the time Arndt, later to become Archbishop Mark, was an activist in the NTS. Some Russian emigrants now say: "What if the KGB just frightened Archbishop Mark and then let him go in peace?" As a retired lieutenant colonel of the KGB, I assure you that this could not have occurred. Smuggling anti-Soviet literature into the Soviet Union fell under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of Soviet Russia as "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." It was considered an especially dangerous crime against the State and promised a lengthy prison term.

Had the KGB released Mark, what would the agent have reported back to his superior? Surely he could not have told his boss that he had allowed Mark to walk free. What would he have reported as the "concrete result of his work", which is so highly valued by the KGB? A release for an Article 70 crime? That would not have been an acceptable result.

No one would have allowed Mark just to be released. Any foreigner who somehow got into the KGB's hands was considered

a fattened-up delicacy. There was so much you could do with a foreigner: he could be exchanged for an imprisoned Soviet spy, or he could be used for Communist propaganda purposes. Either way, the KGB agent's career soars.

Mark's arrest would have been considered a lucky break for the arresting agents, and smelled of decorations or promotions. If they had released the foreigner, there would have been no rewards, no decorations. The KGB, after all, is a military institution. Each step must be coordinated with ten superiors.

The KGB officers would have released Mark only with the promise of even bigger rewards. Recruiting a foreigner is considered the highest achievement of an agent's career. After that, his career takes off.

In the KGB school in Minsk, they teach how to recruit foreigners captured by the KGB. It is considered very easy to recruit a naïve Westerner. For this, they use the "good" and the "bad" investigator scenario.

The "bad" investigator says: "You've read, no doubt, Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*? Well, now you're trapped! Our prison camps have not changed at all since then, you know. We'll put you there for some seven years. We'll instruct our moles among the prisoners to rape you every day. You will not last two months!"

Here the "good" investigator steps in.

"Oh, do not be so cruel to our friend! He'll work with us, won't you?" He then turns to the foreigner and pushes a sheet of paper at him.

The frightened foreigner, who never in his life encountered such behavior, is frightened out of his wits. He nods his head eagerly.

The voice of the "good" investigator has suddenly turned threatening: "Write what I tell you. I promise to work with the KGB."

If the foreigner still refuses to sign, the procedure could continue for a long time.

They certainly worked Mark over. He even had to spend the night in the KGB. But where — on the bare boards of Lefortovo Prison? Or on the soft sheets of some secret apartment owned by the KGB and used exclusively for secret meetings with foreign agents?

In 1979, I was already a senior lieutenant of the KGB, and I remember perfectly well the watchfulness and concern in the KGB over any anti-Soviet literature crossing into the USSR.

To counter the proliferation of anti-Soviet literature involved not only the counter-intelligence service, which would catch people like Mark, but it also involved the use of intelligence agents working overseas.

Intelligence would recruit sales clerks in Russian book stores in the West. They were forced to inform which Soviet citizens purchased books forbidden in the Soviet Union.

All representatives of the Soviet State-run *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga* ("International Books") at the trade shows were officers of the political intelligence of the KGB. It was they who recruited the booksellers of Russian literature. They were very direct about it:

"If you inform on your Soviet customers, we will sign a contract which will be most profitable for you, and it will be a loss for 'International Books'. But our Soviet State is rich. It can afford it."

Then the Western businessman, often of Russian extraction, would be most grateful, and the KGB agent would suddenly switch to a threatening tone: "Sign right here" as he would produce a note obligating his cooperation with the KGB.

After this, until his dying day the trusting bookseller would live in fear of arrest by the counter-intelligence of his own country.

To further underscore the atmosphere during those years that supported the behavior of the KGB, I phoned Sergey Grigoriants, a famous human rights activist in Moscow who spent nine years in labor camps, accused under that same Article 70, relating to "Anti-Soviet propaganda".

Why is it, I asked him, that the KGB did not release him, as they did Archbishop Mark? The question unleashed a story:

Toward the end of the 1980s, on the wave of Gorbachev's *perestroika*, Sergey Grigoriants managed to form a human rights defense foundation called *Glasnost* ("Publicity"). Its goal was to discredit the KGB. *Glasnost* organized international congresses called "KGB Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow", which exposed KGB activities and gave the FSB many a sleepless night. However, because of the emerging democracy that characterized those days, they were powerless to do anything. In spite of this, however, the FSB made its statement. It was during this brief period of

democracy that Sergey Grigoriants' son was killed. The KGB descendants frequently hinted to Sergey Grigoriants that they were responsible for his death.

Once Putin came to power, the FSB understood immediately that their hands were finally untied. At the end of 2003, in an atmosphere of open provocation, *Glasnost* could no longer do its work, and only managed to hold a final conference, "The Role of Security Services in the Governance of Russia." After this, their activities ceased.

Sergey Grigoriants recalled, "If in the 1970s anti-Soviet literature was found in someone's luggage upon entry into the USSR, this person would have immediately been accused of anti-Soviet propaganda. The investigation of such matters was within the scope of the KGB.

"If the KGB were forced to release a foreigner due to political necessity, it was done in the form of a scandal. The foreigner would be expelled from the USSR and forever banned from getting an entry visa. The fact that the KGB treated Archbishop Mark so 'humanely' speaks of some possible mutually beneficial agreement between them." Today, the FSB hates Sergey Grigoriants with an intense personal hatred.

Not long ago I received the newspaper *Nasha Strana* ("Our Land"), issue #2741, which published my article "A Marriage of Inequality." In this same issue, I read an article "The Role of Solidarists in the Capitulation" by Nikolai Kasanzew. The following lines shocked me, as a former KGB agent, to the core:

"The NKVD (forerunner agency of the KGB) places their agents into the NTS using different methods. One was the recruitment of those who visited the USSR and were arrested there.

"This draws attention to one important, unpublicized detail in the biography of Archbishop Mark of Berlin, who is now fanatical in his obsession to subjugate ROCOR to the Moscow Patriarchate, which is headed by KGB agents.

"In his youth, Mark Arndt, the future Archbishop, was an activist in the "Solidaritsy" (not to be confused with the Polish freedom fighters) movement, and while still a layperson, he traveled to the USSR with NTS literature. He and his colleagues were arrested, but his companions were released after only a couple of hours of interrogation, while Mark was held much longer.

"If members of the Synod under Metropolitan Philaret had known about this most suspicious episode, Mark would have never become a bishop in the Church Abroad."

What does all this mean? It means that the future Archbishop Mark concealed from his Church leadership the fact of his arrest by Soviet Counter-Intelligence, despite the importance of it!

This is so strange! A person is released from the torture chambers of the KGB. There are no accusations, no claims against him; he is cleared! But instead of screaming to the world about his illegal arrest, he keeps silent, thereby playing into the hands of his tormentors and confirming one's suspicion that an amicable agreement had been reached with the KGB. It would seem to be a clear sign of Mark having been recruited.

"But where's the proof?" someone could ask.

It is possible that there are two forms of evidence that could prove the complicity. The first is that Mark undoubtedly signed the obligatory note to collaborate with the KGB. The second piece of evidence could possibly be obtained from counter-intelligence of another country.

RECRUITING A FOREIGN AGENT

Even if someone were to succeed in obtaining Mark's personal KGB file, it still would not prove anything because you would never find any real names in it, only code names. You would see something like this:

"Today Ivanov met with 'Petrov'."¹⁴ In quotation marks is the code name of an agent. The name without quotation marks is the KGB Intelligence officer, but both are in code, making it difficult to figure out who's who.

Only the names of the superiors obtaining the statements are real. That is why Russian Intelligence never allows foreign scholars access to the files, even of unmasked and well-known agents.

As far as the obligatory signed cooperation-with-the-KGB-note goes, the recruited foreigner can refuse to give it. This sometimes happens, too. Then in his report, the recruitment, the officer would include a phrase such as this: "A signed note was not demanded of the recruit for operational reasons."

The bosses, however, do not like that. In the KGB no one trusts anyone else. What if there had not been any recruitment? What if

the officer is just placing extra cash into his own pocket each month? There are millions of such cases. There is even a term for it — “dead souls”. A signed receipt calms the bosses.

Theoretically, Mark's obligatory note (if in fact it exists) would be kept in the Archives of the 15th Department of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, on the first floor of an enormous building in Yasenevo, a Moscow suburb, where the windows open onto a green meadow, overgrown with wild flowers in the summer. But you cannot jump out onto it — the iron bars will not allow it.

You could, of course, secretly copy the note. It is in an envelope attached to the first volume of the agent's personal file. I wanted to do this many times, as I sat reading personal files of other agents, but I was afraid of the surveillance cameras mounted in the ceiling.

President Putin has definitely seen this note. They would have brought it to his office — not in the Kremlin, but to his office in Yasenevo. His office is on the second floor of the main building behind the inconspicuous door, to which a red and green carpet runner leads. That used to be Andropov's office.

I saw Andropov there once in 1980. At that time, Putin was probably studying at the KGB school and thus was not even authorized to enter this building. Inscrutable are the paths of the Lord....

A foreign counter-intelligence agent can point out which of their citizens is secretly cooperating with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. But they would only do that if the individual broke a law — if, for example, he were stealing secret documents.

But not all agents break the law. There are different categories of agents!

The most important of them are the informers. Risking their lives, they steal State secrets of their home countries and hand them over to Russia. Why would they do that? The reasons differ in each case.

There is another type of agent. They are called “mailbox owners”. Their duties are much simpler — just to receive a letter or message and to deliver it according to instructions.

Some agents are scornfully referred to as “auxiliary”. They are recruited for a one-time action, from making a phone call to murdering someone.

There are also agents of influence. Their role is to interfere or impact policies within their own country, for the benefit of Russia. They do not, as a rule, violate any laws.

If Archbishop Mark is truly a KGB agent, he would belong to this last category of agents. Does his activity correspond to the goals of Putin's administration? Undoubtedly, yes. His frenzied insistence on subjugating ROCOR to Moscow fits right in with Putin's goal of putting the Russian émigré community under the control of FSB.

Does Archbishop Mark's activity meet his personal goals? It has been reported in newspapers that Archbishop Mark anticipates becoming the head of the German Metropolia (Diocese) of the Moscow Patriarchate once the union takes place.

But I'm afraid that this will never happen, because Archbishop Mark, despite his sharp intellect, does not know the basic rules of the KGB. The KGB, once the mission is accomplished, gets rid of the agents involved. They know too much, which makes them dangerous. They no longer depend on Russian Intelligence Service. On the contrary, the Russian Service now fears *them*, dreading the day when a former agent will reveal damaging information.

Remember the fate of the British spy, Kim Philby? In the 1930s, in his youth, he was recruited by the Soviet Intelligence. He believed in the Communist ideology although he had never been to the Soviet Union. Thirty years later, after he was uncovered, he arrived in the Soviet Union for the first time. The depressing reality of the 1960s Khrushchev era Russia so struck him that he realized that the KGB had deceived and manipulated him his whole life. He began to drink, and died in obscurity.

The tragedy of Glenn Souther, a former American Navy photography specialist, is also very telling. In 1988 he defected to Moscow, having worked for the KGB for rather a short time. But as he immersed himself into Soviet life, he became an ardent opponent of Communism. Being accustomed to America's freedom of speech, he implanted his dangerous views on the young agents in the Krasnoznamenny (the “Red-Bannered”) Institute of the KGB, where he taught English.

The KGB leadership became concerned enough about his views to transfer him to the school for senior officers, where students were considered more ideologically mature.

But Glenn Souther did not quiet down there either. Then one day, it was reported that he had committed suicide, dying of carbon monoxide poisoning from the exhaust of his own car. The question still remains whether this 'suicide' was in fact something far more sinister.

The KGB reported that they had found a note next to his body. It said: "Please bury me in the uniform of a KGB Major". His request was granted with great pomp and circumstance. The questions remains, why would a man who was such an outspoken opponent of Communism wish to be buried as an officer of the Soviet Army? It is likely that the KGB took the opportunity to make a political statement of his death.

The Russian Intelligence has enormous experience in dealing with the intricacies of the ingratitude and fickleness of human nature. Yes, today Archbishop Mark is satisfied with everything, but what about tomorrow? What if he gets miffed at Moscow and gives an interview which could make Berlin's senior resident at the Intelligence station's skin crawl?

Such an event has already taken place in the highly filtered Moscow Patriarchate! Toward the end of the 1980s, during the height of the Gorbachev "perestroika", Metropolitan Chrysostom publicly declared that he was an agent of the KGB. He was a Soviet person, who had graduated from the difficult school of survival in a totalitarian State, and would have understood the risk involved in divulging such a thing publicly. What can then be expected from Archbishop Mark, who is accustomed to the West's freedom of speech?

And so, why create problems for the future? Would not it be easier to appoint another archbishop as the Metropolitan of Berlin and Germany? His name is Theofan and he has already been assigned by the Moscow Patriarchate. It cannot be ignored that the MP has created this parallel position in Germany. In order to always have a replacement for Mark, a trusted double, just like astronauts have?

Further, Russian metropolitans do not need a new rival, especially one who is a foreigner. They could start complaining: "What, a Russian could not be found?" In today's atmosphere of nationalism and xenophobia which has enveloped Russia, such protests would be supported by both the authorities and the flock.

Once Archbishop Mark is retired, he can give all the interviews he wants. No one will listen to him. They'll just call it sour grapes.

In the biography of this archbishop, there is another secret, more shocking than the first one. No one knows how Mark managed to escape East Germany and come to the West.

In his article, "The Role of Solidarists in the Capitulation,"¹⁵ Nikolai Kazanzev wrote this about Mark: "...he was raised in Communist Germany, voluntarily joined its army, where he became an officer. Interesting, which armies did he serve in?"

We can forgive the émigré author his inadequate knowledge of the intricacies of military service in the former Communist countries, where no one could become an officer after having served as a soldier in the army. To be an officer, you had to graduate from a military academy or a civilian university which has a military school¹⁶

In East Germany, military service used to be universal and compulsory. Willingly or not, every man was obligated, after completing his studies, to go off for a time into the army barracks. Therefore Mark's voluntary service was of no legal consequence.

No one knows how Mark managed to move to the West. They say that he came over to Western Germany in 1963. He could not have done so legally at that time, especially if he had been an army officer. If Mark had defected, he would have been considered a traitor. And then as a traitor he would never have risked going to the USSR because of the fear of an immediate arrest.

But he risked it. And he was arrested, but for a different reason. Then he was released. Believe me, an old KGB agent, when I say that all of this is extremely strange. It is unnatural. It just never happened that way.

I appealed to the retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin for an explanation. He confirmed my belief that Archbishop Mark could not have legally left East Germany in those years, other than with the assistance of the security services. Young people from Socialist countries were not released to the West under any circumstances — especially not army officers. The only way an East German officer could go to the West was as a spy.

Now things fall into place. Mark's strange promotion to officer without having gone to military school can be easily explained by his graduating from an intelligence school, where they also gave the rank of lieutenant. Probably his years of

soldier's service were also, in fact, spent there. In that case, even Mark's arrest in 1979 in the USSR has a different explanation. There are two possibilities:

1) The arrest of Mark was the result of typical Soviet bungling, of which there was plenty, even within the KGB. When Mark declared his membership in the East German Intelligence (or "friends" as they used to say in the KGB), his name was investigated according to their records. This rushed verification process is what took a couple of days – since back in 1979, records were not computerized, and papers needed to be handled physically. Having gotten to the bottom of this, the KGB quietly released Mark and agreed to forget about this episode.

2) Mark was arrested demonstratively, in order to show that the Soviet government does not like people like him. This was a normal practice in relations with fictitious religious dissidents. Some of them deliberately asked the KGB to imprison them in order to gain a martyr's crown for cover.

If we assume that Archbishop Mark is a veteran of the East German Intelligence Service, the *Stazi*, then immediately the question of his present citizenship arises. He lives in the Federal Republic of Germany, but every spy should have a home country.

As far as I know, a lot of officers of the Intelligence of East Germany were secretly granted Soviet citizenship in the latter part of the 1980s when Socialism fell in their country. What if Archbishop Mark is a citizen of the Russian Federation? That would change his situation greatly now, would it not?

Chapter 3

THE ESPIONAGE CHURCH

1. THE CONFESSIONS OF ALEKSEY II

During the Soviet Period, the Moscow Patriarchate (MP) bishops were all KGB agents, and the highest of them were also members of the Communist Party. They say that the first Communist within the church was Patriarch Pimen. He was a senior officer of the Red Army, and joined the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) at the front. Metropolitan Chrysostom was the only one who openly acknowledged his collaboration with the KGB.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the bishops remained silent about their KGB affiliations because of their fear of new exposure. For instance, if one were to admit having collaborated with the KGB, that could lead to the exposure also of your membership in the Communist Party.

There could not have been any officers who believed in God, nor officers who were not Communist Party members. More than that, they were all forced to fight religion. That means that the future patriarch of the MP renounced his faith.

High-ranking workers of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had let me in on this secret when I was an officer of intelligence. They used to practice a sort of crude joke on the MP hierarchs. Seeing a person in episcopal clothing at a Kremlin party or at a conference for peace fighters, they would clap him on the shoulder and inquire loudly: "Tell us, Father, which pocket of your cassock holds your party membership ID card?" The bishop would smile a bit sheepishly, but he never objected, since everyone at that gathering was of the same background.

But they keep quiet for another reason, as I was recently told by a well-known former general of the KGB, Oleg Kalugin. In 1990, when he became the deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was the first person to begin exposing KGB agents in cassocks.

The MP became greatly disturbed. They were not afraid of individual exposés, but they were petrified that their main secret — that the MP had been intentionally created by Stalin to be a liaison with the KGB — just as other Soviet organizations of the State, would be revealed. No one would ever dream of bringing to light the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has KGB agents working in it. That is understood. But if you were to admit that the same thing is true in the MP, then where is its sanctity?

Soon after my talk with him, General Kalugin was invited to a private luncheon with the Patriarch. Patriarch Aleksey II told Kalugin the following: "Why are you exaggerating what happened? Yes, we collaborated with the KGB, even I did. But it was a struggle for peace, for disarmament! There's nothing wrong with that!"

To say that a KGB informer is fighting for peace, now that is truly unbelievable. No one has ever portrayed it that way before. The KGB did not have any specialties in that vein – no struggle for peace departments. These words are propaganda nonsense! On the contrary, we fought for war! Results of our activity were

military conflicts one after the other – in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola. This led to a bloating of the military-industrial complex, of which Intelligence was a part. The country was unable to sustain the weight of it all, and the USSR collapsed.

Aleksey II let me know in no uncertain terms that he does not consider his collaboration with the KGB something shameful, and has no intention of repenting of it. On the contrary, he is proud of it, just as Putin is proud of his work in the KGB during the Soviet years. The complete absence of repentance lays down a bridge for future cooperation of the MP and the KGB remnants of today. Why would a well-bred nobleman Ridiger (which was Aleksey II's family name) be so dedicated to the Soviet authorities? What has bound them so tightly?

In 1996, my journalistic destiny brought me to a Communist meeting in Novocherkassk. Presidential elections were underway in Russia, and the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Zyuganov, appeared to be a serious contender to Boris Yeltsin. He came for support to this Cossack region, where his predecessors conducted mass executions 90 years ago. The region is now known for its pro-Communist sentiment.

An elderly priest from a local cathedral, Father Vladimir, also spoke at this meeting. He spoke out in favor of Zyuganov, which brought about immense surprise on the part of foreign journalists. But Father Vladimir firmly declared:

"In order for us to study in the seminary, we were recalled from the Front! We are still grateful to the Communist Party for it. Therefore we accepted our studies in the seminary as one would accept an assignment at the Front. That is how we referred to ourselves our whole life — the non-party-ticketed Communists!"

Which department had the authority to recall people from the Front, especially during such critical years of the war, when even the sick and feeble were dragged into the army? It could only have been the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the precursor to the KGB). On whom would it have bestowed this unheard of privilege, which could have saved the person's life? Only on those who had already been proven reliable and trustworthy, the agents.

Stalin created the MP with the hands of the KGB. This department became her mother. The genetic ties with the KGB in the Moscow Patriarchate are just as strong as the ties between ROCOR and the White anti-Communist Movement.

Informing to the KGB within the Moscow Patriarchate should have been a serious obstacle to the unification of the MP with the Church Abroad. Those who side with the unification of the churches try to minimize the collaboration and to make it look like it was just individual cases, not the global phenomenon within the Church that it truly was. They say, for instance, that only some priests became KGB agents within the overall independent life of the Church. Here in the West this story is swallowed easily.

The rector of the Saint John the Baptist Cathedral in Washington, D.C., Archpriest Victor Potapov, says in the August 2004 issue of the magazine, *Prihodskaya Zhizn* ("Parish Life"): "Within the confines of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, hot disputes are occurring regarding the future path of the Church and regarding the reunion with the Moscow Patriarchate. In reference to this, I find myself hearing sharp attacks against individual bishops and certain church activists. Objections sometimes are simplified to this – it is impossible to unite with the church in Russia because some of the priests have been corrupted and collaborated with the KGB and have not repented of their collaboration. It cannot be possible that the sins of individual people would throw a shadow on the sanctity of the Church."

Dear Father Victor! It is not so at all. It is not some individuals who have been corrupted. It is, in fact, some individuals who escaped corruption! Absolutely all bishops and the overwhelming majority of priests collaborated with the KGB.

You have to understand that the Church was considered a hostile environment, and it needed, therefore, to be controlled by agents. Even the mechanism of choosing a bishop was pushed through its agents.

Bishops were part of the nomenclature of the CCPSN (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and therefore each individual had to be approved by its Ideological Department.

Which organization, do you think, would send documentation to the Central Committee for important staff appointments? That is right, it was the NKVD/KGB. The recommendation for the future bishop would have been prepared by the Fifth Department, which had general responsibility over the Church, and

Intelligence, if the candidate had ever been overseas. Each of the recommendations ended with the phrase: "Collaborates since such and such a year."

It was this phrase that was most important for the Central Committee. This phrase testified to the fact that the future bishop was not only loyal to the Soviet authorities, but that he also hangs on a hook: since each agent invariably has compromising materials in his file! This means that this bishop can be trusted not to play any dissident tricks. The astuteness of this observation is evident even today – all the bishops sacredly keep their vow of silence.

The ecclesiastical merits of a candidate for bishop did not interest the Ideological Department. To the contrary, they were hostile to them. The less merit, the better. Once the candidate had been properly reviewed, the Central Committee sanctioned the consecration of a bishop.

However, the consecration was only the beginning. Afterward, it was necessary to be registered as a bishop in the Council on Religious Affairs. This was granted after a confidential interview with its chairman, Kuroyedov, a KGB lieutenant general.

He used to like to come dine in the generals' dining hall at the Lubyanka. Entering, he would show everyone his pass into the Kremlin dining hall and would say: "See, I could have been dining with Brezhnev himself! But I prefer to eat with my guys!"

The generals replied with a responsive roar and each would move his chair back, inviting Kuroyedov to his table. Not infrequently his table partner would wind up being my father, the Deputy Chief of the KGB's Border Patrol. In the evenings he would retell some amazing stories from church life, which at that time were completely confidential. And all the bishops, blessed by Kuroyedov, still hold their posts and are instrumental in attaching the Church Abroad to the MP.

To this day they all remain, as before, a part of the agency network. They would have been excluded from the network for decoding, had they made a public repentance. But there was no such repentance. That means that their files still remain active in the safes of Lubyanka — not in its archives, but in its working files.

The MP hierarchs not only informed against each other in the KGB, but they were also engaged in espionage — first of all, in Russian émigré communities. Even metropolitans had no aversion to espionage.

For instance, Irinei, the metropolitan of Vienna and Austria, in 1969 recruited and handled the American military intelligence officer, Colonel George Trofimov, who is now serving a life sentence for espionage in the United States.¹⁷

For approximately thirty years, the KGB residence in Israel was located inside the Jerusalem Mission of the MP. There were no other Soviet offices in that country after the break of diplomatic relations in the middle 1960s.

On the staff of the Mission, intelligence officers worked as priests and laity, whereas the "real" clergy served as collaborators to assist their KGB bosses.

The Secretary of the Mission and KGB Major Dubov fled to the West in the late 1980s, and the MP did everything it could to avoid publicity. This case has not been covered by the media at all. I was informed of it by Colonel Yuri Rakovsky, the head of Group "A" of Directorate T, the KGB Chief Directorate (intelligence), at a meeting devoted to Dubov's defection.

3. THE CHURCH OF SPECIAL PURPOSE

A priest in epaulets is not such a strange sight in the Moscow Patriarchate. I do not mean that literally, of course. I met one of them on my first day on the job in the KGB's Intelligence Headquarters in Yasenevo in 1977.

I remember how amazed I was by the long corridors, seemingly kilometers long, along which scurried hundreds of men in business suits and ties. Their coat jackets were perfectly buttoned-shut, their hair was parted neatly in the middle. Their overall slicked-back appearance was supposed to attest to their highest level of loyalty. And suddenly an officer with a bushy red beard passed me in the corridor. What a remarkable appearance, so totally out of place for a Communist-*chekist*!

"Do not be alarmed; he has grown a beard at the instruction of his intelligence supervisor!" a friend of mine explained, laughing. He worked in the personnel department. "Right now this high-level employee is gaining experience in the foreign section of the patriarchate, and soon he'll be leaving for an overseas assignment."

My friend did not disclose exactly where the bearded KGB officer was being sent, in keeping with the KGB's conspiratorial

protocol; however, he did tell me a story about a professor he knew in the Krasnoznamenny Institute, (today known as the Academy of Foreign Intelligence), who kept a cassock next to his KGB colonel's dress-jacket hanging in his closet. When Patriarch Pimen traveled overseas, the professor/colonel would don the cassock and join his entourage.

In those years, a young supervisor of foreign counter-intelligence, General Oleg Kalugin, arrived in East Berlin to inspect the KGB residence. On one of those days, Colonel Ivan Nazarovich Gumeniuk came up to him and invited him to stop by at the Russian cathedral that evening.

"I will be serving there," explained Gumeniuk.

He served in church so professionally that the parishioners who came up to get his blessing were convinced that they were kissing the hand of Father John, and not the hand of Colonel Gumeniuk.

"Wow, you really came across great! Just like a real priest," General Kalugin told him enthusiastically the next morning when they met at the residence.

Such "just like the real thing" priests formed the staff of MP churches all over the world; but in the friendly Arab countries they practically made up the entire clergy. The local Muslim counter-intelligence closed their eyes to it, since the priests-*chekists* worked against the West.

These people did not always have a happy life. The Lord sent them many trials and tribulations. The children of some began to have faith in God, which was considered unacceptable in the family of a *chekist*. Others themselves began to believe. Their *chekist*-colleagues would sniff it out immediately, and that would be the end of their careers. In my book, *KGB in Japan*,¹⁸ I wrote in detail about the KGB's pseudo-priests.

Where are these pseudo-priests now? Have they remained among the clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate?

In the West it is customary to assume that these clerics have evaporated into thin air. But why? Is there even one Russian state enterprise which has purged itself of its KGB agents, as had taken place in some other former socialist countries after the fall of Communism? Unfortunately, in Russia this was squashed by the powerful Communist lobby. There definitely were no purges of the KGB within the MP, today's greatest fan of the Soviet past.

I am aware of only one attempt. It took place in the newspaper *Izvestia* ("News") right after the fall of the August putsch in 1991. The then editor-in-chief, Igor Golembiovsky, called all the *chekists* into his office, all those who were working in his newspaper as journalists, and suggested that they either resign from the newspaper or from the KGB. He told them that he was no longer willing to put up with them working in both capacities.¹⁹

Golembiovsky was never forgiven for his independent thinking, and in Putin's Russia he is persecuted. Aleksey II, on the other hand, remains at the peak of his glory. The conclusion one can draw from this, of course, is that no *chekists* were ever expelled from his ranks.

The collaboration of the MP with the KGB, unfortunately, is not a thing of the past, as many prefer to believe in the West. With Putin in power, it has even increased. The reason for this is the new social structure, which Putin has managed to create in Russia: the State of "Special Services". Internal policies and propaganda is under the Federal Security Service, the FSB, whereas the external is under the Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR. All other departments report to them. Participating in today's Russian political life, it is impossible to avoid contact with intelligence and counter-intelligence. The MP gladly utilizes its Soviet experience within them.

THE CHURCH OF SPECIAL PURPOSE IN NORTH KOREA

For instance, Putin's flirtation with the North Korean (NKDR) dictator, Kim Chen Ir, is held in strictest confidence, in order to keep Americans in the dark. The MP, however, is involved, and takes a most active role in it.

In August 2006 an MP church, dedicated to the Holy Trinity, was opened in Pyongyang, although religion is forbidden in North Korea, and belief in God is considered a political crime. But Kim Chen Ir made an exception for his Russian friend. The construction was financed mostly by Russian money, but Kim Chen Ir also kindly carved out about a million dollars from the budget of his poverty-stricken country for the construction of the church. This gave him the privilege of being considered a "founder of this temple".

"For the founder of this temple, let us pray to the Lord!" the Russian deacon will proclaim at each service daily. To make the

North Korean dictator an object of religious worship — this is something previously unattainable even by any Western president! The appearance of a Russian church in the capital of North Korea, the first stone of which had been laid in June of 2003, is a sign of a great personal friendship between Kim Chen Ir and Putin, to spite the Americans.

On this occasion, Kim even established a new government office, "The Orthodox Committee of the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)" although there have not been any Orthodox believers in this country for more than fifty years.

A delegation of this bogus Committee recently went to Moscow. Within the MP, the delegation only visited one office, besides that of the foreign Church. And which might that be? The office on collaboration with the armed forces and law enforcement agencies. What business did this delegation have there? It appears that Kim Jong Il considers the MP a militarized organization, meant for resolving special tasks.

The appearance of the Russian church in Pyongyang creates a channel for secret contacts for both leaders, a channel inaccessible to international control. No one could possibly know what type of epistles the silent priests in black robes will begin to bring into Pyongyang.

This channel is especially valuable because all other channels are open to scrutiny by the Americans. For instance, Bush could ask Putin at one of their meetings:

"Tell me, my friend Vladimir, are you engaged in some kind of clandestine hanky-panky with Kim Jong Il?"

And Putin would be forced to explain himself, because Intelligence checks everything. But in questions regarding religious contacts, Putin will have the right to reply:

"Well that, my dear friend, is none of your business. Faith — is sacrosanct!"

And Bush will have no comeback because his government truly does not get involved in matters of the Church.

In the Moscow Theological Academy, currently there are students from North Korea. Where did they come from? If they were truly believers, they would have been imprisoned. The answer is obvious — they are from the Ministry of State Security. Kim Chen Ir is creating an Orthodox Church patterned after Stalin's church, with the hands of the *chekists*, the security forces.

All of the officers of friendly Special Services accredited in Russia are under the inconspicuous patronage of the Service of External Intelligence. They are invited to resorts, to closed meetings, to banquets. The North Korean seminarians, leaving the Lavra (monastery) for Moscow, tell their spiritual advisor something like the following: "Bless us, Father, to go to the Reception House of the Service of External Intelligence, which is located in Kolpachniy Lane"?

MURDERS AND INTRIGUES

The MP also "lit up" in the spy scandal which erupted after the murder of the former Chechen leader, Zelimhan Yandarbiev, in Qatar at the hands of Russian agents in February 2004. They blew up the car Yandarbiev was entering after he left a mosque, and were subsequently arrested.

One of the arrested Russian agents happened to be the local resident of the GRU ("Military Intelligence). Since his diplomatic immunity did not allow for him to be imprisoned, he was released. But two others did not have diplomat immunity, and were retained for a long time. They immediately admitted to their membership in the GRU, attesting to the fact that Russia is involved in international terrorism — the same terrorism which it so passionately appeals for the world to fight. Putin was furious. He applied tremendous efforts to get the unfortunate terrorists released, but his efforts were futile.

Then a stream of Russian representatives began to flow into Qatar. Many officials under various pretexts tried to break into the jail cell, but the Qatar authorities would allow no one to see them due to security precautions. They were right to do so, since the killers needed to be liquidated. All that was needed was to smuggle a tiny ampoule under one's finger nail into the prison cell. Then you would break it open, emitting a colorless substance inside the cell. Within minutes, the person is gone, and as Comrade Stalin used to say: "No person, no problem."

In despair, Moscow decided to utilize its most unflinching helper for tricky assignments — the Moscow Patriarchate. Bishop Theofan of Stavropol and Vladikavkaz flew to Qatar, making it look as though the poor suffering officers imprisoned there were so deeply religious that they would rather listen to sermons of a

bishop than to break bread — and not just any bishop, but specifically Theofan, known for his contact with intelligence. Prior to this, he served for many years in the Department of External Church Relations, where he was an intimate of Metropolitan Kyrill, whose code name in KGB files is “Mikhailov”, and Aleksey II, known as “Drozdov”.

Qatar did not let him in either. It is possible that they knew that the MP was a cover for espionage. Besides, the faith of the agents had left great doubts since, inside the exploded car, Yandabiev's young son had also been killed. It is unlikely that a believing Christian would decide to kill an innocent child.

Even the socialist-revolutionary terrorists who, in 1905, blew up the car with Grand Duke Sergey Alexandrovich, the Governor-General of Moscow, at first refused to carry out the attack because there were children in the car.

Yet these terrorists now imprisoned in Qatar had been to Chechnya, where the GRU tortures and kills people. Since they were sent to Qatar to do the assignment, it is reasonable to assume that they did everything themselves. The resulting problems, one can attribute to the punishing hand of God. It would have been better for Bishop Theofan to visit the thousands of innocent people rotting in Russia's prisons.

The Moscow Patriarchate is amazingly merciful toward murderers fulfilling presidential orders. Not long ago, Aleksey II awarded Alexander Pavlichenko, a colonel of the Byelorussian Special Services, the Medal of the Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Vladimir. He was the infamous organizer of the “squadrons of death”, which liquidated political enemies of President Lukashenko. The MP exarch in Byelorussia, Metropolitan Philaret, personally petitioned for this award. His stated reasoning was that in a garrison under Pavlichenko's control, a church had been built. The occasion was clearly not in keeping with the high status of the medal he received.

Novaya Gazeta (New Newspaper) published an article about this under the heading “Church of Special Purpose” in August 2004. “The awarding to Dmitri Pavlichenko of the Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Vladimir Medal is beyond any logical explanation. You do not need to travel to Belarus to see newly-constructed churches scattered on garrison and prison territories. There are more than enough of those to be found in Russia, but for some

reason, those who construct churches in Russia do not receive medals for it. Could it be that the patriarch and his metropolitan have decided that he who with his own hand sends people to God, is worthy of this high church award?”

“No one in Europe doubts that Pavlichenko, as well as Sheiman and Sivakov, the former Secretary of the Security Council and the Minister of Internal Affairs respectively, were participants in the organization and execution of the murders,” continues the newspaper. “It is why the Greek authorities refused to allow entry to Sivakov, who now holds the position of Minister of Sport and was supposed to head the Olympic delegation, entry into Athens. The European Community made a special declaration on this point. And in exactly three days, the Russian Orthodox Church awards Pavlichenko this medal. A coincidence, one could say. Or is it the Russians' ‘reply to Chamberlain’?”

“Svetlana Zavadskaya, the wife of Dmitri Zavadskiy, the ORT (Russian Television) cameraman who was kidnapped on July 7, 2000, said: ‘It is very sad that the Russian Orthodox Church awards its second highest medal to Dmitri Pavlichenko, who is known in the civilized world as a person suspected of being an accomplice in kidnappings and murders of people. As a believer, I am deeply offended by this. The Orthodox Church in Russia and Belarus is so highly politicized that, for me, clearly it would be better to commune with God directly, without intermediaries.”

Yet here, among Russian émigrés, the sentiments are diametrically opposite to those just expressed — many dream of unifying with the Moscow Patriarchate.

4. THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER OF ROCOR IN THE NAME OF “UNIFICATION”

In the West, although hostile takeovers are legal, they are not used in the normal course of business. But in Russia hostile takeovers are the norm. It is how most Russian business conflicts are resolved.

The Russian State is hostile to the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia. Its parishes are furiously expelled from the country, although its hierarchs are eagerly welcomed. Here in the West, this contradiction is ignored, for some reason, but ecclesiastical Moscow does not hide its hostility.

"The actions of ROCOR on the territory of Russia carry a schismatic, uncanonical character, and therefore their churches should not be attended by parishioners of the Russian Orthodox Church," explains Hieromonk Adrian (Pashin) to the faithful on his website *Pravoslavie.ru* (*Orthodoxy.ru*).

This site is edited by the Meeting of Our Lord and Savior Monastery, whose deputy, Archimandrite Tikhon, is the ardent negotiator with ROCOR for unification. He recently published a book, singing the praises of Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky) — the same Sergius whom ROCOR so furiously repudiates. And today's patriarch, in turn, has called this work the best Orthodox book of the year, thus expressing his own views on Patriarch Sergius. All this could make your head spin.

But many priests in ROCOR view these strange contradictions with humor, as though they are misunderstandings or "extremes", as they used to be called in Stalin's time; as though they were nothing compared to the enormity of the political tasks ahead of us. When the priests are shown these comments, they only smile condescendingly.

This same all-knowing smirk used to play on the well-groomed faces of the party bureaucrats of the Soviet epoch, when they were asked why in the stores of the USSR superpower there was no meat for sale.

"Yes, there is no meat, although a real patriot would not ask such a question!" the important Communists would parry. "However we have something that would wow you! But for the present, it's a secret!"

This answer was good enough for most.

In Putin's Russia it has also become fashionable to laugh at things which bring about unease. You can feel it by how Russian politicians respond to American TV viewers on the air.

"What dictatorship? Putin's cult of personality?" they giggle nervously, but there is fear in their eyes.

Once upon a time, decades ago, creators of Soviet culture, in replying to foreigners who were asking about the Soviet prison camps in Siberia, also exploded in hysterical laughter.

Stalin offered incentives to those talented writer-humorists who would avoid sticky subjects. Such brilliant film comedies as *Tsirk* ("Circus"), and *Volga-Volga*, which are still popular today, were

created during the peak of mass repressions. The entire country was then experiencing the development of humor as an industry.

The Soviet habit of mocking tragedy has infected ROCOR.

"Is it true that Aleksey II disdainfully called ROCOR a church of 'one and a half old ladies'?" asked one of the women at our parish meeting in Washington, D.C.'s Cathedral of Saint John the Baptist.

"Yes, he did! And what of it?" smiled the rector, Father Victor Puhopov unpersuasively, in deference to the Patriarch's sense of humor.

"But why did they recently again close down several of our parishes in Russia?" the parishioner was not going to give in.

"It is because they were not registered!" parried merrily the second priest, Father Vladimir Boikov, and the discussion ended.

"They're in a conspiracy" I guessed.

Unfortunately I did not have a microphone in my hand to ask: But why did they not simply register the parishes? What stopped them?

It appeared that most of the parishioners, having been raised in America, understood this to mean that the parish just did not register in time. Here, any type of registration is only a technicality, but in Russia, you have to earn your registration! You earn it by going to different offices multiple times over the course of many months. You earn it by humiliating yourself, by begging and offering bribes, because in Russia, registration is not automatic. You can be refused a registration for no apparent reason. And the court system will not help.

Registration of social and religious organizations falls under the Ministry of Justice. In the past it was a quiet, rather boring, and strictly bureaucratic institution.

But Putin has militarized it. Now the Ministry of Justice is part of the FSB power block. It even has its own army. It is made up of special forces (*spetznaz*) of OMON, the military detachments of special purpose, whose job it is to crush prison uprisings. And when there are none, the OMON goons keep their skills sharp by practicing on peaceful prisoners.

Once a month, a company of muscular fighters break into one or another prison camp and, using *dubinki* (clubs) beats up anyone who gets underfoot. Sometimes physicians accompany them, pointing out sick inmates, so that they would be treated less brutally. When Yeltsin was president, human rights groups raised a fuss, but now they've quieted down. There really is no place to voice your protest.

The Moscow Patriarchate also officially collaborates with both organizations through its office on Cooperation with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement. The result of this mutually beneficial relationship brings about the closing of ROCOR parishes in Russia.

These closings are based on the fact that the MP does not acknowledge ROCOR's right to minister in Russia, although it is ROCOR's historical homeland. The MP considers ROCOR an unwelcome guest, something akin to the Catholics. However, here in the West, for some reason it is considered good manners to keep silent about it.

At the end of 2003, Aleksey II came to a meeting with teachers and students of the Russian Academy of Government Services, where he stated the following:

"ROCOR has created parallel parishes on Russian territory and republics of the former Soviet Union, thereby crossing over into the canonical territory of the MP."

But he was wrong. ROCOR was formed by those bishops and priests who served on this very land, which was then called the Russian Empire, for generations. They were forced into emigration, they fled from Red bayonets pointed at their backs. Among them was also Saint John of San Francisco. What — for him, too, Russia is uncanonical territory?

Well then, where exactly is the canonical territory of ROCOR? Outside the borders of Russia? But there, too, parishes of the MP operate freely. And I have never heard representatives of MP ever utter the phrase: "Oh, we recently opened a church in Buenos Aires, on what is not our canonical territory!"

It seems as though there, too, ROCOR is operating on its canonical territory. As everywhere, the bully wins out. That is the motto of Stalin, the godfather of today's Moscow Patriarchate.

An episode comes to mind which was recorded by presidents of former Baltic republics, annexed by Stalin in 1939-1940. They wrote that the Soviet diplomats were exceedingly polite towards them until the Annexation Pact was signed. In one split second, the diplomats became extremely rude and surrendered their subordinates to the NKVD.

I imagine that this is precisely how the unification with ROCOR will occur, using the method of a hostile takeover. The dictionary defines this term thus: "The acquisition by an

individual or a group of individuals of a controlling interest of shares without the agreement of the management of a corporation."

The Patriarch's talk at the Russian Academy of Government Services was significant because he made a truly historic statement there.

He said, "Meeting three bishops of ROCOR who represented the Dioceses of the United States, Germany, and Australia, I began by reading excerpts from a letter written in 1991 in response to a letter sent to me and simultaneously to Metropolitan Vitaly (Oustinov) by the Congress of Compatriots, which was taking place in Moscow in August of 1991."

In fact, all of the papers "presented" at this conference were fake. Young intelligence officers with degrees in the humanities from MGU (Moscow State University), many of whom were my friends, wrote all the papers from that Congress, including the above-mentioned letter.

This Congress was prepared by the KGB. Who else in the Soviet Union had the right to rub elbows with traitors and spies, as their foreign compatriots were affectionately called within the confines of the corridors of power. Elderly instructors in the Minsk KGB School referred to them in no other manner than as "emigrant scum." Sadly, this has not disappeared anywhere! There has been no cleansing of the old Communists from the ranks of the KGB.

Realistically, can you imagine that Russian emigrants, having arrived from all corners of the globe, and being under constant surveillance of the KGB, would get together to write appeals to heads of both churches? And that this appeal would have reached them? And would have lodged itself in the Patriarch's archive? While the authors would have been gathering their thoughts and brainstorming, let alone putting it all down on paper, the Congress would have ended!

By the will of God, this Congress became the last political act of the Soviet authorities. On the second day of its work sessions, the August coup occurred, signaling the end of the Soviet era. But to this day I remember the indignant voices of the young officers in the corridors of the KGB Intelligence Headquarters in Yasenevo: "Why do we have to write stupid letters for this Congress when the country is falling apart? What will happen to us tomorrow? What will happen to our families?" But strict military discipline won out.

This goes to show what great emphasis the KGB placed on bringing ROCOR into the MP, even back in Soviet times. Even on the eve of their own demise, they still continued to plug away.

The government coup and the Congress of Compatriots was prepared by the KGB at the same time. The same people orchestrated both.

Nothing has changed in our days. On April 7, 2004, Alexander Chuyev, the Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Public Organizations and Religious Associations of Russian Parliament, confirmed this on the air of the television station MNZ-2:

"In the interest of unifying Christianity," he announced publicly, "the most important issue for us is the joining of the Russian Church Abroad to Moscow,"

That is how he revealed that this goal of the State was not strictly a Church issue. The leading politician of Putin's Russia never entertained the thought that the Church is supposed to be separate from the State. Its use for government interests would previously have been expected to be properly masked, but now it is customary to talk about it directly. That which is needed by the State is considered sacred. All these departments are equally dependent on the State. The MP does not own its churches. They are part of the State's properties, although this is not generally known in the West. They seem to think that the Church in Russia is just as economically independent as it is in America. In reality she remains in the State's financial vise.

Here is how *Pravoslavnaya gazeta (Orthodox Newspaper)*, the official publication of the Ekaterinburg Diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate, characterizes this turn of events: "In 1917, all of the property of the Orthodox Church was nationalized and transferred into the property of the State. In the last decade, property formerly nationalized has started to be handed over to the faithful. But, as it turns out, of all the properties owned by the Russian Orthodox Church today, there is not even a single church building. All churches are only handed over for usage."

It is strange to hear this, since the Law Regarding Freedom of Conscience of 1997 permits the transfer of State property to the Church. Paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the Law states: "The transfer of cult buildings and structures with land lots related to them and other property of religious purpose being under State or municipal ownership, for the use of religious organizations in

accordance with its functional purpose, is to be accomplished gratuitously."

However, since 1997 nothing has been transferred. The State preferred another path, described in the first paragraph of the same Article: "Religious organizations having the right to use for their needs land plots, buildings, and property granted to them by the State, municipal, public and other organizations and citizens, in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation."

But all this could be taken away as the political winds change in the country. The Moscow Patriarchate, with some trepidation, expected a mass exodus of the faithful to ROCOR if it elected Metropolitan Kyrill, then head of the Department of External Church Relations of the MP, to the position of patriarch. Simple Russians understood that ROCOR was the carrier of the more pure Orthodoxy, tracing its roots back to Tsarist Russia. They understood that ROCOR was truly independent of the State, if for no other reason than that the governments on whose territories she ministered to her flock were many, and she did not belong to any of them.

However, after May 17, 2007, most of the ROCOR parishes in the USA and throughout the world came under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate. They may well have become outposts of Russian state interests forever.

That is specifically why the standard bylaws of parishes of the MP deprives parishes of all property in case of their leaving for another Church. The Church By-Laws of Tsarist Russia did not contain such a demand. However, MP itself has never let an opportunity slip by to grab ROCOR properties, at times demonstrating unprecedented KGB-style cunning and skill.

The newspaper, *Tserkovniye Novosti (Church News)* reported, "Recently a parish in England joined the MP jurisdiction. ROCOR gave them its blessing, due to the fact that the parish had fallen apart. In the parish council remained only several old people – some from the second and later waves of emigration, and some who had remained from the first. But the behavior of the MP emissaries troubled them immensely.

"Whereas the Parish Council tried to solve all problems with goodwill, in an Orthodox manner, working together, the Moscow guests only knew how to issue orders, cheat, and threaten. The elderly parishioners, having spent their entire lives in the

bourgeois West, had never encountered such authoritarian methods. This behavior most poignantly reminded them of how unceremoniously and brutally the MP had confiscated ROCOR churches in the Holy Land in 1997.

"The parishioners feel confused and do not know what to do. They have formed an impression that the representatives of MP are interested more in the properties than in parish life.

"The chief problem in the relationship between ROCOR and the MP is the difference in mentality, they say. If ROCOR-ites were raised in conditions of freedom, then the MP was raised in dictatorship conditions, when the Church was in servitude to the State. In ROCOR many monks do not want to be or are incapable of being politicians. They are losing ground to church *apparatchiks* (the operators of apparatus, i.e. the government; the 'movers and the shakers').

"A parishioner of the MP wrote, 'Archbishop Anatoly (of the Moscow Patriarchate) began to manipulate the parish, telling us one thing, and doing another. He had promised a rational self-government under the Patriarch, but instead, behind our backs, he prepared legal documents, according to which the parish would lose all of its property, including the land, to the Department of External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate.'

"And this completely uncanonical organization, a leftover of the Soviet-KGB times, still retains enormous power under Putin in the Patriarchate.

"Three elderly parishioners, the legal guardians of the property, are now being forced to sign an agreement removing them from power. Metropolitan Kyrill, the Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations, will appoint their successors. Even the Patriarch is mentioned only third in the text of the agreement.

"The new agreement does not demand that the legal guardians of the property be Orthodox and members of the parish. This means that if the old men sign the agreement they will be thrown out, and in their place three lawyers from London will be appointed, who will begin to follow the instructions of Metropolitan Kyrill. The parish will be considered closed.

"This is Sergianism in action! It is a sign not of the past, but of today's world. It is brought about by the lack of *sobornost*²⁰ in governance, the supremacy of the all-mighty bureaucratic organizations such as OVCS (Department of External Church Relations)

and the Moscow Patriarchate itself, which it would be more correct to name the personal department of the Patriarch. They are accustomed to using intimidation and deceit as their weapons — the Soviet Apparatt methods, grafted onto the Church.

"Russians abroad need to understand that the Church in Russia is both better and worse than they think. It is not only the Church bureaucracy. There is also a contingent of truly Orthodox people, against both ecumenism and modernism.

"But Metropolitan Laurus, present chief hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, or ROCOR, and others, [are now] dealing not with these pious Orthodox believers, but with the leadership, which includes the likes of Metropolitan Kyrill, who are just predators. They are not pastors, but wolves."

5. ECUMENISM AND INTELLIGENCE: TWO MYTHS OF THE RUSSIAN CHURCH

Russian Intelligence accompanies each of its great political actions with a wave of lies in the world press. These lies are created in Service "A", the Intelligence disinformation bureau. Bogus suppositions are fabricated there, and then they are disseminated widely in the press through its network of agent-journalists. Well-meaning people use these fabrications in their own articles and interviews, thinking them authentic.

It is easy to recognize the hand of Intelligence by how frequently these suppositions are repeated in the press. Each time a lie is repeated, Service "A" pays a bonus.

There are two suppositions in "Operation ROCOR": The first is that the MP is ready to cut all ties with ecumenism. Any day now she will resign from the World Council of Churches (WCC). Just one small step remains. The issue of the upcoming resignation from the WCC is already widely discussed in parishes of the MP.

The second supposition is that Putin needs his "personal" patriarch. Stalin had Sergey, Khrushchev had Aleksey I, Brezhnev had Pimen, and Putin wanted to see Metropolitan Laurus as *his* patriarch, prior to his death.

Both suppositions were calculated for the benefit of the Russian emigrants, who sincerely love their historical homeland, but who are unfamiliar with many of its unwritten rules.

Both suppositions were false. A careful examination of the facts shatters them, like a house of cards.

The Moscow Patriarchate will break with ecumenism.

Alas, this issue does not hold any public interest in Russia, if for no other reason than that the majority of the faithful is made up of old peasant women, who have never even heard the word "ecumenism". They trust the views of their priests on everything. And the priests sometimes admit with a deep sigh that they were forced to join the WCC by the KGB, although they do not elaborate on what goal they had in mind.

Although the Soviet days are supposedly over, Russia remains in the World Council of Churches. That means that today's Intelligence also finds it imperative for this membership to continue. But why?

The answer is really quite simple. They need to influence the Western politicians with the recruited foreign clergy, since in many countries fervent parishioners include parliamentarians, defense ministers, and heads of intelligence. Why would Russian intelligence not try to recruit them through one of their bishops or cardinals?

This idea is really quite feasible. But first you need these bishops and cardinals themselves to become collaborators of Russian Intelligence. It is precisely this in which the gigantic missions of the MP, under the leadership of the Geneva Intelligence office, are involved.

The high density of clergy in Geneva frees the Russian intelligence agents from the necessity of incurring travel costs. The reason for meetings is most convincing.

"Tell me about yourself. Allow me to interview you. I am most interested in your work within the Council of Churches."

And the foreign bishop can easily agree to a heart-to-heart conversation with his Russian friend. Proselytizing is, after all, his pastoral duty. Then the Russian hands the bishop an expensive gift. Or, he could show him a photograph, the publication of which would end his career. After this the recruitment goes smoothly.

Sometimes the tables get turned. The foreign bishop himself recruits the Russian agent and converts him to his faith. There have been such incidents. In recruitment, he who is spiritually stronger prevails.

It is much more difficult to make that first contact with the same bishop in his home country. Back in his home country, if a bishop were approached for an interview by a Russian journalist

with a sudden interest in religion, the bishop's immediate reaction would be guarded: "Why are you interested in me, and not in one of my colleagues?"

MP representatives in the WCC also have a lot of work. External Intelligence Service uses them as virtual pimps of the foreign clergy.

"This is my friend from the Russian Embassy! He's a very worthy man! I highly recommend him to you," says the Moscow priest convincingly with his deep bass voice, while introducing the Russian diplomat with shifty eyes, whom he barely knows, to a Lutheran pastor. The pastor, raised in the sheltered bourgeois democracy, blindly believes him.

No one had ever cheated him before, since in the West lying is considered in bad taste. The pastor never learned to detect it.

In Russia, on the other hand, it is the norm. Soviet people are raised in an atmosphere of general lies. It is, therefore, more difficult to cheat us.

The pastor smiles, flattered at hearing an invitation to continue their conversation in a restaurant. There he reddens in embarrassment, seeing the extensive selection of dishes ordered.

And, naturally, he agrees to fulfill a small request of his new friend not to call each other on the phone but to agree on a time and place of their next meeting directly now.

That is the first clue of espionage. The Russian spy knows that his telephone is bugged by Swiss counter-intelligence, so he tries to hide his new friendship with the pastor.

However, all that just took place between the Russian spy and the pastor, could have very well been done by an MP cleric — that is, if he were an experienced KGB agent. In Soviet times, only such emissaries were sent to the World Council of Churches.

But the clergy has gotten younger. After 1991 there was no more mass recruitment. This could seem to make the work of Russian Intelligence more difficult.

But Russian Intelligence knows that any priest who works overseas has to fulfill all the assignments given by the Russian Embassy. The MP, after all, has chosen to take the course of aiding its government in everything, even when there is a conflict with the Christian conscience. And therefore, even if he is not recruited, a Moscow priest will do everything the Russian Intelligence agent orders him to do.

At the agent's instruction, he himself would invite the pastor to restaurants and would engage him in conversations of a delicate nature, seeking out his weaknesses. Then the more risky assignments would follow, such as getting the pastor so intoxicated that it would be possible to take his fingerprints or make duplicate keys of his apartment without his even being aware of it.

So gradually, without consciously meaning to, the young Russian priest himself becomes an agent of Russian intelligence. By then, he gives his signature without hesitation, promising to collaborate under the politically correct code-name of "Patriot". The embassy agent, as a result, receives a double bonus from Moscow.

It is not by coincidence that Solzhenitsyn called the World Council of Churches "fairly well sovietized". This is the result of many years of collaboration between the KGB and the Moscow Patriarchate. The MP's involvement in the ecumenical movement is nothing more than a smoke screen for Russian intelligence.

Work within the WCC is the most important mission of Department "PR" (political intelligence) of the Geneva office of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Some fifteen officers work there exclusively. Each officer has a scheduled plan of assignments years in advance. He also has a replacement waiting in Moscow, dreaming of the four happy years he'll spend in Switzerland.

The Russian clergy do not object to trips to Switzerland either. People who live in the West find it hard to comprehend the unimaginable rush a Russian gets at just the thought of a trip abroad. And to live there for a few years in comfortable conditions emerges as an unheard of stroke of good fortune for many.

Imagine yourself a village priest in the far Russian North, where in spring and in the fall the mud is so thick you cannot get out of the house, where only children attend church because their parents drink themselves into oblivion. And suddenly one day the bishop hints that an opportunity has come up for you to take a little trip to Switzerland. And you can take your entire family, and it will last a few years. And upon return, you will not necessarily have to return to the impoverished village. Tears of joy would flow down your emaciated face.

Let's not forget, too, that many priests have sons who follow in their fathers' footsteps. Work in the WCC does not in any way impede their career.

And so, the MP will continue to solemnly assure ROCOR of its impending withdrawal from the WCC, while doing absolutely nothing about it. For the same reason, I think, the MP will very soon renew its relations with the Episcopal Church, broken in late 2003 because it elected an openly homosexual bishop.

Russian intelligence needs the Episcopal Church, which is extremely powerful in the United States. Among its members there are many American generals, influential politicians, scientists working on secret projects, and others of interest to Russian intelligence.

As far as homosexual bishops go, there are plenty in the MP also — only they keep quiet about it. In Russia, homosexuality is euphemistically called the "nikodimian sin". In fact, for 70 years, the KGB specifically promoted homosexuals to the highest ecclesiastical posts. Even Patriarch Sergey, rumor has it, was a homosexual. Since they were in a constant state of anxiety over being found out, homosexuals were easily managed by the KGB.

At the same time, the KGB would falsely accuse insubordinate bishops of being homosexual. Here is what Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) of ROCOR wrote in his book, *The Russian Church in the Face of Dominating Evil*, recalling the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1971: "Regarding Archbishop of Novgorod Pavel, one bishop commented: 'The entirety of Bishop Pavel's guilt is in that he attracts the youth, and that is why they are trying to hang a label of homosexuality on him. They will destroy Bishop Pavel, they will. Once a person gets on the true path, they will destroy him!' And that is exactly what happened. He was removed, and nothing more has been heard of him."

Homosexual scandals play out in the MP only when they come from outside. The leading character of one such scandal, which took place in 1999, was Bishop Nikon of Yekaterinburg.

For a long time, the MP ignored the many complaints received from priests subordinate to Bishop Nikon, but it could not pretend not to notice the rising voices of indignant newspaper reports. A resolution of the Holy Synod sent him off into "retirement" to the Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery in the far North.

But after three short years, Bishop Nikon appeared as rector of a church in Vesnyaky (area of Moscow), one of the wealthiest in the capital. He was saved by the influential homosexual lobby within the Moscow Patriarchate.

Myth #2

A foreigner can become patriarch.

Seeds of this myth fall on fertile soil, especially since the Kremlin has truly not yet made a decision about a new patriarch. Metropolitan Kyrill, head of the Department of External Church Relations, has eliminated all his rivals, and has become the only remaining front runner for the patriarchal post, but he leaves the Kremlin cold. I think the reasons for this are far from issues of faith. More likely is the probability of a power struggle between rival reigning factions.

The Kremlin would have liked to see a different metropolitan in Kyrill's place, Metropolitan Methodius. I have heard that he is not even a KGB agent, as all the other Soviet bishops are, but rather a staff officer of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Defense Ministry. That, by the way, would not impede his being a KGB agent, since the army is also under the KGB's control.

In the KGB they call such people "officers under deep cover." There are not many of them, but they are very influential, because they have reporting to them agents among the clergy.

For Putin, Metropolitan Methodius is one of the guys. Alone with him, he can be himself, temporarily dropping his role of Commander-in-Chief. He can relax.

There's only one problem — Metropolitan Kyrill managed to send Methodius to faraway Kazakhstan, even though he was respected by the faithful for being able to raise the Voronezh-Lipetsk Diocese out of its ruins.

Currently, within the inner circle of Metropolitan Kyrill, rumors are spreading that once he becomes patriarch, he would sharply raise the image of the Church, that he would bring the Church to a position equal to the government's — in other words, that he would repeat the failed experiment of Patriarch Mitrohin, who ruled in the 17th century. In Putin's Russia, where the FSB controls everything, he would be cut off at the root if he were seen to be attempting such a thing.

In fact, Metropolitan Kyrill has never been known to have such leanings. On the contrary, it is more characteristic for him to neglect Church administration for the sake of business, which is where his heart lies.

There is no sense in overvaluing the scope of the Kremlin's unhappiness with Metropolitan Kyrill, since he is, after all, also an

agent of the KGB! His code name is "Mikhailov". This means that Putin knows all about his personal life, and that Metropolitan Kyrill is totally defenseless before him.

In the safes of Lubyanka (Headquarters of the KGB), there are many files containing compromising materials on Metropolitan Kyrill. The regulations of the KGB require such materials to be kept on every one of its agents.

If an honest-beyond-reproach individual were fraudulently pulled into collaborating with the KGB, compromising materials would be fabricated intentionally. These materials would be either pulled out of thin air, forcing other agents to write false denunciations on him, or they would provoke the honest man, by involving him in dubious situations which would force him to perform a criminal act. Then they would lay out the evidence against him and warn him: "You are now on our hook! Do not even think of doing something against us!"

In KGB language this is referred to as "solidifying the collaboration." Each agent's annual review plan includes gathering constantly new "solidifying" materials.

There is no need to fabricate compromising materials against Metropolitan Kyrill. It is common knowledge in Russia that he is involved in a civil marriage, prohibited to Orthodox monks.²¹

As for the civil law, were Kyrill to make one misstep, he would be treated the same way as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an early tycoon. He'd be rotting in jail for "financial crimes", because Russian laws are written in such a way that any entrepreneur can be criminally charged at any time.

The groveling Russian journalists will joyously exclaim: "See, before Russian law, all are equal. Even metropolitans!" This is the essence of Putin's "electorate justice".

Therefore Metropolitan Kyrill, should he become patriarch, will toe the party line and follow all of the orders coming from the Kremlin.

Choosing this talented businessman, Kyrill, for the patriarchal throne will elicit a deep disappointment among Russians. A sizeable contingent will turn to other Orthodox churches, among them ROCOR. That is why already now Metropolitan Kyrill has joined the ranks of ROCOR's fiercest persecutors. Yes, yes, that same ROCOR which the Moscow Patriarchate has now absorbed.

In March 2004, Kyrill called Evtikhy, ROCOR's Bishop of Ishim

and Siberia to Moscow, and gave him an ultimatum — either become the patriarch's vicar bishop, or leave Russia. How strangely incompatible this seems with the principles of separation of Church from the State!

By the way, who issues or rejects visas in Russia? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they tell me. Maybe so, but only after a background check is performed by the FSB. In reality, it is the FSB, and not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which truly issues the visas. This is what Metropolitan Kyrill was trying to frighten Bishop Evtikhy with — the FSB!

After the democratic reforms of the 1990s, the *chekists* were able to turn back the clock, and the FSB became the resurrected KGB of the Soviet era. Today's FSB encompasses all the Directorates of the Soviet KGB, except for two — the Intelligence Directorate, and the Ninth Directorate, which used to protect members of the Politburo.

Although these are considered independent, they have kept close ties with the FSB. From the Soviet KGB past, they have kept their common life support systems in place — the polyclinics and hospitals, the resorts, pensions, but most importantly, the operative telephone network of the OS. The *chekists* can talk freely on this network, without fear of wiretapping. They all consider December 20, the Day of the KGB, their personal, professional holiday.

The former First Chief Directorate of the KGB, now called the Foreign Intelligence Service, is successfully pursuing operation "ROCOR".

The former Ninth Directorate is now called the Federal Guard Service, offers its bodyguards to Putin, and other of the highest dignitaries — and the Patriarch of All Russia.

"Well, What is wrong with that?" someone might object. "The president is concerned about the safety of the life of Aleksey II."

Oh no, that is not it at all. The bodyguards are not there to protect anyone's life. Bodyguards are meant to protect the government secrets the person they are guarding knows. The higher the level of security clearance of the individual, the more need for bodyguards. The more government secrets the person knows, the higher the likelihood of his being kidnapped. If that were to happen, someone would be able to pump government secrets out of him either through torture or with the help of psychotropic drugs.

It is not the life of the guarded individual, but the secrets he knows — that is the true object of the concern of the presidential bodyguards. But the life? The same bodyguard could also take it away. When a dignitary falls into disfavor, his arrest is also entrusted to his bodyguards.

It must be very difficult to feel the hands, which had just moments before guided you gently by the elbows, grab you suddenly, twisting your arms behind you roughly, and push you into a car. Such betrayal!

Academician Sergey Korolyov, a well-known Soviet creator of space ships, spent quite a few years in Stalin's prison camps. When he once again returned to fame, he admitted to friends that he could not get accustomed to his bodyguards. "Going to bed at night, I keep waiting for them to knock my door down and scream, "Get your things, you rotted-out dead meat!"

He'd already lived through it all once.

The bodyguards' main objective is not to allow any leaks of State secrets. That is why they listen in on all the conversations of the person they are "protecting" and watch him day and night. It is impossible to shake the bodyguards.

I must tell you, to have bodyguards from the KGB is not something to be happy about.

Patriarch Aleksey II is protected as though he were the head of the most secret of services. It is because he knows the most important thing — secrets of the Kremlin court, sometimes vile, sometimes frightening. Any one of those secrets could cause an international scandal.

The Kremlin is also involved in the Patriarch's healthcare. Aleksey II gets treated in the Kremlin hospital along with the highest government bureaucrats. Actually it is an excellent facility with superb treatment. But there's a problem — treating high-profile patients is not the only concern of the Kremlin hospital doctors. There is another one, the liquidation of those same patients when ordered to do so from above.

This side of hospital life is shrouded in mystery. God alone knows how many of the highest Soviet officials ended their days at the skilled hands of the Kremlin doctors. The only one which has come to light was Mikhail Frunze, Stalin's Minister of Defense. Stalin ordered an unnecessary surgery for him, resulting in Frunze's death.

Clergy were also eliminated there. Moscow Patriarchate's top leaders were attached to the Kremlin hospital from the Stalinist times. It is unclear what value the hierarchs' lives had for the Communist leaders, who openly declared their goal to annihilate religion and churches.

Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) of ROCOR writes in his book *Russian Church Facing the Dominant Evil*: "The Holy Synod has excommunicated and anathematized all the 'former Orthodox' who openly abused the name of God. Then, in February 1960, Patriarch Aleksey I appeared with a courageous speech at the first Soviet Public Conference on Disarmament, at which he clearly hinted at the oppression of the Church by the government. At the end of his speech, he said, 'Christ's church, which has been aiming at the well-being of all mankind, is being attacked and insulted by people ...' and, quoting the words of Christ, he said, 'the gates of hell shall not prevail over the Church.'" ²²

The Soviet authorities blamed Metropolitan Nikolai for the Patriarch Aleksey's speech, but they did not blame the elderly patriarch himself. Metropolitan Nikolai was forced to retire that year, and although he was apparently in good health, he was taken to Botkin Hospital in Moscow, ostensibly to treat a heart condition. He passed away shortly afterwards from a "heart attack". There is a prevailing opinion that his death was an act of force, and consequently, was excruciating torment. But there is no evidence to confirm it. At every hospital in Moscow there is a ward connected to the hospital in the Kremlin, which provides for the treatment of high-ranking patients, but also provides a convenient cover for eliminating "undesirable persons".

In the language of the KGB people like Metropolitan Nikolai are called "unguideable". The rest is elementary.

6. ARCHBISHOP MARK'S "FRIEND"

"Friend" is an agency pseudonym for Archpriest Vasili Fonchenkov, a ROCOR priest. In the 1970s, he helped the KGB imprison anti-Communist priests. Now this does not preclude him from being a cleric of ROCOR. The KGB is so confident in its relationship with ROCOR that it does not find it necessary to hide its agents. This "friend" serves at a ROCOR parish in Salzburg, Austria.

If you are sceptical, let me direct you to *Mitrokhin's Archive*, a book he co-authored with Professor Christopher Andrew in 1992. Vasili Mitrokhin, as head of the Archive Division of the KGB, managed to take many secret documents to the West. In the course of decades, risking his life, he had secretly removed copies of documents from the buildings of the KGB. Mitrokhin's face is familiar to me; I saw him in the corridors of Lubyanka. He created an impression of being a stern, true-believing Communist. Apparently, his solid appearance saved him from any suspicions.

Mitrokhin's high level of professionalism allows us not to limit ourselves to the hanging of an "unproven spy" label on the priest. Here are the facts, which Mitrokhin brings to light:

"The Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights tried to protect itself from infiltration by the KGB by keeping its numbers small, never exceeding four persons. In May of 1979, however, Father Vasili Fonchenkov became a member. No one in the Committee knew that nine years earlier he had been recruited by the Fifth Division of the KGB as an agent under the code name of "Friend". As is noted in his personal file, he "had been instrumental in cultivating persons of operative interest (in the Orthodox Church); he fulfilled his assignments conscientiously and showed initiative."

From 1972, Fonchenkov worked as an instructor at the Theological Academy in Zagorsk; he simultaneously held a post at the Department of International Relations in the Moscow Patriarchate. In 1976-77 he was the priest in the Saint Sergius' Church in East Berlin, and the publisher of *Stimme der Orthodoxie* ("the Voice of Orthodoxy"), a German magazine of the Central-European "exarchate" of the Moscow Patriarchate. His close foreign-church connections could have easily recommended agent "Friend" to unsuspecting colleagues in the Christian Committee.

KGB's campaign against open dissidents within the Orthodox Church reached its peak in 1979-80, marked by a wave of arrests of the leading dissidents; first among them was Father Gleb Yakunin. They were all later imprisoned or persuaded to repent publicly. It is possible that, in order to save Fonchenkov from being exposed, he was also called in to the KGB for questioning, after which he publicly announced that he had been threatened with arrest, but had never been charged." ²³

The simple fact that Father Vasili Fonchenkov worked in the Department of External Religious Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate allows one to speak of his collaboration with the KGB, since this department is not canonical, but was created by the Soviet KGB for exploitation of external church contacts for its own ends.

The true bosses of this department do not occupy offices in the Patriarchate, but are located in a small pink building near the metro stop Prospekt of Vernadsky. There you will find the managing organs of the RT Agency of External Intelligence. This abbreviation means "Intelligence from the Russian Territory." The management of RT also sends Russian scientists and social scientists on their spy missions. Some of its officers work as laity in the Department of External Church Relations.

One might wonder whether it is possible that not everyone is an agent there. Alas, all are. Each person in the Department of External Church Relations can become an unwilling witness to secret intelligence operations and other breaches of the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State. Therefore the KGB can only keep from being exposed if it binds everyone securely to itself through having them sign a receipt of collaboration.

Further, the authors of *The Sword and the Shield* note that in 1979 the KGB managed to convince Father Dmitri Dudko to make a public apology. It did not seem possible, however, to get the same from Father Gleb Yakunin. Therefore, Mitrokhin writes, "only Yakunin's wife was allowed to be present at the trial. The rest of his family and friends, as well as western journalists, were not permitted entry. Among those who received a refusal was also Fonchenkov. It is possible that this was deliberate, to save him from losing his cover."

On the official Moscow Patriarchate website, ortho-rus.ru, this period of Fonchenkov's biography is described in a different manner: "In 1973, he was ordained to the priesthood; in 1976-77 he was the rector of the St. Sergius' Church in Karlhorst (Berlin) and editor of the magazine, *Stimme der Orthodoxie*. In 1979 he joined the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights; at the present time he is in the ROCOR jurisdiction and serves in Salzburg." Here his membership in the Committee looks like he performed some kind of outstanding public service, like editing the magazine in the German language.

Naïve people can form the opinion that Fonchenkov even now is a member of this Committee, fighting bravely for the rights of the faithful. The thought would never occur to them that he joined it only to destroy it, and to send its members to prison.

THE EVIDENCE OF FATHER GLEB YAKUNIN

"And what would the hero of the tale I am writing here, Father Gleb Yakunin, have to say," I wondered, and dialed up his Moscow telephone number.

"I accepted the appearance of Father Vasili Fonchenkov in our Christian Committee for the Defense Believers' Rights calmly," recalled Father Gleb. "He and I had been acquainted for a long time, and I knew he had anti-Soviet sentiments. I was not at all bothered that he was the son of an old Bolshevik, in whose honor there is a street named in Moscow. In those days, children of staunch Stalinists quite frequently became enemies of the regime.

"It is true that now I understand that I did not think through the fact that he so easily became associated with us, and entered our discussions. At that time, any contact with dissidents was dangerous for Soviet people. However, I did not have a concrete certitude that Vasili Fonchenkov was an agent of the KGB, even though he did teach in the Theological Academy, which was under the strictest control of the 'organs'. The department of the KGB which oversaw it was located across from the entrance to the Lavra, right behind the movie theatre.

"I do not hold it against Father Vasili and am even grateful to him for his slight hint of my pending arrest," underscored Father Gleb. "Besides, he did not witness against me. For some reason, he and a few other people were freed from interrogation, although logically they should have been questioned. That is how the KGB protects its agents. After that, after I was imprisoned, Fonchenkov assumed the leadership of the Committee, but the following year his activities ceased. We found out that the Politburo made a resolution to eradicate all dissident activity with repressions, and it decided not to risk their own people."

"After I was freed from prison, I did not get together with Father Vasili Fonchenkov, but he phoned me after Mitrokhin's book was published. His voice was shaky. He insisted that everything written in the book was disinformation, and asked me whether I would like

to speak out against it. I refused, explaining to him that I considered Mitrokhin's book a serious historical source of information.

"Father Vasili asked me whether I had been instrumental in its publication. I told him no, but I remember thanking him for letting me know of my pending arrest. He did not like that, and said quite emphatically that he had not warned me of anything.

"By the way, he phoned me from Moscow. Father Vasili was forced to return there after some ROCOR priests had written angry letters to Metropolitan Laurus about him. But when the small storm had passed, Vasili Fonchenkov returned again to the West," Father Gleb laughed bitterly.

"Friend" is certainly not alone. It is just that through him, the Lord sent us a lesson to be learned. A long time ago, the KGB planted "friends" within the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. ROCOR has many priests with complicated biographies.

At first all of them worked in the KGB's External Church Department of the Moscow Patriarchate. Then, for some unknown reason, most likely on a KGB assignment, they transferred to ROCOR. This transfer, however, was not accompanied by either penance, or a break with Moscow. The purpose of this transfer, then, is unclear. And here, within ROCOR, these priests openly work for Moscow. But for some reason, this does not surprise anyone.

It is easy to imagine what would have happened to the Soviet spy Stirlitz, the star of the famous film, *17 Moments of Spring*, if he had walked into the corridors of the Gestapo and agitated for Stalin. But in ROCOR, it was ignored. That is how strong KGB's hold is within her.

Preparing to swallow up the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, the KGB watches the Russian émigré community's opinions closely. Right now they are worried about the talks within ROCOR of the KGB infiltration of the clergy. That is why they have floated the usual kind of disinformation — that, yes, all Soviet priests who worked overseas were agents of the KGB. What of it? Those were the times. Not long ago I heard this freshly minted idea from several Russian immigrants.

The disinformation is in the idea that spy work is relegated to the past, as though with the fall of Communism the KGB also disappeared. But the truth of the matter is that the KGB has not fallen! In fact, the KGB has grabbed the entire governmental power.

All those who were agents during the Soviet era have remained agents to this day. There is only one way to cease being an agent — to denounce publicly, in print, and then the KGB itself will expel you for coming out. There were such cases, even among the clergy. But "Friend" did not do this.

I personally did not see his KGB file, but am certain that it contains a note such as this: "Was utilized in cases ending in arrests and prosecutions of objects of operative processing." This means that he was in the front lines. He was not some village priest, who for the sake of throwing people off would be signaling to the KGB that other priests drink. "Friend" can be used in acute situations. And in this sense, it is not unusual that he is located in Austria.

Austria is a useful country for Russian intelligence. It has a soft counter-intelligence agency, because neutral Austria is not of significant interest to foreign intelligence services. Therefore the KGB has long become accustomed to using it as a center for risky operations for which other countries could very well expel you.

As a rule, these are meetings with especially valuable agents, who, in their own countries, are hanging on by a thread — generals, parliamentarians, scientists with security clearance.

Here, one of them announces to his colleagues at work: "I feel like taking a trip to Austria. To historic Salzburg! Visit the streets Mozart walked on."

"Go ahead," his colleagues say to him. "It is a good thing."

In a couple days our hero is zig-zagging through the little streets and alleyways of Salzburg where he meets up with a Russian diplomat in the agreed upon spot. What if the diplomat is being watched? No, it is better to walk into the picturesque Russian church! And at the end of a social visit with the priest, hand him an envelope with a film. No counter-intelligence would dare stick their noses into a church — faith is sacred.

METROPOLITAN LAURUS AND KGB AGENTS: THE DARK PODVORYE ²⁴

What resources were used to build the Jordanville podvorye in the suburbs of Moscow? When you ask Russian immigrants in America this question, their jaw drops—they have no idea that one even exists. Some, however, have heard something or other —

either about it or about the expensive dacha of Metropolitan Laurus not far from Moscow.

The *podvorye* is located in a prestigious summer cottage area, where unfamiliar faces are not admitted. Many corrupt, high-ranking officials live here, alongside their ultra-rich "new Russian" neighbors, many of whom, it is well-known, have mafia connections.

The *podvorye* is a vast three-storied mansion with a garret and a beautiful interior church, with wall icons by Archbishop Alipiy of Chicago. According to estimates given by specialists, its value clearly surpasses one million dollars, especially considering the bribes paid to the local officials, a practice rampant in Russia.

When I called in July 2005, the ROCOR monk Nikolai Savinov, who picked up the phone, was most gracious. He explained to me that the *podvorye* was built in 2000, but at the present time is operating, illegally, as a private home. He suggested that I contact Metropolitan Laurus for a blessing to give me a full-fledged interview.

This is nice private residence from which they send you to America (which in Russia is considered more and more adversarial each day). And they send you to Metropolitan Laurus, even though he is not listed as an owner of this property. The house, as I found out, is listed under a group of other ROCOR clerics.



THE "DARK PODVORYE", ROCOR/MP HEADQUARTERS IN MOSCOW
BUILT IN 2000

The presence of a foreign *podvorye* within the domain of the Moscow Patriarchate assumes concelebration with it.

According to the rules of the Department of Foreign Relations, only the rector of the *podvorye* can be sent from overseas; the rest must be Russian priests to serve there. But ROCOR did not have Eucharistic communion with the Moscow Patriarchate until 17 May 2007. Yet the *podvorye* was completed more than five years ago. Could it be possible that someone threw his money to the wind?

Not expecting any luck, I phoned Metropolitan Laurus in Jordanville. I was surprised to be connected to him. That day an American monk, not fluent in Russian and apparently not familiar with all my articles about the work of the KGB in ROCOR, was on duty answering the phones. Had one of the native Russian monks, openly working for Moscow, been manning the phones, I would not have had the opportunity to speak to Metropolitan Laurus. I saw the hand of God in this.

At first Metropolitan Laurus was good-natured.

"The *podvorye* has not yet opened", he told me.

"When will it open?"

"When we make all the arrangements."

"When did the *podvorye* appear in its present form?" I asked for clarification.

"A few years ago." he replied.

"Will it open officially after the Eucharistic relationship is established with the Moscow Patriarchate?" I asked.

"Maybe later" he explained. "We need to send people over there. It is possible that the question regarding the *podvorye* will be discussed at the meeting of the joint commission."

When I asked for an explanation as to whether the existence of the *podvorye* is in accordance with church canons, he became guarded.

"What do you need that for?" he asked me.

I answered him honestly, that I wanted it for an article.

"This is not to be written about," he snapped, and the interview was over. The last time I had received such an answer was at the headquarters of Russian Communists. I had called there to ask at which hotel Ziuganov, the head of the KPRF (Communist party of the Russian Federation), was staying.

But the Russian authorities know about the *podvorye*, especially the FSB, whose responsibility it is to watch all US organiza-

tions operating in Russia. Then why hide it from your own flock? There are not supposed to be any secrets in the Church.

But how can you explain to the flock that the construction of the *podvorye* began in the late 1990's, when there was absolutely no talk of concelebrating with the Moscow Patriarchate? It means that the question was decided already then, behind the backs of the faithful. It means that the talks with the MP, which began in 2003, were a fiction — or, as they used to say in Soviet times, a "deception of the workers." And that is scandalous!

The Moscow Archpriest Mikhail Ardoff told me that way back in 1994 he arrived in Jordanville and offered his book, which condemned the Sergianism of the Moscow Patriarchate, to the monastery publishers. Metropolitan Laurus did not bless its publication.

Now they say that the monastery back then did not publish works of unknown authors from Russia, being afraid of making a *faux pas*. But Mikhail Ardoff at that time was a priest of ROCOR and even received money from ROCOR for his church in Moscow. I think that the reason for the rejection was different.

Archpriest Sergey Klestov, a New-Yorker, revealed how he had reproached Metropolitan Laurus for his joint prayer with Aleksey II in May of 2004 at the Butovo Polygon (firing range) near Moscow, where in the mid-1930s mass executions had taken place.

"How could you, Vladyka?" he said, "How could you serve together with Sergianists on the exact spot where New Martyrs had lost their lives, for which the Sergianists themselves were responsible? You mixed the New Martyrs with those who betrayed Christ!"

"But I did not put on my vestments," retorted Metropolitan Laurus cleverly.

"Does it make a difference to the New Martyrs whether you served in vestments or not?" continued Father Sergey; Metropolitan Laurus had no reply.

Hieromonk Tikhon, a well-known Moscow priest, rector of the Church of the Kazan Icon of the Mother of God in the town of Aleksin, Russia told me, "Metropolitan Laurus had long ago planned on creating a base for himself in Russia, and he built this palace in Velyaminovo for himself." Father Tikhon had rubbed shoulders with Metropolitan Laurus in the 1990's.

"Metropolitan Laurus always stifled any initiative which would have led to the strengthening of ROCOR in Russia," he continued.

"At that time, many visible activists of the Moscow Patriarchate would come to him for talks, asking to be accepted into ROCOR. But he did not accept even a one. He was, however, most affectionate with his guests, and just as sweetly he would send them packing. With his own people, though, he could often be quite gruff, pretending he was very tired, displaying his "slippery fish" characteristics.

"In the first years after the fall of the Soviet authorities, there remained many abandoned churches and other buildings in the vastness of Russia. ROCOR could have received them for next to nothing. But Metropolitan Laurus sabotaged all such endeavors. A Jesuit smile would overshadow his face which, as everyone knows, is a sign of leading a double life. He pretended that he did not understand, that he was sleepy. But the most screaming example of his sabotage was his refusal to take a wonderful ancient church in the village of Byokhovo, near Polenovo, the world-famous native home of a great Russian artist. That church could have become a gem of ROCOR in Russia.

If one were to suppose that he is an agent of Moscow, whose goal is to destroy ROCOR from the inside, one could not find a better example of behavior characteristic of that," my interlocutor concluded bitterly.

Father Tikhon told me how a few years back, when Aleksey II's health suddenly deteriorated, the "orthodox KGB-ist and banker" Pugachev and the businessman Boris Jordan suggested the candidacy of Laurus for the post of the Russian Patriarch to Putin. They did this through Putin's political technologist Gleb Pavlovsk, and, as proof of their good will, they bought the ailing Patriarch Aleksey II a villa in Switzerland as a consolation gift.

The wealthy Jordan family was always close to him. Boris Jordan's father, the late Aleksey Borisovich, set up a fund for aid to the Cadet School in 1999 in Russia. But this fund was not under the auspices of ROCOR, which would have been logical, but under the MP, with which there was no canonical communion at the time. No spirit of the White Guard officers prevailed over this fund. Soviet generals and Communists presided.

In the biographies of ROCOR hierarchs who are pushing for subjugating ROCOR to Moscow, there are oddities, giving credence to their connections to the KGB. One only has only to remember the story of Archbishop Mark, which is full of omissions

and anomalies that are difficult to explain without assuming complicity with the KGB.

Mrs. Anastasia Shatiloff, Bishop Gregory (Grabbe)'s daughter and publisher of *Church News*, told me that Archbishop Hilarion of Sydney and New Zealand tried to enroll in the Leningrad Theological Academy, but was urged instead to go to Jordanville. She had received this information from Archpriest Arcady Tyshchuk, rector of the Moscow Patriarchate Cathedral of St. Nicholas in New York, (also a KGB agent, whose code name, according to Mitrokhin's archives, was "Vornov").²⁵ According to Mrs. Shatiloff, he had also told her that Archbishop Hilarion had traveled to the USSR.

In Metropolitan Laurus' biography, his regular trips to visit relatives in Communist Czechoslovakia appear quite strange.

"But he did not travel to the USSR," some would argue.

But it is the same thing, because all the intelligence agencies of the Socialist countries had a unified system of registering US nationals with the KGB. Former citizens of "bourgeois Czechoslovakia" and anti-Communists were not left without close watch. Metropolitan Laurus should have fallen into that category.

"Activists" of ROCOR, in KGB lingo, were "activists of the émigré anti-Communist center." It is highly unlikely that when such an "activist" would apply for a visa to go to Czechoslovakia, no one in Prague would then call Moscow on that secret phone and ask:

"Would you like to use him?"

The Moscow agents could use an anti-Communist emigrant to receive a medal or to move up in rank. According to orders from the KGB, not even one such activist was to be left without their attention. He had to have some "damage" inflicted on him, whether it was harassment to be recruited, or to be placed in a compromising situation, or, finally, to be scared so badly that he would never return to the Soviet paradise. This was called "to give someone an operative workout."

Metropolitan Laurus himself would have been subjected to this type of workout every time he went to Czechoslovakia. Yet he always returned to the US safely. And then he would again be issued a visa. Apparently even after the Soviet army occupied Czechoslovakia in 1968, when the authorities really cracked down on visitors, Metropolitan Laurus had no visa problems.

In those years, my parents frequented the resorts of Karlovy

Vary at the invitation of the Czechoslovak KGB. Upon returning, my father would tell me what a difficult battle the Czechoslovak KGB was having with "internal enemies".

It is unthinkable that Metropolitan Laurus was not "approached" by our comrades, not only by the Czech KGB, but also by the Soviets, whose enormous offices in Prague employed more agents than that of their local colleagues.

PUTIN'S FOOTPRINT IN AMERICA

In the KGB it is customary to give gifts to the bosses. It is a tradition dating back to Stalin's time. What would be an appropriate gift for Putin to receive for subjugating ROCOR? This is a question of great importance to the Chief Resident of the Russian Intelligence in Washington, DC.

The answer really is quite obvious: the Saint John the Baptist Cathedral in Washington, DC. It would be a symbol of the unattainable victory of Russia over America, the bastion of Russia's strategic interests right under the nose of the White House. Putin would come here not as a distinguished guest, but as the master coming home, just as he goes into Christ the Savior Church in Moscow, the central church of the Russian authorities. Here in the US, this has to be the Washington DC Church of Saint John the Baptist.

Let Bush do what he wants in his White House. Our Russian president will do the same two steps away from him, in a Russian church, on a scrap of native soil in the hostile American environment. Imagine what propaganda effect this will have in Russia. After this, Putin will spend a few more terms in his presidential office.

Right now the parishioners are sure that nothing can threaten them, that the cathedral belongs to them, and that their interests are protected by American law. But the KGB will not take them to court! It will use other methods — illegal, but effective.

People who have been raised in the West believe in the infallibility of the law. We Russians are not so sure. Do you think it would be difficult to exchange parishioners? In DC, you only have a handful of parishioners, but behind the KGB is the power of an enormous country.

Many have an excessive hope that among parishioners there are dependable guardians, who are called "trustees" in American

jurisprudence. These trustees supposedly would protect the cathedral with a stone wall against an enemy's feeble impulses. But they are also human. Some of them could suddenly develop a strange infatuation with Putin, just as many ROCOR priests have done recently. Others, not so easily swayed, could be rendered harmless in other ways. The field for the operative activity of the KGB is quite vast here. The spy post in DC is in the Russian Embassy, coincidentally located near ROCOR's cathedral. They will write up a multi-page proposal for a plan of action, and will receive necessary "force and resources," as they evasively say in the Agency, to implement their operations.

To seize the cathedral, they will use a method, fine-tuned during the elections in Chechnya, where instead of the Chechens voting, Russian soldiers would vote. In Washington, this would be done by KGB officers of both sexes. Just like cockroaches they will invade the cathedral under the guise of emigrants, and will vote to hand the cathedral over to Russia. In Russia, foreign real estate holdings belong to the Administration of the president — in other words, to Putin personally. In order to please him, the KGB will stop at nothing, not even war. The war in Chechnya showed how far they are willing to go.

Putin's intelligence network is drunk with impunity, while placid western leaders forgive their friend Volodya (nickname for Vladimir) everything. They will only come to their senses after he has made them accomplices to his crimes.

The parishioner-agents will work competently, according to the approved plan. They will overflow the church coffers with donations, in comparison to which the donations of the current parishioners will seem meager and insignificant. The old parishioners will at first feel resentful and angry; but, as is often the case in America, they will soon turn away in distaste at the sight of this rampant impudence. This will be the moment that the KGB has been waiting for. Yes, the operation of the seizure of the cathedral will be rude and crude, but is not that exactly how the seizure of ROCOR is taking place?

There is no "fighting the crowbar". Every former Soviet person knows this truism, but an American needs to have it explained to him.

"Comrade President, here is your personal cathedral in Washington, DC. We recently grabbed it from the local morons," the

Chief Resident off Intelligence will report to Putin, who will give an approving smirk. The Resident, in turn, will receive a Hero's star on his chest.

Soon thereafter Putin, in a most touching manner, will say to Bush: "How glad I am, George, that now I have my own church in Washington. I have come to love praying in it in the evenings."

And Bush will respectfully nod his head: but of course, freedom of religion, it is the most precious thing!

And then later he'll say that in Putin he saw the soul of a true Christian.

Americans will not notice the subjugation of ROCOR to the Soviet intelligence apparatus. They will see it as a purely internal Church issue. With their bright smiles, American lawyers will stand by watching as the cathedral is handed over to Russia, their partner in the antiterrorist coalition. The letter of the law will have been preserved — and besides, who knows, there could be KGB agents even among the lawyers.

The American government not only does not interfere with church activity, but it is terrified of doing so, afraid to trample on someone's religious feelings. The Russian government, on the other hand, is not afraid at all, and behaves in religious organizations as the master, more than willing to be the bull in the china shop.

The present-day clerics in the DC Cathedral will be swept away by a powerful hurricane. The master here, as on all presidential premises, will be Putin's personal bodyguards, and they have no need for foreign priests, who are not privy to State secrets.

I can foresee their outrage now, their slew of questions to their new masters. But Putin's henchmen are not used to ceremonious relations with their underlings, and they are not averse to using physical force against those who cross them. ROCOR priests, who had been so enraptured with Putin, will now experience firsthand the unscrupulousness of his subordinates. They will feel just as helpless in front of them as do rank and file Soviet citizens. And, finally, they will come to understand that ROCOR did not "unite" with the Moscow Patriarchate, but was absorbed by it.

Attending church services in the ancient Dormition Cathedral in the city of Vladimir, Putin unabashedly stands in the Tsar's place. Why not build him a replica in the Washington Cathedral, under pretext of the coming resurgence of Russian monarchy?

Some of the Russian émigrés will all but salute this. The Tsar's place in the Washington Cathedral would be constructed by masters of all trades — from the KGB, of course.

Standing in the Tsar's place in the Saint John the Baptist Cathedral in Washington, Putin would undoubtedly experience a vindictive joy at the thought that this very cathedral had long before been founded by the unrepentant enemy of the Communist regime, St. John, Archbishop of San Francisco.

Chapter 4

PUTIN AND THE CHURCH

THE DEFAMATION OF ST. JOHN OF SAN FRANCISCO

The defamation began when the hierarchs of ROCOR entered an agreement of betrayal with Putin. At a meeting with him in New York in September of 2003, they presented him with an icon of the New Martyr Grand Duchess Elizabeth, the sister of the last Empress.

People would wonder later why Putin was not presented instead with an icon of St. John of San Francisco, which would have seemed more logical, as he is an American saint.

The official explanation was as follows: one of Putin's numerous residences is the palace of Novo-Ogarevo, which was expropriated from the Grand Duchess by the Bolsheviks in 1917.

Putin's predecessors, the *chekists*, threw the Duchess out of her palace and to her death at the bottom of a mine shaft, for which she was later sainted by ROCOR. Putin was awarded with her icon. One could understand this gift, had Putin condemned the bloody history of the KGB, and denounced crimes of the *chekists*. But that is not what happened. Today the *chekists* are again hailed as heroes!

St. Elizabeth's icon was bestowed on Putin because Archbishop John of San Francisco was a staunch anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. Such people are not tolerated in Putin's Russia. As a banner of the Church Abroad, it was more appropriate for them to choose Duchess Elizabeth, a figure more politically neutral, who did not live long enough to perform any acts against the Soviet authorities.

On July 3, 2004, in the San Francisco Cathedral of Joy for All Who Sorrow, where the relics of Saint John repose, an icon of Saint John, which had been lying undisturbed on an analogon, fell to the floor and cracked the glass of its case. This occurred at precisely the moment when Father Peter Perekrestov (who is more often referred to now as "Comrade Perekrestov") announced at the 11th All-Diaspora Orthodox Conference, that "We need to leave the past behind and go forward." Was the inexplicable fall of the icon a sign from God, witnessing that Saint John is not in agreement with that statement?

I came across a video recording of a discussion of this event at a repast on the feast day of the Church of Saint Seraphim of Sarov, August 1, 2004, in the town of Sea Cliff, New York. Metropolitan Laurus was present at this discussion, and his reaction was most revealing.

First to speak was a young priest, Father Seraphim Gan. He tried to convince the parishioners that this was no sign whatsoever but just a coincidence, an individual occurrence, just a gust of wind that caused it. It was very difficult to watch a priest lying, especially such a young priest. But that was his support of the "party line" for unification with the MP. In my past, I had seen so many similar presentations at party meetings in the Soviet Union!

The parish rector, Father Sergey Klestov, rose with indignant rebuke. "How can we leave our past behind?" he asked with emotion. "We received our apostolic succession from Patriarch Tikhon, from our New Martyrs and Confessors. And we're supposed to abandon all this? We're to repudiate Metropolitans Anthony Khrapovitsky, Anastasy, Archbishop Averky, Metropolitan Philaret? When the icon fell.... In this we received an important sign. To laugh at it is sinful."

At the first defiant words of the rector, Metropolitan Laurus began quickly to gather up his things. Soon thereafter, Archpriest Sergey Klestov was removed from the parish at Sea Cliff.

Advocates of the union with Moscow are characteristically prone to lying and behind-the-scenes-intrigues, as though they had been trained in the Soviet party apparatus. For example, not long ago, Archpriest George Larin of Nyack, NY visited the ailing Archbishop Alipiy of Chicago, who is known to be less than fond of the Moscow Patriarchate, and threatened him that if he even

dared to hint against the subjugation of ROCOR to Moscow, he would be immediately exiled to the Jordanville monastery.

He allowed that San Francisco, where the venerable relics of Saint John repose, would become the hotbed of ROCOR's capitulatory tendencies. This is the result of the KGB's long-term spying activity from their station within the Russian Consulate in San Francisco. The KGB officers who are stationed in the San Francisco Consulate have great experience dealing with the large Russian-American community there. That is why the Council met in San Francisco, and not in New York, where the Synod is situated, and where the All-Diaspora Local Council took place.

It was expected that the Council would approve the union with the MP, although some hope against hope still remained that it would not occur. However, one could not imagine a more blatant desecration of Saint John of San Francisco's relics than the announcement made in the Cathedral he built, in the presence of his relics, that his cherished ROCOR is being handed over to Stalin's Church — the Moscow Patriarchate.

Soon thereafter they transferred General Denikin's remains to Moscow under the red banner. Putin could not resist playing Russia's national anthem, the Soviet anthem of the Bolshevik Party, as today's national anthem was originally known, over Denikin's grave. The ultimate insult! Thus Putin, the short red-haired boy from a poor working-class family, has fully satiated his class hatred. Or has he?

The All-Diaspora Council did not exactly follow Putin's script. It tried to retain ROCOR's independence, since too many of her parishioners and clergy have been speaking out against submitting to the *chekists* in Moscow. But Moscow, too, had not given up, and the battle raged on, leading to the capitulation of ROCOR to the MP on May 17, 2007.

MOSCOW'S FAKE EPISCOPATE

The *Russkaya Liniya* news agency, known to be affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, called my appearance on the August 17, 2005 talk show of *Voice of America* (VOA) radio station a "gross provocation". The words had the familiar scent of the nineteen seventies when I, as a young Intelligence officer, was working for the TASS New Agency, editing precisely these types of phrases.

The news agency blamed me for flinging mud at the episcopate of the Russian Orthodox Church. All I said was that during the Soviet period all bishops were appointed by the Communist government and, according to church canons, should be removed.

Well then, with whom, in that case, is ROCOR planning to unify - with the *chekists*? Precisely.

"Attempts to subvert the unification process of the Russian Church!" sternly warned the *Russkaya Liniya*, as though the issue were already decided. And indeed, it now seems, it was.

In Moscow, ROCOR was already considered part of the MP, albeit unofficially. All that was left was to place a couple of signatures on a couple of papers. This was only meant to pacify the Russian émigrés anyway.

Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet Union's World War II hero, had a favorite saying: "Shoot first, and then we'll have a tribunal to decide his execution!" Now it looks like the victim is still twitching. That is unacceptable, disorderly conduct!

ROCOR's assets have already been divided among cold-blooded men who do not like jokes. If they do not get what they want, someone in Moscow could get a bullet through his head. That is why any mention of such a possibility evokes a panic reaction.

FATHER VICTOR POTAPOV TAKES OFFENSE ON BEHALF OF PUTIN

August 22, 2005, a representative of the Russian Embassy attended a meeting of parishioners of the Saint John the Baptist Cathedral in Washington, DC.

Fr. Victor and I had recently participated in a VOA broadcast in which he advocated the unification. Nevertheless, Moscow suspected him of disloyalty and demanded that he decisively disassociate himself from me, like they used to do in Stalin's day. Father Victor hastened to do so by publishing an article called "The Sin of Prooflessness."

"I must disagree with the respected Konstantin, when he groundlessly says that all bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia are agents of the KGB" he wrote. "First of all it is necessary to point out that since the time that the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, there have been more than one hundred

consecrations of new bishops. And this is during the post-Soviet period, when the KGB no longer decided who could and who could not become a bishop."

Nonetheless, KGB agents certainly exist among them. One example is Bishop Theofan (Ashurkov), whose ties with intelligence are widely known. For many years he was the right hand man of Metropolitan Kyrill (Gundyaev), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Department of the MP, known by the codename of "Mikhailov".

"Besides that," continued Father Victor, "even in the dark Soviet times, Vasilii Furov, the Deputy Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, in his secret Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which was smuggled to the West in 1973, wrote that there were three groups of bishops: bishops who truly cooperate; those who cooperate half-heartedly; and bishops who do not cooperate and are enemies of the Soviet Union. So even then, there were many bishops who refused to cooperate, and maybe only pretended that they were willing to cooperate."

Furov, however, characterizes the third group of bishop much differently! He writes: "The third is that part of the episcopate, which at one time or another has made an attempt to circumvent the laws on cults (Soviet name for "religion"), some of whom are religiously conservative, others are capable of falsifying the situation in the dioceses and their relationships with the governing bodies, and yet others have been noticed to have shown a tendency for bribery and libel toward the local bureaucrats."

Yes, apparently these people with difficult personalities are either quarrelsome or just the opposite — truth-lovers. But in no way are they anti-Soviet. More than that, Furov specifically notes that "many years of observation, a deep study of the tendencies of the ruling bishops accentuate once again that the episcopate is loyal to the Soviet authorities." There are no "enemies of the Soviet Union" here, not even a hint! How come, Father Victor?

Father Victor's article creates for the Western reader a sympathetic view of the MP church which, although dependent on the State, nonetheless decided for herself who should be a bishop. How could it be otherwise? Yes, there were times when the KGB annoyed the bishops with requests to cooperate. Some refused, others not; after all, we're all human.

But in the USSR the reverse order was the norm! It was first necessary to become a KGB agent, and only then could you become a bishop. Not the other way around. Bishops were supposed to mingle with foreigners and would even travel overseas. How could they do this without being KGB agents?

Furov's secret report was smuggled to the West by Father Gleb Yakunin, who received a prison sentence for doing so. He also participated in that same VOA radio broadcast. He stated: "Any monk wanting to become a bishop first had to give his signature attesting to his collaboration with the KGB and chose a code name. Only then could he become a bishop!"

Can it be that Father Victor does not agree with him either?

The "Temporary Holy Synod of the Patriarchate" of Metropolitan Sergey (Stragorodsky) was formed on Lubyanka (KGB headquarters). In 1927, the NKVD (KGB predecessor agency) offered the New Martyr Archbishop Seraphim of Uglich, who had been ruling the Russian Church for one hundred days, to head this Synod, but he refused, instead putting forth his own Synod, for which he was placed under arrest. Metropolitan Sergey, meanwhile, accepted this gift from the *chekists*. He usurped the church power illegally, with the help of the NKVD, thereby defying the still-living patriarchal *locum tenens* Metropolitan Peter, who was imprisoned. After this, how could there be any doubts about the *chekist* origin of the MP?

The subject of recruitment of priests to this day causes consternation among the Russian clergy. Recently Deacon Andrei Kuraev announced that in the 1970s he considered it normal to cooperate with Lubyanka (KGB) because it helped strengthen the unity of the USSR.

But back then that was not considered the main goal. It would be more characteristic today, when Russia truly faces collapse. Andrei Kuraev, with his statement, in effect, makes an appeal to Russian clergy to cooperate with Lubyanka today.

SOVIET PATRIOTISM IN THE CHURCH ABROAD

The champions of the unification with Moscow have found themselves in a most awkward position. In order to show that, in the face of the MP, they are not unifying with a Soviet organization, they are forced to sing praises to the Soviet Union of old, even

though in Soviet times, they did their best to revile it. They are now forced to prove that there had been some semblance of independence in the Church, although they then had categorically denied it. Putin is returning Russia to its Soviet past, and our unifiers are bringing us along.

At a parish meeting which took place on August 22, 2005, Father Victor was also most kind to the Land of the Soviets. There was more order then, he reminded us. There was no pornography. And although in Soviet times he spoke differently, now he spoke the truth.

This is also the basis of Putin's propaganda! And he makes a logical conclusion: the collapse of the Soviet Union was a historical error, and all of our current ills began after the collapse. The USSR must be resurrected.

The whole strategy of the émigré-unifiers is built on that sigh of relief when the Soviet Union collapsed, and on the illusion that "gigantic changes" have taken place in Russia. But the changes are regressing! Putin's Russia today is similar to Brezhnev's; only the prison terms have lengthened.

Putin's pro-Soviet policies are knocking the feet out from under our unifiers, robbing them of arguments. They are forced to either deny the sovietization of Russia, or explain it away as individual slips of the tongue of some big bosses. The patriarch, on the other hand, is turning more and more "communist" together with Putin. He not only does not protest against a return to Communism, but he guarantees its ideological support. When he met a group of youth in Kaluga last August, Aleksey II quoted directly from the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism", which supposedly parallels Christian norms. During the 1990s, many lances were broken to prove this was not so!

This means that the Moscow *batushki* (familiar for priest); who will flood the West after the unification of the Churches, will tell stories to the naïve emigrant young people about how wonderful life was in the Soviet Union. Those who want to find out the details can contact the Russian Embassy, Comrade So-and-so. The next step is recruitment on "ideological grounds". Communist ideology and espionage are closely linked.

Father Victor began our parish meeting with criticism generally aimed at those against the union, and more specifically against the "little newspaper *Nasha Strana*"²⁶ for publishing my

article entitled "Laurus and the *chekists*". This article made our meeting meaningless, since the meeting was supposed to address the decisions of the joint "Conciliatory Commissions" of ROCOR and the MP.

In that article I revealed that in a Moscow suburb, there has existed for many years a *podvorye* of the [ROCOR] Jordanville monastery. It had been constructed in the year 2000, when there was no hint of any Eucharistic union between the two Churches. Ergo, the issue was resolved back then, one on one, in a Soviet manner, "in the narrow circle of limited individuals," as the illiterate provincial *chekists* say. Therefore, all the negotiations regarding the unification of the Churches, which began in 2003, were no more than "smoke and mirrors", aimed at the unsuspecting Russian émigré community.

Why discuss such out and out lies? Why pretend there truly were negotiations, and not just a game with a single goal post? It is as though we believe that players of the same "Ridiger's team"²⁷ were not seated at both ends of the table. It is as though the negotiators were not trying to combine that which cannot be combined – criticism of Metropolitan Sergius with praise of him, the refutation of ecumenism with MP's membership in the World Council of Churches. It is as though the "double-speak" papers signed were really aimed at the faithful abroad and in Russia.

But our pious old ladies will not understand a single word in them! Actually, these papers were not meant for them, they were only meant to lull to sleep the vigilance of the Russian émigrés. Priest-monk Tikhon (Kozushin), rector of the church of the Kazan Mother of God icon in the town of Aleksin in Russia, called these papers the "export variation of Sergianism."

Father Victor, however, never tired of repeating that the ROCOR side was making demands on its Moscow colleagues, that ROCOR put forth some kind of conditions, as though they were in the same weight class. What can a commander of a platoon demand of the Commander-in-Chief? What conditions can a mouse set before a cat about to devour it? Can one even imagine Archbishop Mark defending the interests of his Church, when all he has ever done was to concede?

But Father Victor has a foolproof argument. He claims that the MP, as a result of ROCOR's pressure, glorified the New Martyrs in the year 2000!

"How could ROCOR have applied pressure on the MP if there were no negotiations going on at the time? Only Archbishop Mark was involved in behind-the-scenes contacts," Archpriest Mikhail Ardoff, Rector of the Church of the Tsar-Martyr and All the New Martyrs and Confessors at the Golovino Cemetery in Moscow, told me emphatically.

"The MP went ahead with the glorification because of pressure from the Russian flock, who began *en masse* to venerate the New Martyrs in a grassroots fashion, spreading their iconographic images throughout the land. But even here, the MP could not tell the goats apart from the sheep, because together with the New Martyrs, they canonized Sergianists who were responsible for the death of the New Martyrs," Father Mikhail accentuated.

"This example is witness to the fact that bishops of the MP are instantly ready to change their views on instructions from above," sadly noted Father Tikhon. "It was not long before that the MP's Synod of Bishops had voted almost unanimously against the canonization of the New Martyrs, above all against the Royal Family. The bishops had spoken out with pro-Soviet speeches. And suddenly — such an about-face! Archbishop Mark silently changed all of their minds? I doubt it. It is more like Putin began working over the Russian émigrés!"

PUTIN IN PRIESTLY GARB

Earlier, I explored the methods the KGB would use to confiscate the Saint John the Baptist Cathedral in Washington, DC, once the merger of the two Churches takes place. For Putin, the cathedral, not far from the White House, must become the symbol of Russia's foothold in the United States, the personal church of Putin. For this, there will be a massive influx of *chekists* as parishioners, who will then vote to transfer the cathedral to Russia.

Father Victor tried to laugh it off, calling this idea absurd. But has not Moscow already taken churches away from ROCOR? Of course it has, and very crudely. So my idea, no matter how you might laugh at it, is not all that unrealistic.

"Well then, why do not your colleagues from the embassy join our parish in droves?" Father Victor mockingly asked a taciturn woman sitting in the next row. He addressed her by name. The

embassy employee did not respond to the question, but only jotted something down in her notebook.

Apparently she, too, attended our meeting. That is interesting. We, the enemies of the union are faulted in extreme politicization, yet Father Victor invited an employee of the Russian Embassy to our parish meeting! And there has not even been a union of the Churches yet!

Father Mikhail Ardoff remarked quite wittily that that madam, the Russian diplomat, wanted to see the tone of Father Victor's meeting. Maybe it is time to find a replacement for him in Moscow. After all, Moscow is full of willing candidates!

"Be careful writing about this madam diplomat," my friends from the parish warned me. "Who knows, maybe she's our parishioner. The road to church is not closed off to anyone!"

It is true, of course. But a foreign diplomat, no matter where he goes, even if it is simply to a *banya* [bath house], can always be suspected of gathering data. That is the essence of his work — to be the eyes and ears of his government. The current government of Russia is located in Lubyanka.

Can a Russian diplomat be a parishioner of a ROCOR church? To be sure, yes, but his superiors might become suspicious. ROCOR, after all, is still foreign and anti-Soviet. Yes, and it has parishes located in Russia, but the State persecutes them, and they get closed down at every opportunity. They could not even dream of the kind of benefits that the MP receives from the government.

Unsanctioned visits to a ROCOR church by a Russian diplomat could be interpreted as a hint of a certain level of disloyalty, or even as defiance towards their own government. For a diplomat, this is fatal.

"If she frequents an emigrant church, is she herself planning on becoming an emigrant? If that is so, then how can she be trusted with State secrets? Can she remain in the diplomatic corps?" These deep questions can certainly be pondered by the counter-intelligence officers in the Russian Embassy in DC. I think that the visits of Madam Diplomat are coordinated with the Foreign Intelligence Service, the principal agency charged with corrupting ROCOR.

"Why do you say that Putin does not believe in God? God alone can know that!" Father Victor attacked me. His voice expressed sincere indignation.

Yes, I indeed did say so over the "Voice of America". I even revealed Putin's chief secret — that he began his career not in the intelligence ranks but in the "Fifth Branch" of the Leningrad Regional KGB, which also fought religion and the Church. Putin carefully hides this fact from foreign church leaders, and you will not find it in any of his official biographies.

I reminded Father Victor of Putin's habit of lying, his vengeance, his cruelty, all qualities that a believing Christian should not have. But what meaning does it all have, if the Church in Russia is separate from the government?

The myth of Putin's religiosity is important for proponents of "the union". It allows Putin to be characterized as some Orthodox Emperor Constantine, accepting the perishing Church Abroad under his regal wing. For his kindness, we should be stretching out our arms to him with tears of gratitude. If he is not a believer, then why does he stick his nose into church affairs? Because worldly motives drive him. What other motives could inspire the ringleader of the "Petersburg *chekists*"? Only those — grabbing property and espionage — that is all he's been taught.

How did Brezhnev thank the KGB Chief Vladimir Semichastny, who brought him to power, having first removed Khrushchev? He fired him the next day. How did Putin show his gratitude to his Russian oligarchs who made him president? He set the FSB (formerly KGB) on them. Why should he treat those who help him subjugate the Church Abroad any differently? Who can force him?

But Father Victor said that we have to unite with the MP anyway, and even threatened imperceptibly that the train could leave and we will have missed it. I even know the name of the train — it is Putin's third term. They will not like it in the West, but preparations for it have already begun.

Father Victor offered a reminder that at each liturgy we pray for the "unification of all". Therefore we must unite with the MP. He tells us it is now free, reborn, and many of its churches and seminaries are open. He specifically underscores the Saint Tikhon Theological Institute, a wonderful educational facility. But the churches of the MP continue to belong to the State! How can there be any discussion of her independence?

"We pray for unity, but not unity with just anyone. The intent of this prayer is for heretics to join Orthodoxy through repentance.

The heretical MP, having repented, must enter the Church Abroad, which has preserved true Orthodoxy," Father Mikhail Ardoff explained to me.

"The opening of new churches is not the same thing as religious revival. The MP has just expanded its functions," Father Mikhail continued. "All the new seminaries are Sergianist.²⁸ The MP has not shed the State; she has only been emancipated. It is ruled by the oligarchy of Metropolitan Kyrill, whose personal assets are valued at billions of dollars. The position of rector of a Moscow parish costs up to fifty thousand dollars, and Metropolitan Isidor, of Ekaterinodar and Kuban, paid 750 dollars for his white *klobuk*" [metropolitan's head covering].

"The MP cannot exist without support from the government since there are few truly Orthodox in Russia, no more than two percent of the population," noted Father Gleb Yakunin in an interview with me. "The MP's biggest problem is its empty churches, but it continues to seize new ones. It has an overdeveloped acquisitive reflex, and will put forth every effort to seize churches of ROCOR. I hope that at the threat of the annihilation of ROCOR, her parishioners will come to their senses. Hopefully this sobering up will not come too late," emphasized Father Gleb.

Parishioners of Saint John the Baptist Cathedral also turned out to be quite skeptical.

"We are children of the White Guard, and do not believe Putin, who is turning back the clock in Russia to the Soviet era. Neither do we believe the MP. I am against the union," declared one of the female parishioners.

"And what if the Bishop's Synod decides, nonetheless, to unite?" interjected Father Victor quickly.

"I will not accept their decision," the parishioner remained firm.

Disappointed, Father Victor explained that the old emigration is disappearing, and the new has a leaning toward the MP. But it is precisely the new emigrants who do not want to have anything to do with it! They know it all too well.

This opinion was expressed by one of the new female emigrants. She said:

"I am the daughter of a priest, and therefore I beg you, do not believe the MP! We cannot unite because ROCOR is the only Church which has remained pure. Only here did I find true Russian Orthodoxy." She concluded by comparing the MP to a

barrel of fragrant honey, on the bottom of which lies the dead rat of Sergianism.

Father Victor assured her that the MP has denounced Sergianism in the documents of the Joint Conciliatory Commissions, refutes it, and that one could even interpret this as "a sort of repentance".

"Nice repentance," stormed Father Gleb Yakunin, hearing my tale. "Judas, too, could have said: I condemn my act, take me back!"

"It is impossible to repent in some undecipherable document or interview," explained Father Mikhail Ardoff. "You would need to go into the Dormition Cathedral in the Kremlin and repent openly, in front of all the people, just as Patriarchs Job and Hermogen repented for sins of the Russian people during the "Time of Troubles". Even the future Metropolitan Sergey, when he left the Renovatianist schism, repented, not in an interview in the Communist newspaper *Komsomol Pravda*, but in front of believers, in a church," Father Mikhail emphasized.

Would Aleksey II have the courage to do that? By so doing, he would eliminate the entire period of Soviet history, whereas Putin called on him to be proud of it. Would the MP resign from the World Council of Churches as a sign of repentance of Ecumenism? To the contrary, she's more involved than ever! Putin's image has been tarnished in Europe, and it needs to be quickly restored with church gilding! Russia has neither freedom of speech nor freedom of elections. But there is freedom for the MP! Father Victor would come in real handy with his tale of the Saint Tikhon Theological Institute.

As the parishioners spoke up one by one, they all criticized the MP, but Father Victor steadfastly took its side.

The parishioners reminded Father Victor that Aleksey II had recently congratulated Vietnam on the 30th anniversary of its victory over the United States, and according to Communist tradition, he used the term "brotherly". Father Victor, however, immediately negated the role the Patriarch played in this, saying that it was not his own doing, he only signed a text written by someone else. He does, after all, sign hundreds of papers! In other words, no matter what they bring him, he signs it. In the KGB, they would call this "switching gears" — in other words, a diversionary tactic.

It was not long ago that this same patriarch demanded that the American authorities fire Father Victor from the "Voice of America" for the anti-Soviet content of his programs. Yes, he's come a long way since then, but the patriarch would never dream of changing his opinions. What if he should remind Father Victor of his anti-Soviet past the day after the unification takes place? And what if he demands that the cathedral be taken away from him?

When Father Victor could no longer find any arguments in defense of the MP, he began to point out mistakes of his own ROCOR Church.

"Moreover, our Metropolitan Anastasy sent a letter of gratitude to Hitler," he stated, noble indignation seeping into his voice. This was not the first time he had resorted to this argument. But how many letters did Stalin send to Hitler? Besides, it did not stop at letters. The German army was being resurrected in the USSR during the 1930s. Hitler and Stalin had signed a military alliance to fight the democratic West. Does anyone remember that?

Putin has fully resurrected Stalin's interpretation of World War II and is ready to quarrel with his neighbors over it. The MP supports Putin's interpretation completely, and is eager to explain it to the dim-witted foreigners. Father Victor castigates his own Church for supporting Hitler, rather than the Soviet Union, and in hindsight he whitewashes the image of Stalin's Empire, even though his own father refused to return there after he was released from German captivity.

After this, Father Victor painted a sweet picture of the flourishing ROCOR under the heel of the MP, making it appear that the MP only wants to unify with ROCOR in order to grant her the freedom she already has.

But who will guarantee this idyll? Where is the Complaint Department, if Moscow were to destroy her? Alas, the entire world has no such organization where one could complain against Putin.

"And you, yourself, do you trust the MP?" asked another of the parishioners. Father Victor admitted that he does not quite trust them, but it is necessary to unite nonetheless. Well then why call the meeting? There are so many secrets regarding this unification! And when there are secrets, there is a sure sign of the involvement of Intelligence services.

Proponents of the union pointed to the renaissance of church life in Russia. "What is wrong with bringing this renaissance to us here in the United States?" they mused.

"What is bad is that the MP is too closely tied to the State, and this threatens both the national security of the USA, and each one of us individually. Under cover of the church, Putin will come to America wearing a priest's cassock," I explained.

In Washington, DC it was generally assumed that the unification of Churches is historically inevitable. But opponents of the unification of the Churches spoke out more vehemently. And it was not just a small group of extremists, but the most respected, the eldest members of the parish.

LOST FREEDOM IN THE RUSSIAN CHURCH

In March of 2004, Patriarch Aleksey II appeared on national television in Russia and appealed to its citizens, believers and nonbelievers alike, to go to the voting polls for the election of Putin. Obviously he did not speak out this bluntly, but there was only one candidate. All others had already fallen by the wayside.

"The Church is separate from the government, and the Church and its religious organizations do not interfere in political battles, but we are citizens of this country, and it is, therefore, our duty to actively take part in elections of our president and not stand on the sidelines," he declared.

On the internet site Grani.ru an astute comment was made regarding the Patriarch's speech:

"It is interesting to note that any political announcements that the servers of the cult make is always preceded with the mandatory disclaimer about the 'separation between the Church and State.'"

They feel that something is not quite right here, that perhaps they should not be taking sides. But their civil duty takes precedence.

In general, reminding people of their civil duty and appealing to both "believers and nonbelievers," announces that the hierarchy is appearing as a secular individual. If that is the case, one has to conclude that either the Church is not quite separate from the government, or that this citizen is taking advantage of his position within the Church. Thus, in this round between the Devil and the

Lord, victory is clearly on the side of the former. But what is to be done when there is such a disjunction in the appeal?

Caesar is getting nervous. And civil duty will not let him rest. So Citizen Patriarch, dressing himself in his Sunday best, appeals to the "young and old, faithful and nonbelievers, to make the correct choice."

But the reality is that there was no choice! Putin's administration was seriously concerned that the voters would not come to the polling stations, so they called the patriarch himself to their aid.

But why did he not respond with something like this? "Mr. President, with all due respect to you and your position, I can not speak out for you on television, because it could be interpreted as an endorsement of you!"

Would he have been executed for his refusal, as would have happened in Stalin's day? Then why is he so complacent as to distort the concept of Christian duty, which does not demand involvement in presidential elections?

Because the government has bound him hands and feet. The government is the owner of all the churches of the Moscow Patriarchate and can confiscate them at any moment. This is a grave threat for even Patriarch Aleksey II.

But here, in the West, the strength of this leverage is not widely known. Here, they are convinced that the Church in Russia is just as financially independent as it is in the West. They think that the parishes can control their churches as they see fit. As we have observed earlier, this is far from the reality.

Since 1917, when all the churches were nationalized by the Bolsheviks, the churches in Russia belong to the government. And today's Russian government holds dear to the Bolshevik legacy.

The law "regarding freedom of conscience and regarding religious organizations" from 1997 (Article 21, point 3) allows the government to hand churches over to religious organizations, without being compensated. But this same law also contains Article 22, point 2, which also permits free transfer to religious organizations but only for the use of the church, not ownership.

The government chose the second option. Article 21 has remained on paper only. From the context of both Articles, it is obvious that in 1997, all churches belonged to the government.

Since that time, the situation has not improved; it has only become worse. The law "regarding objects of cultural heritage"

from 2002 has further impeded the transfer of churches from the government to the Orthodox Church.

The magazine *Church Vestnik* ("Church Messenger"), which is the official publication of the Moscow Patriarchate, asked two specialists of the Historic-Judicial Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church to comment on this law. One was its Executive Secretary, PhD Candidate of Jurisprudence, Yuri Kunitsin; the other was an Expert Government Adviser of the RF, First Class, PhD Candidate of Philosophical Studies, Henry Mikhailov. Here is what they said:

"Now the opportunity to transfer to Church ownership the confiscated objects of cultural heritage by the God-battling regime has been brought down to a bare minimum. This, of course, denies the Church its rights and is in direct contradiction to Russia's international responsibilities.

"The churches are government property and there is always the possibility that they may not be used in manner intended. This denies simple citizens their rights of practicing their religion and the dissemination thereof."

The MP has made this abundantly clear and has begun appropriating the property held by ROCOR around the world and turning it over to ROC.

In July 1997, following an agreement between Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksey II and Yassir Arafat, the Palestinian Police broke into ROCOR's 130-year-old Russian Monastery of Abraham's Oak in Hebron, Israel. They forcibly evicted the clerics of ROCOR, handing over the monastery to representatives of the Moscow-based church, who had been silent observers to the proceedings. They watched as the Palestinian police, behaving like thugs, handcuffed and beat the monks, and punched two elderly nuns, dragged them down a flight of stone stairs "like a sack of potatoes".²⁹ Their injuries required hospitalization.

Archbishop Mark acknowledged that representatives of his church had been present at the eviction, but he assured the world that the eviction had been carried out "properly."³⁰

In January 2000, armed Palestinian soldiers and policemen invaded a second ROCOR property, the Jericho Garden Monastery, and announced that, "from 10 o'clock this property belongs to the Russian Church." They forcibly expelled the monks and novices living there, giving them half an hour in which to collect

their personal property. Two representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate's Mission were present, and remained on the property. Once the monks were forcibly removed, they were immediately replaced by Theodosius, head of the Moscow Patriarchate's Ecclesiastical Mission.

In Bari, Italy, the Church of St Nicholas was also given over to Russian ownership. When the MP seized the church, a young ROCOR priest died of the stress. But the MP quickly dismissed this, claiming he had been ill before that!

At least one attempt at acquisition has been unsuccessful so far. Since the mid 1980s, the Moscow Patriarchate has been trying to take over the Church of Pope Clement of Rome on Pytnitsky Street, where a portion of the government library fund is kept. To this day, however, this beautiful church has not been returned.

In Russia, the law recognizes all religious buildings and construction as objects of cultural heritage, except for those which are newly constructed. It follows, then, that special laws pertain to them. But the hopes that a process would finally begin of returning Russian Orthodox Church property confiscated by the Soviets have not been realized.

A new law has created an atmosphere in which government organs will be able to transfer religious objects of cultural heritage to lay organizations and even to individuals *gratis* for use or for rental, without consulting the religious organizations involved. The non-existence of a precedent right of religious organizations to receive this property will, in reality, mean the loss of these facilities not only to them, but, possibly, to all of society.

"A part of these objects of cultural heritage, formerly belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church or to Old Believer communities, is today no longer the property of the government. Unfortunately, these objects are sometimes utilized in most suspect ways. The illegality of these transactions is evident. However, the law which passed does not give a foundation on which to base a return of these church buildings. Moreover, as we imagine it, it even protects the physical and judicial interests of the individuals, who have as their property any object of cultural heritage, including a church object. Is this not sacrilege, when a church is used as a warehouse, factory, or set up as a restaurant or other entertainment center?"³¹

On September 24, 2002, the Publication Committee of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), held a meeting regarding this

law. As reported by the reference/information portal *Religiya i SMI* (Religion and Media), the presiding officer of the Publication Soviet of ROC, Archpriest Vladimir Siloviev, opened the meeting by declaring, "As everyone knows, the problem is that the Church buildings and land have been transferred to the Church for its use for an unspecified term and free of charge. But on the agenda is the question of those mechanisms which will guarantee the Church ownership of the buildings and lands as its own assets."

Alas, the government's agenda does not include this issue at all. The vice president of the methodical Soviet Ministry of the Culture of the RF, Aleksei Komich, declared at this meeting that the Church needs to understand the necessity of special treatment of monuments, and this is not always the case. The Church needs to have literate restorers and must work with the government organs, which are responsible for these monuments. Without this, it is impossible to transfer ownership of the Church buildings and monuments because they can be irretrievably lost.

In its turn, representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate have called this law regarding objects of cultural heritage anti-church. They have also complained about the arbitrary rule of the local bureaucrats. But in Russia, there is no medicine for that illness! The legal position of churches is quite shaky. At any moment the government could take them away.

TURNING BACK TO THE SOVIET CULTURE

In the spring of 2004, Russia began to de-privatize. Companies, which in the beginning of the 1990s became privately owned, are once again being transferred to the government. This process is most painful. It is connected to bogus lawsuits, arrests of the wrong parties, and with murders from behind the corner.

Nevertheless, the population applauds this de-privatization. In it is seen a return to a glorified Soviet past with its free education and healthcare, and a guaranteed salary, however small.

De-privatization will also affect the Church. It will pass smoothly because the government will return to itself that which it considers belongs to it anyway. No wonder the Church is already called a collective oligarch. Since oligarchs are not tolerated well under the Soviet system, if you have been recognized as an oligarch, be ready for a nighttime knock on the door. But the true

oligarchs, the generals of the FSB and the Russian Mafia, feel in control of their situation. No one ever dares to mention their names inappropriately.

In Russia right now there is a renaissance of everything Soviet. If the government decides to return to the relationship it had with the Church during the Soviet period, it may well say to the Church the same thing it has said to the rich business-people: "Do not you, ladies and gentlemen, have way too many assets? Is not it time for you to share?"

And the Church is not able to protest, since the government knows her greatest secret: in reality the churches do not enjoy good attendance to their regular services. On weekdays, many churches stand empty, and less than 1.5 percent of all Moscow residents attend the nighttime Christmas service in 2004, in spite of the fact that Moscow is called "the capital of Orthodoxy"! The Patriarchy shrouds these low figures in great secrecy. The government is also not eager to broadcast them; far better to use them as leverage to extract the wealth of the Church for the benefit of the government.

THE CHURCH AND THE MILITARY

The Russian army has for many years been a high risk zone. People in the know say that it would be better to spend two years in jail than to spend them in the army, although Russian prisons are considered some of the worst in the world. Amnesty International equates spending time in a Russian prison with being tortured.

Since Soviet times, the army has been struck by an incurable illness called *dedovshchina*.³² Its essence is that a young recruit, during his first year of service, is subjected to cruel and brutal humiliation. In his second year of service, this recruit will himself torture the new arrivals. It is impossible to break out of this vicious cycle. The army will break a brave man. Officers encourage *dedovshchina*. They never, except for extraordinarily rare cases, are held responsible for the death of soldiers who do not survive the brutal ordeal.

Soldiers flee from the army in droves, trying to get away from the humiliation, and fall to the feet of the "Soldiers Mothers", a

human rights women's organization. But what can it do in Putin's Russia where everything is controlled by the FSB? The soldiers are returned to the army. What happens to them afterwards is impossible to ascertain.

But each year, in the autumn and in the spring, Aleksey II sends a letter to the General Military Headquarters. In this letter is a list of several hundred names of soldier-believers. As a result of this disclosure, these soldiers are destined to be sent to assignments where conditions will be better than is common in the Russian military. Headquarters approves the Patriarch's *ukase*³³ without comment.

In the 1990s, the patriarchate managed to create small garrisons within the army, where only believer-soldiers serve. No one beats them up there, no one forces *dedovshchina* on them, they are not taught to smoke there, which is considered something essential for a soldier. If you do not smoke, that means you're an outsider. And they are further freed from the temptations of hearing foul language, which has become the normal means of communication in the army.

These garrisons are located near monasteries, where soldiers can have an ongoing relationship with their father-confessors. Frankly speaking, this is how normal military service should be — faith, along with dutifully performing your military service, nothing else. So it was in Tsarist Russia. But in today's Russia, we do not have that.

There are many more soldiers-believers than those listed in the Patriarch's annual letters. But they live far from Moscow and have no opportunity to knock on the patriarch's door. His list only includes sons of priests, seminarians, and zealous young parishioners.

In order to be included on the patriarch's list, you need to bring a certificate from your spiritual father to the Department of the Relations with the Armed Forces and Security Forces of the Moscow Patriarchate. After that, it is up to fate. There is no judicial mechanism to control the path of this certificate. It can be approved, or not.

But if the future recruit brings a certificate from a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, he will be thrown out with humiliating jeers. The privilege of being freed from *dedovshchina* is exclusively for the faithful of ROC.

Is this good or bad? Undoubtedly, it is good that several hundred well-bred boys, the hope of Orthodoxy, are freed of this physical and moral suffering. But this privilege is only for the few. It is granted arbitrarily and approved by the government.

To speak of the Church in Russia as being independent of the government becomes increasingly difficult to believe.

Chapter 5

PUTIN'S HISTORY REVEALS THE MAN

PUTIN'S MISSING YEARS

In Putin's biography there is a noticeable blank. It hides the subdivision of the KGB in which he worked prior to his Intelligence career. Russian biographers carefully omit these few years of his life.

University graduates could never be immediately accepted into Intelligence. They first had to gain experience, to show themselves as capable in the lower ranks of operative work, and only later could they receive a recommendation into Intelligence. Exceptions were made only for the sons of bosses, but Putin was not one of them.

In his book, *From the First Person*, Putin did not mention that the KGB accepted him into the sadly notorious Fifth Division, which fought against dissidents. It also persecuted the Church. His job was not called counter-intelligence, but political repressions. This was Andropov's brainchild, modeled after the Secret Political Division of the NKVD (forerunner to the KGB), whose work included mass repressions.

In the latter part of the 1970s, I was a student in the Minsk KGB School, the same school where the current Russian Defense Minister, Sergey Ivanov, studied.

All students had to already hold degrees from civilian higher education institutions, so the course of study was not long, a mere ten months. They taught only one subject — how to recruit agents. Graduates of technical universities were segregated from the humanitarians. The former were destined to provide safety or security to the military installations. The latter would work in the "Fifth Branch". It was in this group that the future Defense Minister undertook his studies.

Later, with a great sense of pride, he would write that he began his career in the KGB in the same branch as Putin, and that during those days they were friends. In order to avoid leakage of information, the bosses would not permit friendships between officers of different departments. You were only permitted to be friends with others within your own department. This further confirms that Putin also worked in the "Fifth Branch".

I also heard about Putin's work in the "Fifth Branch" from General Oleg Kalugin, the famous KGB dissident, who was recently granted US citizenship. During the time period that I am describing here, he was the First Deputy boss of the USSR KGB of Leningrad and the Leningrad Region, and Putin was his subordinate.

Today Putin is embarrassed to mention his involvement in the Soviet Political Repressions Unit. The nature of the work he did may shed some light on his insistence on hiding it. His job was to seek out anti-Soviet tendencies within the student population he worked in. Taking advantage of young people's naïveté, Putin would recruit them, forcing them to report on each other.

If someone would say to me: "But he did not work directly against the Church!" I would say: "Well, the Church line of work and the student line intertwine very closely. The religious dissident movement was prevalent within the student ranks. In order to fish them out, Putin had to bring in partners from the department of battling the Church, which had agents among clergymen."

Of course, Putin also participated in Party meeting discussions of their projects. Portraying this in the typically clumsy, professional language of the Agency, a report would sound something like this:

"For the period ending in December 1978, the Fifth Branch of the Directorate of the KGB of Leningrad and the Leningrad Region accomplished a large project within the Church category. Using professors/agents from the teaching staff of the Leningrad Theological Academy, we received information that P, a student of the Academy, allowed himself anti-Soviet expressions, and criticized the politics of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in relationship to religion and the Church.

"He was then 'prophylacted'³⁴ (i.e. warned and frightened) by 'Vigilante', a professor at the Academy. Then, under some pretext or other, 'Vigilante' introduced P to the Senior First Representative

of our department, Captain Ivanov, whom he introduced as a religion specialist/graduate student. After several outings in town, Captain Ivanov managed to recruit P into collaborating with the KGB. P even signed a receipt of his future collaboration, using a self-chosen code name of 'Judas.'"

This is the procedure for recruiting of an agent from a hostile environment. First a contact is made with the target. Then friendly relations are established. Then he is asked to help the Soviet state as a patriot by denouncing his friends. Captain Ivanov (a fictitious example) is promoted to the rank of Major. This, of course, is speculation, not fact — such a discussion might have taken place.

Putin not only listened to such reports without batting an eyelash, but he also raised his hand in support of a unanimous approval of it, and gave Ivanov friendly slaps on the back for a job well done.

Putin himself could have been in Ivanov's shoes. The boss of the Fifth Branch had the right to utilize any of its subordinates to recruit students at the Leningrad Theological Academy, irrespective of which departments they worked for — whether in battling the Church, writers, dissidents, or Zionists. All officers had to know how to substitute for each other.

Furthermore, Putin, like all the officers of the Fifth Branch, would have been involved in "guaranteeing safety" during the annual Paschal procession. Mixing themselves with the crowds of the faithful, KGB agents made certain that no one would call out any anti-Soviet slogans.

But the main assignment that night was something else. It was their job to keep close watch over the foreign diplomats who had been invited to the Pascha midnight service, to ensure that they would not take advantage of the confusion and trade notes with any Soviet citizens. For this, it was necessary to stand close to the diplomats, and to artfully portray a believer, to make the sign of the cross zealously, to bow down fervently, all the while keeping your eyes moving inconspicuously in all directions.

HOW PUTIN LEARNED TO MAKE THE SIGN OF THE CROSS IN THE KGB

In 2000, I had the rare opportunity to go through training in the museums of the Kremlin, which gave me the right to work as a guide with foreign tourists.

To this day, I thank the Lord for this! How else could I have walked through every corner of the territory of the Kremlin, open only to foreign tourists, and hear the surprising, at times mystical, history of the exhibit items of the Armory!

The curators voiced complaints. "Can you imagine," they would say, "Putin has gotten into the habit of flying into the Kremlin on a helicopter and he lands smack in the middle of Cathedral Square. The vibration from the propeller causes paint to chip and fall off the icons. Some of these icons were painted in the eleventh century!"

The audience was shocked. It would have been understandable if this were the habit of some semiliterate Soviet leader, like Khrushchev, but Putin, a University graduate?! He must understand the value of the Dormition Cathedral to the Russian people. Just the same, he lands his helicopter next to the Cathedral, as though he is landing at his *dacha*.³⁵ One must agree that this scenario contains an element of disrespect for the sacred. There, in the bosom of the KGB, is where Putin learned to make the sign of the cross properly.

PUTIN AND ROCOR

Many KGB agents, being cynics and atheists themselves, understand quite well the psychology of the faithful. This is evident in how correctly nuanced today's Russian Intelligence service's destruction of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) came about.

This quality was demonstrated quite expertly by Putin when he met with ROCOR's hierarchs on September 24, 2003 in New York. At this meeting he accomplished two "active processes", and so expertly, that no one could possibly suspect it.

"Active processes", in KGB language, means disseminating disinformation for the purposes of shaping global public opinion. This is the job of Service "A" of the Russian Service of Foreign Intelligence. Rubbing shoulders with the ROCOR hierarchs, Putin acted like a Service "A" officer. He enjoyed this Service. Many of its employees now work in his personal administration, using its methods to mold Russia's public opinion.

Disinformation is not always outright falsehoods or lies. It can also be the truth, just not the whole truth. This method was used by

Putin, who calmed the misgivings of ROCOR hierarchs by assuring them that there would be no return to Communism in Russia.

Formally, of course, this is true. Although they support Putin, Communists are in the opposition party. But why should they criticize him, since he has managed to deftly incorporate all of their dreams and desires into reality? The government now is once again more important than the individual, there is no freedom of speech, militarization is in full swing, the hated America is once again its Enemy Number One, and, the bourgeoisie, although still enjoying its freedom, is shaking with fear.

It is no longer referred to as Communism — it is called something different now, "stateruledom", and it encompasses the central idea of Communism, which is the subjugation of the individual to the State. It is the renewed embodiment of Lenin's book, *The State and Revolution*.

The resurrection of Stalin's hymn and of the red flag serve only as ideological formulation of Russia's laws today. Recently, the government started to again pay pensions for Party-Komsomol work performed during Soviet times. What can this be, if not a return to Communism? This decree was signed by none other than Putin himself, but it is impossible to explain all of this in two words to someone in the course of a social conversation!

Putin managed to pull off his second "active", just as brilliantly. When ROCOR's hierarchs suggested to him that he institute a Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Godless Terror, Putin declined to provide an answer, saying only that it is worthy of further thought. He neglected, however, to mention the fact that Russia already has precisely such a Day of Remembrance. It is called the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repression, October 30, except that now they keep quiet about it, and forbid any rallies on that day.

Visiting the Solovetskii Monastery, Putin has never mentioned that in Stalin's time there was a concentration camp located here in which thousands of priests and laity perished. In today's Russia, it is quite unfashionable and even considered unpatriotic to talk of Stalin's repressions. References to them are being removed from schoolbooks, as new repressions have already begun.

KGB agents, especially, hate to commemorate this Day. It is because the Day serves as a reminder of the fact that their entire

history has been criminal. In Putin's Russia today, KGB agents are once again hailed as heroes.

Putin, using his expertise, has achieved a double goal: First of all, he kept quiet about the existence of the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repressions, thereby landing it a fatal blow.

Secondly, he planted a seed of hope in ROCOR's hierarchs that a Day of Remembrance of the victims of the godless government in Russia can truly be instituted. But this hope is futile, if for no other reason than with Putin at the helm, the Soviet government is no longer called "godless". On the contrary, Putin's government is referred to with great respect!

ROCOR hierarchs became all teary-eyed watching the former Communist reverently kiss their icon. They failed to recognize that he was only playing along, as a good secret agent would. One need only to remember that Putin never left the Intelligence Service. Becoming a Prime Minister and President, he still remained in the Secret Intelligence ranks. Current Russian law does not demand resignation from the Intelligence Service.

ROCOR's hierarchs were wine and dined not only by the president, but also by the acting agent. Thus, this meeting bore the distinguishing marks of an Intelligence Operational Plan.

Putin personally directs "Operation ROCOR". This means that it is the most important of all the Russian foreign intelligence service operations. All over the world, no means or personnel have been spared to make this operation a success, which is what we are now watching unfold.

Putin is closely following the script laid down by the famous Soviet spy, Rudolph Abel, who used to say: "The Germans always took me for a German, Jews thought I was a Jew, and Englishmen saw me as English." In order to be accepted by the atheists, Putin acts differently. When he was asked in an interview on CNN television whether or not he believes in God, he answered that he believes in man.

"How does such an answer coincide with Christian teachings?" I recently asked an acquaintance priest of the Moscow Patriarchate.

"Putin can speak like that, because he's a politician!" replied the priest with a deep sigh of respect.

"I, too, am a politician. Can I talk like that?" I asked him.

Batushka (a term of endearment for a priest) smiled and shrugged his shoulders. He had no reply.

THE REAL PUTIN BENEATH THE MASK

Putin has some character flaws unbecoming a Christian. He is cruel and vengeful even though, as a Christian, he should forgive his enemies and those who have offended him. That is what his predecessor, Yeltsin, did. He never retaliated against his political opponents.

Putin encourages a cult following, falling into pride himself, and prompting the population to idolize him. Now and again he is caught lying, although a Christian should always tell the truth. But the most important characteristic that Putin lacks is Christian charity.

A former Kremlin journalist, Elena Tregubova, in her book, *Notes of a Kremlin Digger* wrote, "The head of the government also had trouble establishing a rapport with children. The Kremlin pool of journalists had a whole slew of jokes about Putin trying to show his love for children.

"In the Petrozavodsk hospital, instead of showing some kindness to a little boy on crutches who had been knocked down by a car, Putin declared:

"Now you'll know not to break rules!"

"It is no wonder that after this, a tiny little girl, whom Putin was trying to kiss, pulled away from him saying, 'I'm afraid of you!'"

"Putin's press service has forbidden report of such episodes under threat of immediate retraction of accreditation.

"In the Volgograd Military Hospital, which was on Putin's itinerary during a campaign trip, journalists were given white hospital gowns, and were placed at specially choreographed locations throughout. I accidentally walked into a ward of amputees, who had just recently been brought in from Chechnya. Intuitively I felt that at that moment, what they needed most was for me to smile at them and not be afraid to look at them and speak to them.

"Nineteen-year-old Aleksey from Nizhni Novgorod told me that after he was drafted into the army, he had only been in Chechnya for three months when a bomb exploded nearby, ripping off his hand at the wrist and almost blinding him.

"At that precise moment, the door opened wide and Putin

walked in. So as not to interfere with the delegation, I carefully sat on the edge of Aleksey's bed. That is how I managed to witness the monstrous conversation of the Commander-in-Chief with this boy who had been crippled by the war which, he, Putin, had unleashed. At first the Generalissimo walked around the ward shaking hands all around, and handing out watches and personal televisions. Aleksey, who had no wrist to put the watch on, and who could not very well watch television either, was next. Putin calmly asked him:

"Can you see out of one eye?"

"Yes."

"That awful scar on your face, that is nothing. Today surgeons can fix you up so well you'll never even know it's there," Putin said in a cheerful voice.

"After this scene, the presidential candidate tried to slip out of the ward for amputees as quickly as he could. The scene which had just taken place was not exactly what he had planned for the television cameras to capture on his pre-election campaign trail.

"When, pushing his way toward the door, he started to say good-bye, Aleksey mouthed in barely a whisper:

"I can hardly believe it. . . Putin. . . in person."

"More than anything, I wanted to get up and slap Putin across the face for the detached expression on his face at that moment, for his condescending tone of voice which he, who had never fought in any war, permitted himself to use on this boy who had been injured in a war which he, Putin had started just to bolster his chances of winning the election. And also, for Putin's propaganda on all the television channels, which has so totally brainwashed the population that this kid, who had barely survived, is overwhelmed at the sight of Putin in person."

PUTIN'S "CULT OF PERSONALITY"

Putin does not "approve" of this personality cult, as his aides proudly claim. He himself, however, giggles anxiously when replying to this question, to hint that this is nothing more than someone's stupid zeal, nothing more.

Such an answer brings nostalgic tears of tender emotion to the eyes of elderly Russians, because that is exactly the same language, down to the intonation, that Stalin had used to comment

on his own Cult of Personality. Putin, quite frequently, copies Stalin, for whom he holds deep reverence.

The cult of Putin's personality is perpetuated by the powerful government machine. The higher the prices on foodstuffs and for communal services, the greater the quantity of Putin's portraits which appear all around. Store counters are overflowing with little white busts of Putin, bearing an uncanny resemblance to those of Stalin and Lenin.

Not long ago a book called *The Stories of Putin* was published. In it, he plays the role of a magical hero. On one of the book covers Putin appears as a brave special forces warrior who destroyed the terrorist, Hattaba. Pop groups sing a showy song, "Behind us is Putin and Stalingrad". A pro-Putin youth organization called "Going Forward" is even on the presidential administration's dole.

Not long ago, a children's website of the president appeared on the internet. Putin is sowing seeds of his personality cult in the young and malleable children's souls. On this website, Putin presents himself as a romantic hero, and, of course, he's very humble, just like Lenin.

For instance, on this website children are asked: "What should those who love the president very much and cannot live without him do?" He answers the question himself.: "They should calm down," he says.

But can a child understand such language? Does one need to calm oneself, humbly? Or, to the contrary, should one stop singing praises to Putin?

"Calm down", is a favorite phrase of KGB agents. It means nothing. One can take it a number of ways. But a child needs clarity. An answer such as that one spoils innocent souls. With a professional's intuition, I sense that this phrase was inserted on the website by Putin himself.

The idea of Putin's infallibility has been implanted in the conscience of the population to the point that it is considered unpatriotic to question it.

"If I write that Putin will never become a judo champion of the world, that, too, would be considered unpatriotic?" asked a popular journalist, Yuri Shchekochikhin, on the pages of *Novaya Gazeta* in the spring of 2003. He soon died a strange death. Those in the know say that he was poisoned by one of the poisons developed by the KGB. This is indirectly confirmed by the curtain

of official silence which until this day has surrounded his death, despite the fact that he was a deputy of the government Duma.

Yuri Shchekochikhin was a fierce critic of Putin, whom he suspected in the bombing of the apartment buildings in Moscow in 1999 (which led to the war in Chechnya).

All politicians who asserted this were subjected to repressions. Some were killed, others were banished overseas, still others are languishing in Russian prisons. Until recently, Putin disassociated himself from these repressions, preferring to put the blame on his subordinates. More recently, since he has achieved absolute power, he no longer hides his participation.

Putin's lies are many. I will cite two examples:

In June of 2000, Putin was in Spain when the well-known journalist, Vladimir Gussinsky was arrested. *Media-Most*, his holding company, not only criticized Putin's war in Chechnya, but made fun of Putin personally. Putin, as is well known, does not tolerate being ridiculed.

The international public demanded explanations, and Putin found nothing better to say than that he could not get through to the General Prosecutor, Oustinov, in Moscow on the telephone. This was clearly a lie, since the possibility that a head of state could be out of touch with his government while on a state visit abroad is patently absurd.

Russia's popular satirist, Victor Shenderovich, truly distinguished himself in his comments on Putin's lame explanation. From that day onward, whenever a news item would appear regarding a conversation of Putin with the General Prosecutor, Shenderovich would ironically comment from the television screen, "Finally, he was able to get through on the telephone!"

He kidded around only until the television company, TVS, for which he worked, was dismantled, and he himself was shut down. The last laugh was Putin's.

The second example of Putin's lies is more cynical. In October of 2003, Putin announced to American journalists that the nerve-paralyzing gas from which the hostages in the theater in Dubrovka had died in October of 2002, was harmless! He said that it could not have possibly caused any harm to the people in the theater, that they must have become victims of dehydration and their own chronic illnesses.

The general Russian movement "For the Human Rights of

People" published a special notice regarding the fact that this assertion of the President is totally wrong.

Irina Hakamada, who was trying to save the hostages in Dubrovka, told the press that Putin himself chose the gas. She told the press that this was an act of special cynicism, because although Putin is not a specialist in gasses, he knew perfectly well that the gas he had picked would either kill the hostages or would leave them invalids. This speaks of the cruelty and merciless nature of Putin, qualities far from the covenants of Christianity.

The parents of 14-year-old Nina Milovidova, who died in Dubrovka, filed a lawsuit in the Tverskoi Court of Moscow against Putin and the weekly *Kommersant-Vlast* regarding honor and dignity. They are demanding damages for their moral anguish.

In the complaint it says: "The published information regarding the 'gas being harmless and that it could not cause harm to humans is blatantly false; further, it causes the plaintiffs pain and moral suffering."

To file a lawsuit against Putin in today's Russia is the epitome of civic courage. In fact, on June 5, 2004, the Tverskoi Regional Court of Moscow humiliated the bereaved relatives by ruling that Putin's lies affected only the victims, and that the interests of their relatives had not been touched. This means that only those who died could have brought a lawsuit against Putin, who by virtue of his position is beyond the law in Russia. The court declined to examine the claim of Nina Milovidova's parents and of other victims of the theater disaster in Dubrovka.

PATRIARCH PUTIN?

"When Its Talon Gets Caught in the Net, the Bird Perishes"

I can clearly imagine the scenario which will play out in ROCOR parishes, once they join Moscow. A guest from Moscow will come knocking at the rector's door.

"Hello, I am your new rector!" he'll introduce himself and pass him the patriarch's order of appointment."

"What do you mean?" the host-priest will stutter in amazement. "I am the rector!"

"Not any more you're not. Now I am! You were the one who dreamt of two Churches under one patriarch? Well now, he's appointed me."

"But what about the wide autonomy he promised us? I'm going to complain!" exclaims the former rector, feeling deeply slighted.

"Complain to whom?!" the Moscow guest will ask sarcastically, and the host-priest will lower his beard in guilt.

It is true that there will be no one to complain to. American law will not come to the rescue because this situation is outside its jurisdiction.

On the heels of the new rector, not just a group of priests will arrive, but also a church warden, an assistant manager, a treasurer, a chauffeur, and all of their wives. The current budget of the Russian Federation for military and defense needs is the greatest in its history. There will be enough cash to go around.

Now many ROCOR priests would say with a good-natured smile: "What can they do without us? We are the ones who know the local conditions, the parishioners."

But in the nearby residence of the SVR,³⁶ they also know the local conditions, and I assure you, no less well. As far as the parishioners go, KGB agents will manage them quite well, thank you, especially since they consider themselves "doctors of human souls." A mass recruitment effort of émigrés will begin.

The joining of ROCOR to the MP is part of Putin's administrative reforms, which are leading to a strengthening of its departmental and territorial areas with the goal of facilitating their management by the government. Right now, everything in Russia, starting with businesses, is being placed once again under the government's heel. Those who are insubordinate will be quickly destroyed.

Echoes of promises to grant ROCOR wide autonomy are blatant lies. No autonomy, whether wide or narrow, exists in Russia. Presently, every last remnant of local self-rule is being eliminated. Elections of local governors have been cancelled.

Maybe there is autonomy somewhere in the Moscow Patriarchate, one might ask. But there, too, power is vertically integrated, from the top down, with the harshness of military discipline. Ask any young priest, "What does the Church resemble on the inside?" He will say to you: "The army."

Putin is following in Stalin's footsteps. Stalin, who always tried to annex adjoining territories, is his idol. Renaming Karelia "Karelo-Finnish SSR", he invaded Finland, and annexed part of its territory. He renamed Buryatia "Buryat-Mongolia", and Mongolia,

de facto, became a part of the Soviet Union. The swallowing up of ROCOR will mean that Putin's "vertically integrated power" will extend well beyond the borders of the RF, to Russian immigrants.

The material manifestation of this "vertical integration of power" will be that former ROCOR churches will become the personal property of the RF government. A participant of the Commission on Talks with the Moscow Patriarchate recently revealed that foreign real estate is now managed by the President's Administration — Russia's largest private real estate owner-octopus, and its only free entrepreneur.

With this new church real estate, Putin will receive a bastion of Russian political influence in all the major cities of the world. And which department, do you think, manages it overseas? That's right, the Intelligence Service. Therefore, all churches will inevitably become espionage residences.

To suddenly acquire approximately 300 foreign "espionage posts" is a dream come true for any intelligence service. That is the number of posts that they currently have. To *double* that number will require doubling the number of generals and foreign vacancies at these properties. Working overseas, which has remained an unattainable dream for many agents because of the shrinking number of vacancies overseas, will suddenly come within reach. A delectable opportunity such as this will never be allowed to slip away from the grasp of RF Intelligence Service.

Doubling its presence in the West is especially important now, in light of the cooling off between the West and the RF, and Russia's reversion to isolationism. During World War II the Red Army, following KGB directives, left behind "diversion" groups on territories which were about to be invaded by the Germans.

Today, the RF is confidently stepping into a leadership role with miscreant countries such as Cuba, Iran, and North Korea. Friendship with them is growing by leaps and bounds, but Western leaders do not understand the danger. They will only cry foul after the fact, when suddenly they will find three hundred new residences under their noses, owned not by private Russian interests, but by the Russian government itself. Only then will they start spending billions of dollars in a belated attempt to mitigate the damage.

This is precisely why dialog on the union of the Churches has always been cloaked in such secrecy. This was not a dialog; it has

always been nothing more than a game of surrender with only one goal post. From the earliest days, some of ROCOR's hierarchs openly worked for Moscow. When I hear that a ROCOR delegation is headed by Archbishop Mark for the millionth time, I cannot stop myself from making a bitter joke: "Moscow is talking to Moscow!"

For seventy years now, ROCOR has been the object of KGB infiltration. I have personally held in my hands a KGB plan of action regarding ROCOR's dissolution. It is not surprising that something was bound to be accomplished in all this time. ROCOR is so small, and the KGB has at its disposal unlimited resources of an enormous government. It is certainly in a position to replace all of ROCOR's clergy.

However, the KGB is unable to recruit all of the faithful. Many of them have spoken out against a union with Moscow. They do not believe that the MP is independent of the government. They are fearful of what is going on in Putin's Russia. This is where our hopes lie for a resurrection of the Church.

MP A TOOL OF THE RF

Westerners, who are accustomed to clarity, have a difficult time understanding that the dialog on the unification is not really taking place with the MP, which has no power of her own. She is just another dependent of the RF government. Even her own churches do not belong to her. They were expropriated by the Bolsheviks in 1917, and so they remain to this very day. The churches are only on a "limitless loan" to the MP. And in the RF, "limitless" means "forever". If Putin were to cool in his attitude toward religion and the Church, all of the MP's holdings would disappear into thin air.

In its dialog with ROCOR, the MP is only playing the part of an actor/reader, who artfully sounds out the script written by someone else for him, in this case, by the administration of the president, the Foreign Service Intelligence, and the real estate mafia, which controls the property in the country and abroad. It is the inclusion of the mafia that explains the need to hurry with the swallowing up of ROCOR process. The mafia does not like to be kept waiting.

In Russia, all the priests are required to "give" money to the church leaders above them. The foreign priests who serve in

ROCOR churches today cannot understand this Russian custom of giving bribes to their church leaders.

Another thing that foreign priests do not understand, is that they will be considered dangerous by the new owners of ROCOR. Now that unification is official, each parish will begin to have an influx of sociable young men from the nearest Russian Federation Consulate. For these young, a foreign priest in the parish is unnecessary. They will react to him about as they would to a CIA agent in their midst, and will prefer an "approved" *batushka*³⁷ with a red passport.

The cunning appeals for unification emanating from Moscow are full of gaps. For instance, it is said that there is no longer a difference between ROCOR and the MP, except for their position on Sergianism and ecumenism.

In reality, however, there are real differences, and there are many. In ROCOR, for instance, there is more respect toward the faithful. They do not close parish meetings until everyone who wants to participate has had an opportunity to express himself. In ROCOR, church rituals are performed with great care, exactly following the canons of Czarist Russia. The MP, however, takes a much more lenient and flexible approach toward the canons, as was recently demonstrated in the Chuvash Republic.

In the Chuvash Republic worship of pagans cults is still alive. Recently a statue of a pagan goddess was erected in Cheboksary, its capital. The Orthodox Metropolitan Varnava of the Chuvash diocese sanctified the statue, with the full consent of Aleksey II.³⁸ This is only one example of how the Russian Church has deviated from Orthodoxy.

Another difference between ROCOR and the MP lies in the bricks and mortar. ROCOR parishes (or in some cases dioceses) own their own church buildings completely, whereas MP churches belong to the government. When changing their jurisdiction, a ROCOR parish can sometimes take the church building with it, while an MP parish cannot. The parish must leave the church building and all its property to the MP.

Initially it was thought that ROCOR would join the MP together with its property. But this received negative press, and caused indignation among the faithful. The FSB will begin to achieve their goals of property acquisition through more devious means.

They will begin to gain a foothold in ROCOR parish councils.

Working with the parish councils will go quite smoothly. Patriots will be recruited easily, indecisive members will be bought, and those too intelligent to cooperate will be bumped off. The next wave of immigrants will come from the RF with the explicit assignment from the Intelligence Service to infiltrate parish councils. If now, a donation of one thousand dollars is considered a sizeable sum, the Moscow crowd will bring in donations of tens of thousands of dollars.

In the end, the parish councils will vote to unite their churches with Moscow. As for the pseudo-immigrants, there are already plenty of them here. I discovered this to my amazement when I first arrived in America. These people were sent over to corrupt the émigré community from within. Their work is bearing fine fruit.

Not long ago here, in America, I made the acquaintance of one ROCOR priest. As is customary, I first asked him under whose omophorion he serves — Metropolitan Laurus or Metropolitan Vitaly.

"Currently under Laurus," he told me. "And then we'll see."

What will happen is something that already occurred once in the history of Russia — the Whites left and the Reds filled the vacuum. With unification, the descendants of the Bolsheviks have destroyed the last, miraculously spared, bastion of Tsarist Russia.

IS THE GODLESS REGIME REALLY GONE?

On November 7, 2004, at the Cathedral of St. John, the Baptist in Washington, DC, Bishop Michael of Boston served a *panikhida*³⁹ for those murdered by the godless Soviet regime. Afterward, he gave a sermon in which he accentuated that luckily the godless Communist authority had finally disappeared into the past.

Just walking into the church hall where there was to be a reception for the bishop, one saw proof that this is not so. There on the bulletin board hung a poster advertising the Ensemble of Dance and Song of the Russian Army under Alexandroff. This was the same Alexandroff who wrote the Stalinist anthem, which initially bore the title of "Hymn of the Bolshevik Party." This anthem is sung today in the new Russia.

The advertisement was dotted with red flags. The Russian army was called "the Red Army", the very army which created the victims for whom the *panikhida* had just been served. The most prominent spot on the poster was saved for a coat of arms, but not for the double-headed eagle, as one would expect, but a "hammer

and sickle" Soviet emblem. The Ensemble of Song and Dance is a sub-department of the Defense Ministry. The advertising flyer could only have been approved by them. What other proof does one need of Russia's return to its Soviet past?

Many Russian immigrants are confused by what happened to the godless regime: did it disappear or is it still in place? On the one hand, it has already been buried; but on the other, starting with Putin, the same people are still in power.

If they repented, they would cease being a part of the godless regime. But they never had any intentions of doing that. On the contrary, in today's Russia everything Soviet is glorified. The lawsuit brought against the KPSS (the Communist Party) in 1991 sputtered out under the weight of the powerful Communist lobby. Moreover, the Russian people did not repent of the murder of the royal family. And the Moscow Patriarchate did not repent of its collaboration with the KGB or of working with the Communists. No one in Russia repented of anything, except for a hand-full of intellectuals in the early 1990s.

But they were atheists. As far as I can tell, I am the only one who repented in a formal church way. Afterwards, I announced my repentance from a television screen in a program called "Totally Confidential", appealing to all of my fellow KGB agents to repent in the eyes of our Lord.

The next day my phone was ringing off the hook.

"We have nothing to repent for" screamed the enraged voices of both young and old agents.

In the end, I had to flee to America, saving myself from the wrath of retribution of my former colleagues. That is the kind of penance brought by Russia. Nevertheless, many Russian immigrants feel as though there has been some kind of repentance.

Bishop Michael of Boston (now of Geneva), for example, used to be against the union with Moscow, but now he's for it. I asked him whether he felt any remorse at giving up his flock to be sacrificed to the KGB. I reminded him that the Moscow *batushkas* will bring with them Putin's government headed by Special Services, who will begin a massive recruitment drive among Russian immigrants. And then they, the Russian immigrants, *en masse*, will be caught by the FBI. Both intelligence services will be pleased, although many lives will have been broken.

The bishop replied with a historic phrase: "To be Orthodox

means to be loyal to Russia," thereby offering his approval of the recruitment. But today's Russia is not the same naïve and kindly agricultural country his ancestors had left behind.

Putin's Russia is reminiscent of Hitler's Germany. I remembered the words of the old émigré, Count Lamsdorf, regarding his compatriots who had helped the USSR: "They thought that they were helping Russia, but were really helping the Soviet Union." Today, they will be helping Putin's KGB Empire.

Bishop Michael explained to me that recruitment has also been relegated to the past, together with the godless regime. He told me that this is because Russia has become Orthodox, and considers the Russian immigrants to be their friends, not their enemies. The head of Russian Intelligence, however, Colonel General Sergey Nikolayevich Lebedev, has never said that Russian immigrants are no longer recruited. Bishop Michael has put words into his mouth.

In fact, the RF government has never made such a statement regarding their position on émigrés. They refer to Russian immigrants as compatriots, nothing more. Officially, Russia is not an Orthodox country. By population, the largest component are Tatars,⁴⁰ who are Muslims, and Putin constantly makes reference to Russia as either Orthodox or Muslim, depending on his audience, because Putin wants to make Russia a member of the League of Muslim countries. This could never be even considered by a leader of a truly Orthodox Russia.

As for recruitment of Russian immigrants, Putin has made it an intelligence service priority item, side by side with the political and techno-scientific and illegal espionage. Circumstances have pushed Putin into doing so. There are so many Russian immigrants now that it is necessary to control them somehow. If they start to expose Putin, he's in deep trouble. Generally, loyalty can only be achieved through the aid of intelligence, which has access to secrets.

Work with Russian immigrants, in the language of the KGB, is called "Operation EM". In this operation, an assistant has recently been added to each of the many residents of the Foreign Intelligence Service in the entire world. A group of agents working exclusively on Russian immigrants is reporting directly to him. This fresh supply of blood is what can explain the unbelievable aggressiveness in swallowing up the Church Abroad. Young officers want to show "operative" results. They're clawing their way into the Church Abroad from all sides.

It is easy to recruit Russian immigrants. In their souls, many of them cherish an exaggeratedly romantic picture of their homeland, which bears little resemblance to the severe reality of Russian life today. These Russian immigrants experience a sense of guilt toward their motherland, which creates fertile ground for recruitment.

It reminds me of the story of the city of Kitezh,⁴¹ familiar to émigrés who still long for their old ways. A Russian legend tells that rather than submit to the Mongols, the city of Kitezh sank into the lake with all its inhabitants. On Midsummer Eve, the story continues, one can see the lights of the city blinking in the depths. In 1905 Rimsky-Korsakov used this legend as the theme for his opera *The Invisible City of Kitezh and the Maiden Fevronia*.

All you have to say to such an immigrant is, "You need to help Russia!", and he already has tears in his eyes. This is called "recruitment on the basis of patriotism." Accursed nostalgic Intelligence uses nostalgia to its best advantage.

Karl Marx used to say that "consciousness lags behind being." Many Russian immigrants are living proof of the validity of this concept. Russia is returning to Stalinism, yet the immigrants still believe that somewhere, there is the city Kitezh.

However, the greatest value for Intelligence is presented not by the Russian immigrants but by native Russian Orthodox Americans, English, and French. The non-immigrants have greater access to secrets, therefore their intelligence potential is also greater. Not knowing where the underwater rocks of Russian life lie, naïve by their Westerners' nature, and believing in their priest completely, they will become easy prey for the Russian Intelligence. In recent years it has become clear that many of the priests who have not become agents of Russian Intelligence have left the new unified church.

THE DELUSION OF OUR BISHOPS

In its passion to please the MP, ROCOR's leadership is attributing qualities to it that the MP does not even claim for itself. For instance, in an open letter, the MP declared that it did not wish to criticize Metropolitan Sergius, whose canonization is currently under discussion, but considers him a holy man. ROCOR's leadership, however, continues to sing the praises of the Moscow

Patriarchate for its supposed rejection of Sergianism!

In its October 2004, Epistle of the Synod of Bishops of ROCOR to its God-loving flock, the hierarchs wrote that the MP document titled "Basic Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church" by its very nature condemns Metropolitan Sergius' Declaration and the course it had chartered.

But nowhere could I find this condemnation of Sergianism in the actual document; I found only praise. In fact, this "Concept" contains no mention of the persecution of the Church during the Soviet period. It is as though the authors of the "Concept" are deliberately ignoring documented history at the expense of their ROCOR friends.

They characterize the persecution of the Church using the words from its All-Russia Council of 1990, which was convened by the Sergianists under the authority of the Bolsheviks. This Council unemotionally states that after the Council of 1917-1918 all local Councils "were conducted in conditions when history made it impossible to return to pre-Revolutionary principles of church-governmental relations."

The Council continues thus: "In the course of its thousand-year history, the Russian Orthodox Church nurtured the faithful in the spirit of patriotism and peace. Patriotism is expressed in the careful relationship to the historical legacy of the Motherland, in active citizenship, which includes participation in the joys and troubles of one's own nation, in zealous and noble labor, in the care for the moral condition of society, in the preservation of nature."

The ROCOR bishops were seduced by the words referring to the Church's total independence from the State, to the point that they believed that they were entitled to be insubordinate to the State, if the Russian government were to force the Orthodox faithful to deviate from traditional Russian Orthodox values. They failed to realize that the Unification would bring ROCOR under the authority of the Russian government.

Contrary to their fondest beliefs, the Church cannot be independent of the State. Most Church properties in Russia belong to the State, and they are totally dependent on the State for everything. The State even has the power to turn off essential services such as electricity and heat, as they are doing even now in order to demonstrate their control during routine arrests. The ROCOR/MP cannot survive without the assistance of the Russian government.



**THE NEW "TROIKA":
METROPOLITAN LAURUS, VLADIMIR PUTIN, & PATRIARCH ALEKSEY II
MAY 17, 2007**

PART TWO

RUSSIA AND THE PRESS

Chapter 6

THE FSB'S WAR AGAINST FREE SPEECH

Freedom of speech was one of the few victories the young Russian democracy gained after the fall of the Communist Regime in 1991. Now it has been destroyed. Today's mafia-ridden Russian capitalism does not need this freedom. The premier persecutor of free speech is President Putin himself, a graduate of the KGB. The FSB has become the main instrument of suppressing freedom of speech in newly democratic Russia.

The ideological basis for the persecution of freedom of speech in Russia was contained in Putin's "Concept of Informational Safety," which he presented immediately after being elected. Its meaning is KGB-agent-cunning. It consists of transferring the rules for handling "confidential information" to handling "all information", and applying it to freedom of speech in Russia. Confidential information indeed demands certain restrictions in its dissemination. But information which is not "confidential" should not be kept secret and should be accessible to everyone in a democratic society. The goal of Putin's move was to declare all information confidential, since any kind of information regarding weaknesses within the country can be used by the enemy in case of a military attack.

Putin was not the inventor of this concept. Its authorship belongs to Stalin who, in 1947, ordered that all information related to the activity of the government be considered a government secret. From then on, Soviet people had no right to tell their friends even the most basic things, such as where they worked, even if they only worked as simple laborers in a factory. They could not disclose what the factory produced, even if it only baked bread, because even bread could be considered a part of strategically important production. No one knows how many millions of people were imprisoned in Stalinist Russia for breaking this rule!

The FSB and freedom of speech are incompatible. It is a descendant of the Soviet KGB, which was formed under conditions characterized by the absence of freedom of speech, when the last remnants of freedom of speech were being destroyed after the Communist revolution of 1917.

Bolshevism owes its birth not only to Marxism, which was embraced by its adherents in Russia, but to Russian tradition, as well. In Russia, historically, there was always a fear of freedom of speech.

A GENETIC HATRED OF JOURNALISTS

The first indications of free journalism in Russia occurred shortly before the revolution, during the reign of Nicholas II. Colorful literary expressions began to appear on the pages of many newspapers and magazines. Serious articles by political scientists, by economists, and by philosophers also appeared. Russian journalism of that time became famous for its satire and humor.

Having been held back for centuries, Russian journalism broke free just before the First World War, giving birth to a series of excellent humorists, the most important of whom was Arkady Averchenko. He was the first journalist to ridicule Lenin and the Bolshevik Party's cruel politics in his brilliant articles. Averchenko fled the Soviet Union in 1920, traveling to Constantinople, and from there to Prague, where he continued to publish his sharply accusatory pamphlets in exile.

Not one of the Russian journalists who had written for the Soviet press prior to the revolution was permitted to be published after the Bolsheviks came to power. Most of them managed to emigrate, and those who did not, for whatever reason, were executed. Nevertheless, a handful of the most resilient remained, although they were forbidden to publish under their own names.

Throughout the seventy years of Bolshevik rule, the tradition of humoristic journalism was preserved in Russia. However, because of its potential to influence popular opinion and in order to control its content, it was preëempted by the KGB. All the humorist writers became KGB agents and were only allowed to publish under its control. They were forbidden to ridicule the Communist Party, Lenin, and the ideals of Communism. Anyone who tried to do so soon found himself in the concentration camps.

Luckily, everything in Russia is perpetually left unfinished. Before the journalists were almost totally annihilated, the Bolsheviks suddenly realized that somebody had to form a new Soviet press!

Thus, in January 1918, the first group of surviving journalists was mobilized for service to the Soviet government. They created

TASS and the first Communist newspapers. Fearing for their lives, and being forced to pretend and to lie, they could not, of course, be considered an example of honest journalism. They were the unfortunate ones who created the infamous Soviet newspaper writing style, so well-known to the world as unspecific, unprincipled, frequently misleading or misinforming, and extremely boring.

The pre-revolutionary journalists, having been deprived of any opportunity to write analytical articles, were only allowed one type of work, the rewriting of articles of the "worker-peasant-correspondents," *i.e.* the simple folk, mostly illiterate, or at best with one or two grades of the elementary school to their credit. These people, duped by the Bolshevik propaganda, imagined themselves writers and began to inundate the editorial offices with mountains of letters exposing petty dysfunctions of the Soviet government, expressing their rationalization proposals for industries and, of course, castigating "enemies of the people."

These articles were so illiterate and disjointed that an ordinary reader could never understand them. So the former bourgeois journalists grudgingly gave these letters literary face-lifts. That was the only type of work they could ever hope for.

It was in those very years that the KGB, which at that point was called the *Cheka*, the Extraordinary Commission on Fighting Counterrevolution, Speculation and Sabotage, was in the process of being formed in Russia. The infamous word *chekist* came about from this abbreviation. That is why the KGB, being the same age as the Soviet press, from its inception has been accustomed to viewing the press as dependent exclusively on it, since at any moment any journalist could always have been arrested or executed.

To this day, any sign of independence by a journalist is misinterpreted and hated in the FSB. They perceive freedom of speech to be an existential threat and believe they cannot exist without hatred toward the concept free expression.

In the early 1970s, in my early student years, as a fledgling historian, I was eager to become acquainted with the last remaining representatives of Tsarist Russia. I managed to meet quite a few noblemen, and even princes, as well as White officers, who had been through Stalin's concentration camps. I even met some priests, although religion in the USSR had been "eliminated". I

also met those who had collaborated with Hitler's occupying forces during World War II, people who had somehow survived their years in Russian prisons. But I never got to meet even a single journalist of Tsarist Russia. All of them who had not been able to flee the country were destroyed in the concentration camps. That is how dangerous independent journalism was for Communists!

In Gorbachev's time, when it became possible to speak more or less freely, a long-smoldering scandal in the APN ⁴² finally burst into flames. Staff journalists of the APN were outraged that they were being paid many times less than free-lance authors, and demanded an explanation for this discrimination from the Department of Labor Remuneration.

The department avoided addressing this issue for a long time and then, finally bending to the spirit of the new times, produced Lenin's secret order, signed by him in 1921. It ordered that "bourgeois" (i.e. professional journalists) be paid several times less than the illiterate worker-peasant correspondents who sent their letters to the APN.

However, by the 1980s both types of journalists had disappeared, leaving behind a single homogeneous class of corrupt, lying Soviet journalists. Those who came from intellectual but poor families, and those who came from clans of well-to-do (provided for by the party bureaucracy) were educated side by side in the journalism departments of the MGU (Moscow Government University) or the Institute of International Relations.

Those who then joined the ranks of staff reporters of the APN received far less for the same articles than their friends and colleagues, sending APN their correspondence from London and Paris, who were still using the privileges of the illiterate worker-peasant correspondents of the 1920s.

It just so happens that many members of the Party leadership, most of whose children became foreign correspondents, had themselves been from that illiterate-worker-peasant background.

That is how the tradition of the KGB's involvement in the press corps has developed. And that is why Russia's short-lived freedom of speech aroused irritation and anger within the FSB. The FSB does not know how to work with a free press, and considers freedom of expression a threat to its very existence.

According to information leaked from the FSB, Putin has dedicated enormous sums of money to the recruitment of

journalists. This kind of relationship with the press finds sympathy and understanding with today's President Putin. He himself is from the *chekists*, and has been raised to totally reject freedom of speech. It is not just that he is from the KGB for I, too, am from the KGB. The difference is that Putin is in power and considers freedom of the press to be a threat to the autocracy he intends to build.

The threat does not end there. Putin is a representative of today's criminal Russian capitalism. His criminality is two-sided.

The first side is that in Russia today the mafia plays a large role in economic life. And the second side is that today's oligarchs receive privileges from the government by patronage, through criminal channels. They do not need freedom of speech. There are many avenues for criminal redistribution of private property, by means such as embezzlements and secret transfers of Russian capital overseas.

Independent journalists' investigations are therefore most unwelcome there. Putin needs to protect the secrecy of these illegal activities. Putin's administration has delegated its battle with the independent press to the FSB, and the *chekists* have gladly accepted this assignment.

The FSB has many enemies, including the mafia, corruption, and espionage, to name just a few; but the *chekists* seem to take special delight in doing battle with the journalists. Sometimes their hatred toward journalists surfaces in the most surprising ways.

For instance, in 1997, in an effort to fight the mafia (not the journalists), President Boris Yeltsin appointed the boss of the local FSB office, General Victor Kondratov, as his personal representative in the Primorski Region to serve as head of the Directorate of the FSB for the Primorski Region.

In Russia, there is still an illusion that the FSB is not intertwined with the mafia or engaged in corruption. General Kondratov's mission was to create an opposition to the governor, Eugene Nazdratenko, who had sunk into corruption. Governor Nazdratenko's administration was conspicuous with its mass embezzlements of everything, by turning off heat and electricity to the Far East, and mostly by its threat to separate from Russia with its energy-rich resources.

Once he realized he was being challenged, Governor Nazdratenko immediately began his stalling tactics. In June of

1997, he gave an interview to the Moscow magazine, *Profile*, in which he declared that with the arrival of Victor Kondratov, his best officers had left the directorate, resulting in a rapid increase in crime throughout the region. This interview was targeted toward innocent people who did not understand the intricacies of government operations. The FSB does not fight crime, which is the job for the local *militia* (police). But the opinion of the governor, of course, fell onto fertile ground with the Far Easterners, innocent of the workings of the special services.

In December of the same year, Victor Kondratov brought a lawsuit demanding vindication of his honor and dignity. But the representative of the Moscow magazine *Profile*, who wrote the article, never appeared in the Vladivostok court, since an airline ticket to Vladivostok from Moscow costs about as much as a flight to the USA. And so this lawsuit still languishes.

Having lost his battle with the governor, General Kondratov began to fight the local press, which had brought his corruption to the public's attention.

For this he devised a most ingenious plan. He began to hold his press conferences in the FSB's building, where only the chosen ones can step over its threshold.

This building has two entrances. The main one is for employees of the counter-intelligence section of the FSB, and the other, a secret side door, is for the clandestine officers of the domestic intelligence service. How can anyone allow a loose-lipped journalist into a building like that?

It is understood that Kondratov made exceptions only for the former agents of the KGB. But then again, not for all of them, but only for those who are most trusted, those verified and strengthened by many years of collaboration and whose files include compromising materials on themselves as well.

This is the reason that press conferences of the representative of the president of Russia in the Primorsk Region were poorly attended by only a handful of agents. It looked like a mockery.

A couple of days prior to the scheduled press conference, all the newspapers would receive their invitations, and at the appointed hour a crowd of journalists would gather by the FSB building.

And almost every one of the journalists would be thrown completely off by the condescending sneer of a guard, who would comment:

"There is no pass here for you."

"What do you mean there is none?" the journalist would ask indignantly. "Our publication ordered passes two days ago!"

"I know nothing about it!" would be the solemn reply of the guard. "Phone the Officer in Charge of the building, Colonel Petrov!"

But even Colonel Petrov would declare that he did not know anything about any passes. In the end, the majority of journalists were cut off from any sources of information.

But this was not the end of General Kondratov's inventiveness. He created a gigantic press corps, demonstrating therewith that there were many officers with nothing to do in the FSB. From morning to night they phoned all the publishers of newspapers and magazines of the Primorsk Region, and the television stations, recommending which materials they should publish, and which ones should be removed.

Thus they tried to follow in the footsteps of the secretaries of the regional committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet times, who would also either permit or forbid publication. These came in the form of a "recommendation", in order not to carry any responsibility, since the leading role of the party apparatus was not formulated in a legal manner.

All the bureaucrats in the country knew, however, that the true master in the land was the Party, and that its "recommendations" meant much more than someone else's "order". In the 1990s, however, the FSB had not yet become Russia's full-fledged master. Therefore, the Primorsk journalists courageously complained to Moscow, and published articles in the central press exposing General Kondratov.

The saga ended with General Kondratov's being removed, not only from his post as personal representative of President Yeltsin of the Primorsk Region, but also from the FSB. However, the activity of Kondratov did not remain without consequences.

Corruption in the Primorsk Region prospered even more, and the free press disappeared completely. Now the local papers only print facts, without comments. It is frightening to read them.

Chapter 7

RUSSIA LOSES ITS FREEDOM

These actions set the stage psychologically for the current FSB attack on freedom of speech. Putin's rise to his presidential post was marked by repression of freedom of the press not seen since the Soviet days.

In his inaugural speech, Putin made it very clear that he is not inclined to support democratic institutions. He directly stated the following: "We will support democratic institutions, but they, too, must serve the interests of society." This is spoken in code. Democratic institutions serve the interests, not of society as a whole, but of separate individuals. It happens at times that the majority is not right; either they are easily fooled or politically immature, and only one individual is correct. Russia has seen many examples of this in its history.

One recent example was that of the academician, Andrei Sakharov, a fearless fighter against Communism and the KGB during the 1970s and 1980s.

Another example took place on the morning of May 11, 2000, when a crowd of FSB men wearing black masks surrounded a fancy mansion in one of Moscow's ancient side streets, where the *Media-Most* ("Media-Bridge") headquarters was located. *Media-Most* is a holding company for the television channel NTV, the newspaper *Sevodnya* ("Today"), and other mass media outlets. During the presidential elections, these media outlets supported Gregory Yavlinsky, President Putin's current opponent. Therein lay their guilt. They also criticized the war in Chechnya.

The back street where *Media-Most* is located is called Palashevski. In medieval Russian, *palash*, a Tatar word, means "the sword". In the Middle Ages, tradesmen who made swords for the Kremlin guards were located here. The Kremlin itself is nearby; its red brick towers rise over the roofs of the neighboring houses.

From my KGB days, I know that the alleyways and side streets adjacent to the Kremlin are guarded with utmost care. Hundreds of video cameras record everything that takes place there. It is difficult to imagine that the guards of the Kremlin did not notice the multitude of armed men that day. Ergo, Putin knew everything in advance.

It was officially reported that the reason for such aggressive FSB action was the earlier criminal proceedings taken against the former leaders of the Finance Ministry of Russia under Article 285, Part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The Article is called "Abuse of Administrative Authority" and carries a penalty of up to three years in prison. However, the managers of the holding company *Media-Most* could find no logical tie between actions of the former managers of the Finance Ministry of Russia and itself.

FSB officers acted in an exaggeratedly rude manner, as though they were dealing with bandits, not journalists. Fragile secretaries were physically thrown out of their offices, stood face against the wall, and crudely manhandled. Those who expressed indignation were informed, "If you do not want to stand facing the wall for four hours, you'll lie on the floor in handcuffs for four hours."

As strange as it may seem, this type of aggressiveness is not historically characteristic of the KGB. It was more characteristic of the *militzia* (police in other countries). Even during Stalin's repressions, the employees of the NKVD (precursor of the KGB), while arresting innocent people, acted more or less in a dignified manner. They allowed themselves truly to be themselves only in the torture chambers, where there were no outsiders. That was the unique style of the KGB, as I was taught myself in the Minsk School of Counter-intelligence during the 1970s. Today, on the other hand, the FSB has deteriorated to the level of a crude police force. For that particular reason the FSB presents an especially grave danger for Russian society.

The main initiator of this barbaric action against *Media-Most* was General Zaostrovstev, the deputy director of the FSB. In the latter 1980s he, like thousands of other KGB agents, left the KGB, and started to involve himself in banking and commercial business. But in present-day Russia, banking and commerce are synonymous with criminal activity. So Zaostrovstev, together with a group of colleagues, all former *chekists*, returned to the FSB in order to protect himself. In the mass media outlets of *Media-Most*, stories regarding General Zaostrovstev's financial schemes were published frequently. He presided over the FSB meeting at which it was resolved to take *Media-Most* in hand.

A TV program, "Independent Investigation", was shown on NTV in March, 2000. It provoked the wrath of the FSB. The

program discussed the bombings of the apartment buildings in Moscow in the fall of 1999. The program reported how they were not, as the authorities would have you believe, the work of Chechen extremists, but the work of Russian special services.

According to sources close to Kremlin bureaucrats, Putin saw this television program as a personal affront.

FSB employees confiscated many video recordings from the *Media-Most* offices. This was done without any formal charges, breaking current laws. If these documents were to be attached to a criminal lawsuit, the law forbids publicizing them until a verdict can be reached.

However, that is not what happened at all. The FSB considers itself above the law. In the evening of the same day that *Media-Most* was stormed, an official representative of the FSB, General Zdanovich appeared on the TV screens of pro-government Channels One and Two. General Zdanovich had an angry look on his face, and, shaking some papers in front of him, he began screaming that his agents found solid proof of illegal operational-investigative activity in *Media-Most*.

In today's Russia, all firms are forced to be engaged in this type of illegal activity in one form or another. They cannot, after all, depend on the police force to help them. Although the Russian *militia* has the largest number of officers of any police force in the world, businessmen are viewed only as objects for extortion. The force is very weak when it comes to protection, so unfortunate entrepreneurs are forced to depend only on their own resources. That is the reason why there is such a tremendous number of private protection agencies in Russia; the government agencies, which are supposed to protect the citizens, are ineffective.

The FSB is jealous of these private protection agencies since they have attracted the best from KGB's Counter-intelligence Service at a time when only the worst agents remained to fill vacancies at the FSB after the overthrow of Communism.

Media-Most decided to bring a libel lawsuit against General Zdanovich. It was the first of its kind in the recent history of Russia.

Moscow's Kuntsevsky Court (a local, lower court) found the "evidence" collected by the FSB not to be substantiated by the reality, and found it damaging to the reputation of the plaintiff! The court ordered the FSB to publicly repudiate it.

But the journalists started celebrating their victory too early. The Moscow City Court, known for its goodwill toward the special services, threw out the decision of the Kuntsevsky court. Pavel Astakhov, *Media-Most's* attorney, called the decision an "act of unprecedented legal arbitrariness."

Mass media demanded accurate and concrete responses from President Putin regarding these events. He pretended not to know anything about it, as his idol, Stalin, did so often. Putin's press service replied on his behalf that "in front of the law, all are equal."

This may be so in other parts of the world, but not in Russia. Perhaps all are equal in Denmark, where the law protects the individual, or in Germany or in England. But in Russia, the law was always used as an instrument for political revenge. And that is how it is used now too. As a former *chekist*, Putin certainly knows this! I am equally certain that, when he was working in the KGB, he himself utilized the law precisely in this manner.

The shameful storming of the *Media-Most* offices by the strongmen of the FSB gave birth to the first political joke in Putin's Russia. Question: "I wonder, why did FSB strongmen storming *Media-Most* offices hide their faces behind black masks?" Answer: "Because President Putin himself was among them!"

After this, the offices of *Media-Most* were searched another thirty-eight times. Up to five hundred employees of the General Prosecutor's office and the FSB participated in each of these raids. It is difficult to believe that they had nothing better to do. It is far easier to believe that this was a calculated program of pure revenge.

What did this media holding company do to so attract Putin's ire? On an NTV television programs, in their Sunday night program called *Kukly* (dolls), they criticized and ridiculed him. Putin is a vengeful man and reacts pathologically to criticism. These personality traits were nurtured in him by his KGB work and make Putin strikingly different from his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.

Yeltsin was never offended that NTV portrayed him satirically on this same program, *Kukly*, nor did he persecute his political opponents. Putin, on the other hand, persecutes all political opponents. The newspaper *Argumenty I Fauty* (Arguments and Facts) reported in the spring of 2000, that Putin's administration sent the owner of *Media-Most* and NTV, Vladimir Gussinsky, a final warning. It demanded that they stop portraying Putin in

their program *Kukly*, and that NTV coordinate its analyses of politics, both internal and foreign, first with the president's administration.

Gusinsky declined to cooperate, saying that if he were to abide by their request, NTV's programs would become uninteresting and his income would subsequently drop. So Gusinsky was arrested in June of 2000, while Putin happened to be in Spain on a State visit.

When journalists from the world turned to Putin for an explanation, he blatantly lied. He said that he does not know anything, because he was unable to get through on the telephone to the General Prosecutor.

That a head of state should be out of touch with his government at home is unthinkable. In order to guarantee the president an uninterrupted telephone line with the country's highest officials, there is a powerful and technically advanced system of the Federal Agency of Governmental Contact and Information with the acronym FAPSI in Russian. It had been created as a technical subdivision of the KGB. Currently the FAPSI is a part of the FSB.

When Putin addressed the journalists with such outrageous lies, he was guided by his experience of working in the KGB. The KGB always lied to journalists from the whole world. No scandals ever erupted over it. But this time was different, because a scandal erupted throughout the world.

Gusinsky was placed in the Butyrsky Prison in Moscow, which is famous for the barbaric conditions under which the inmates are kept. The formal charges against him were financial misdeeds. At the interrogation, they demanded something entirely different from Gusinsky. They wanted him to give up some of his shares in the television company NTV, so that it could come under government control.

When Gusinsky agreed to this suggestion, he was freed. The criminal charges against him were dropped, making it abundantly clear that his imprisonment was purely political.

Gusinsky then flew to Spain where he repudiated his promises, declaring that he had been coerced to give them. That is when the details of his imprisonment became public. One of the reports Gusinsky signed in prison under duress had the signature of the Minister of the Press, Lesin, confirming that the government had taken an active role in the destruction of NTV television.

Putin and his government tried to present the fight for control of NTV as purely an issue over money owed, not as a political battle. They insisted that NTV had not paid their debts to Gazprom (an energy company) and to other firms. However, as soon as a settlement was within reach, the government rejected it outright.

In January 2001, the American video magnate Ted Turner, owner of CNN, offered to buy shares of NTV. He requested, in return, a guarantee from the Kremlin of political non-interference regarding his editorial policies. Such guarantees were never given to him, and the transaction fell through.

"In this whole sad tale there is one positive aspect" declared Dmitrii Ostalski, then leader of the press corps of *Media-Most*. "All the i's are finally dotted. There are no investors. Neither *Gazprom* nor the Kremlin needs any money. They need only one thing, political control over NTV. The supposed adherence of Mr. Putin and members of his administration to freedom of speech is only a hollow shell. It hides the true actions of those in power against independent means of mass information."⁴³

In the spring of 2001, NTV, the only independent television station left in Russia which had the nerve to criticize Putin publicly, was destroyed, impudently and crudely, as is the norm in the KGB.

Do not get me wrong. NTV continues to exist, but different people now work in it. On each of its programs they first make a loyalty bow to the Kremlin, and then personally to Putin. There are no more independent television stations in Russia.

It is also true that in the fall of 2001, part of NTV's creative group resumed broadcasting on a different television channel. Soon thereafter it, too, was closed down, because they continued to criticize Putin. In June 2002, their activity was temporarily renewed, resulting in a decrease of their critical fervor in the broadcasts. Just the same, it, too, was closed down. But the FSB's agents received medals and valuable gifts for participating in the dismantling of NTV.

WHY THE FSB IS UNABLE TO WORK WITH THE PRESS

These events exposed yet another fact which the FSB tries to hide with all its might — that it just does not know how to work successfully with the press. Historically, it has no experience doing this.

During Soviet times, the KGB truly did not involve itself in controlling the press, even though that issue did come up. There were so many other departments for whom this function was their main job that the KGB just distanced itself from it.

First, the press was controlled by the newspaper editors themselves, who were afraid of losing their supervisory position due to some stupid mistake of a subordinate. Second, the regional committees of the Communist Party in the entire country scrupulously studied each line in every newspaper for hints of any insurgency. Third, there also existed an official Ministry of Censorship, which was called the Committee on Protection of Government Secrets in Print.

This Committee published a secret journal which informed journalists of which topics were forbidden to be mentioned in the open press in the next three months. This journal looked like a regular, thick literary journal and was published, undoubtedly, by the same publishing house. The only difference was that this journal bore a "Strictly Confidential" stamp on its cover.

It was a very limited edition, and it was only accessible to the most secret of departments, among them the Intelligence Service.

Oh, how breathtakingly interesting we found this journal! For us, the young intelligence officers, it served as the single source of information on what was actually occurring within our country. From the dry listings of forbidden topics, we were able to discover the naked truth.

"It is forbidden to print in the open press that on August 23 of this, 1977, someone saw an unidentified flying object land at the train station Sharapova Ohota, 20 kilometers from Moscow. It is also forbidden to mention Professor Azhazha's lectures on 'flying saucers' and, as a matter of fact, it is forbidden to even mention the name of this professor," stated the journal matter-of-factly. Reading these lines, we would clap our hands. Apparently 'flying saucers' exist after all! Otherwise why would the Communist ideology totally reject them, and why would the KGB label those people who have seen these UFOs as crazy?

Further, the journal recorded that it is forbidden to write that the President of the Committee on Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy of the USSR, Slavsky, is also the head of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building. So this ministry, which we already knew as secret, was involved in production of atomic weapons.

We were shocked at the implication that the same man who served as the central figure in forbidding atomic weapons was also the inventor of new forms of nuclear weaponry.

It is understandable that with such strict controls over the press by other departments than the KGB, it just had no need to be involved.

The energy of the KGB's work with the press, therefore, was directed at recruiting foreign journalists so that, through them, the world would be fed misinformation, as well as praises of Communism and the Soviet Union. Foreign journalists who lived in other countries were recruited by the Intelligence Service of the KGB. Those foreign journalists who worked in Moscow, however, were pressed to collaborate with the KGB by the 17th department of the 2nd Main Directorate of the KGB (now the FSB). In today's structure of the FSB, this department still exists.

The KGB also recruited Soviet journalists, but not to use them for the same tasks, since by the very nature of their work, they were expected to write propaganda materials on the USSR. KGB used them for a different purpose, to gain information on attitudes among the intellectual dissidents.

When I served in the KGB, there was a tradition of passing on legendary stories regarding those Soviet citizens who refused to be recruited. Those were, most often, people in the arts, writers, and, as strange as it may seem, the military. It was a risky step for them, demanding great courage on their part. There were no stories, however, of a journalist refusing to cooperate. It just did not happen.

How can you refuse? You would only be allowed overseas for a few days after you've been recruited. Then you could write your little sketch or feature story which might bring some recognition. Your professional prestige would rise. But if you refuse, the KGB would certainly retaliate. You would never be promoted, and if you were a scholar pursuing a PhD, you would not be allowed to defend your dissertation.

The publisher, who is preparing to print your book, would suddenly return your manuscript without explanation. Even the apartment, which you were supposed to receive after a twenty year wait, would be given to someone else. But the most difficult and humiliating thing of all would be the taboo on questioning the reasons for all of the above. Your superior would just smile a certain all-knowing smile and silently shrug his shoulders.

Almost all Russian journalists of the older generation are agents of the KGB. One of my acquaintances, an international journalist, was recruited by the KGB during the Second World War, when he was only 14 years old. He was a ship's boy on a ship bringing material aid from the USA to the Soviet Union. In Stalinist days, the rule of not permitting a Soviet person to go abroad unless he was an agent of the NKVD was strictly adhered to.

Age was not a barrier either. A 14-year old boy could not oppose Stalin's all-mighty NKVD. To this day he is an informer in the FSB. The only people who were exempt from being recruited were workers of the Communist Party and their children.

But even here the KGB found a loophole. In the Communist Party apparatus, the lowest position was the junior advisor. Inside the country, this position was considered a very high one. For many it was the pinnacle of their career. Even the ministers would bow down to the junior advisor of the Communist Party, just to be on the safe side. His position gave unlimited opportunity of climbing the career-ladder, a high salary, a personal auto, the right to buy caviar, and, the right to go abroad. Many junior advisors of the Communist Party, quite presentable 40-year-old men, gladly agreed to become collaborators of embassies or foreign correspondents of Soviet newspapers and magazines. What could be nicer than to live for a few years in luxurious conditions in one of the Western capitals? These people also went to poor or hot countries, but only when given the most senior positions.

But junior advisors did not get to keep their positions as staff employees of the Communist Party while abroad. They had to resign and, upon returning to Moscow, they had to re-enter the Party, something which did not always happen.

That is when they lost their immunity from recruitment, and became easy targets for the KGB organs. They were recruited, and they diligently performed the functions of agents in the foreign Soviet embassies. Then they returned to Moscow, and returned to the Communist Party, and the KGB left them alone.

But after a few years, the cycle could repeat itself, and the junior advisors would once again be lured to the West, even though the same fate awaited them. The only way to avoid this recurring cycle was to have gotten a raise in rank while still in Moscow.

One acquaintance of mine, Yuri Tavrovski, a correspondent of *Novoye Vremya* (New Times) in Tokyo, was a temporary agent like

that for three times. He would be listed in the Agency network. Then his personnel file would be put into the KGB's archives. Finally, upon his return to Moscow, he received a promotion to supervisor of the Chinese Section in the International Department of the Communist Party. The manager of the Chinese Department of the 2nd Main Directorate of the KGB told me about him. Our conversation ended on this note: "Our agent Tavrovski, whom you know well, became a supervisor of a Section in the Communist Party, and we have let him go."

"In my opinion, it is he who resigned!" I corrected him, and we both laughed.

THE FSB GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE

After the collapse of the Communist regime (temporary, as it turns out), the Committee for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press was eliminated. Its functions are currently being performed by the FSB. This duty is unfamiliar to them but it is made easier by the fact that almost all of the former employees of that committee transferred to the FSB. Under the prevailing conditions, driven by the new phenomenon of unemployment and mass layoffs from the bloated Soviet ministries, they had nowhere to go. And while the FSB did not pay much, it was better than no work at all.

The bureaucrats of the former Soviet Committee for Protection of State Secrets found a sphere of political influence in the FSB, since there was now an ideological vacuum there. Communists, whose ideology had been supported by the *chekists*, were in opposition to the new government, and the *chekists* were still afraid to show them their open support. Therefore, the FSB officially showed its support for the powerful relic of the Communist system, its military-industrial complex.

The FSB's interests and those of the army are closely linked because absolutely all Russian generals and approximately 70% of its officers are agents of the FSB. It is this factor, the likes of which exist nowhere in the world except for China, North Korea and formerly in Sadaam Hussein's Iraq, which allows us to understand the true pillars of today's Russian politics, beginning with the war in Chechnya and ending with her anti-American and anti-Western hysteria.

The first victim of the new FSB was a journalist who exposed the vile secrets of the Russian military. Will Mirzayan, a scientist and publicist, wrote in 1992 in the newspaper *Moskovskiy Novosti* ("Moscow News") regarding Russian production of chemical weaponry.

The scientist was immediately arrested. His closed trial, which was directed by the FSB, condemned him to a twelve year prison sentence for divulging State secrets. The FSB was already secretly celebrating its victory, naïvely assuming that now, as in the recent Soviet past, there would be too much fear to stand up to it, to oppose it, or, God forbid, to quarrel with it.

But times had changed unrecognizably. People were no longer afraid of the FSB (although now they are again). As a result of the intense public scrutiny, the fabrication of the charges became clear, and they were forced to free Mirzayan.

Later the FSB got their revenge on Will Mirzayan by delaying his receipt of a passport for a trip to Germany, where he was to have attended a conference of chemists battling for the destruction of chemical-bacteriological weaponry. This was taking place at a time when the FSB was issuing foreign passports right and left to members of the Russian mafia.

Having suffered a real defeat in this case, however, the FSB kept a low profile for a few years, and then renewed its attacks on the freedom of the press in the same vein. In 1996 the FSB accused retired Navy Captain of the First Rank Alexander Nikitin of divulging State secrets after he had contributed to a report published by the Norwegian environmental organization, Bellona.

They accused him of exposing the most embarrassing secret of the Northern Fleet, revealing the locations of Soviet atomic submarine accidents. The accidents had caused enormous harm to the ecology of the Baltic countries and northern Europe. The only difficulty with the accusation was that the locations of these accidents had already been widely known.

Nevertheless, the FSB, via the Russian mass media information under its control, began an attack on Nikitin. Journalists, without any reservations, wrote: "An employee of the KGB, who gave me an interview, explained to me the crux of Nikitin's crime. It appears that the locations of the accidents were widely known, but that is irrelevant. Nikitin is, nonetheless, guilty of divulging State secrets!" This was a symptom of the infantile stage of

Russian journalism. The journalist ranks were truly filled with young people, who came of age in an epoch of freedom and who were not familiar with the cynicism of the FSB.

I managed to have an explanatory talk with some of the journalists who had defamed Nikitin, even if it was at the instruction of the FSB, and however sincere. But I could not possibly do this on a massive scale throughout Russia!

Alexander Nikitin was acquitted in late 1999, thanks to the wide international support he received. However, prior to standing trial he had already spent one and a half years in prison. Once he was free on bail, living in his apartment, he still experienced fear each time his doorbell rang, always expecting another arrest.

Later, in Vladivostok, Grigory Pasko, a military journalist, was arrested and charged with espionage. He, too, had to be released. The court, however, did not fully acquit him. Pasko and his attorneys protested, and the court sent his case back for additional investigation. This investigation coincided with Putin's rise to power, when Russian laws became more stringent, and Pasko was convicted for four and a half years for the same thing for which he had been acquitted not long before.

Shortly thereafter, Putin announced that he would issue Pasko a pardon, but on one condition. Pasko had to request it personally, thereby admitting his guilt of spying for Japan. But Pasko refused to do this, preferring instead to courageously serve his prison term.

Chapter 8

HOW THE FSB RECRUITS JOURNALISTS

In its work with the press, the FSB actively utilizes agents remaining from Soviet times. There are plenty of them, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter. Most of the agents work for the television station, Channel One, which is run by the State television company, ORT (Russian TV).

The explanation for this is that television in the USSR was historically created under the control of the KGB. TV constituted an enormous danger for Communist ideology. What if an announcer on the air suddenly yelled out: "Down with the Communist Party! Everybody, let's fight the Communists!" It could bring

about massive disturbances. Therefore, for decades, the KGB spun its web of double and triple control over the Ostankino television station.

The gigantic complex of buildings of Russian television in Ostankino was built with the idea in mind that everything could be seen and overheard. The eavesdropping and surveillance equipment was pre-wired during construction.

I was told that on the basement floor, there is a giant room containing the eavesdropping apparatus which belongs to the FSB. All the journalists know this and, not trusting the walls, they talk in their offices only about mundane, unimportant things. In order to have a serious conversation, it is customary to go out into the hallway.

Channel One (ORT) is FSB's microphone, just as it used to be during Soviet years. The best illustration of this was the slanderous movie on General Oleg Kalugin. It was shown on ORT in August 1999.

In the late 1980s, KGB General Oleg Kalugin acted courageously, coming out in the Russian press with a series of exposé articles on the KGB. He exposed the true face of the KGB, which had a mythical romantic image in the eyes of the population, an image created by the Communist propaganda machine from the Andropov years. From Kalugin's articles, the simple people of Russia found out that the KGB is not a haven for heroes, but full of careerists and opportunists, intrigue-lovers and traitors, bringing nothing but damage to their country.

The KGB, having lost its psychological support within the society, began to fall apart and, with it, the entire Soviet Empire, which had seemed so solid. Hundreds of KGB high-ranking generals in whose presence, just a short time before, the entire country had trembled, instantaneously lost their posts and became poor pensioners. To this day they cannot forgive Kalugin for this. Now their revenge was being fueled by the government itself.

It is not a coincidence that the film premiered on August 19, the anniversary of the Communist putsch of 1991. The film was brimming with nostalgia for Communism and a gut-level hatred of Kalugin. The retired generals, quivering with anger and indignation, insisted that Kalugin had been an American spy for decades.

The irony of the situation was underscored by the fact that the Kalugin's primary accuser, Victor Grushko, the former assistant

chairman of the KGB, had himself already served a sentence for treason after the putsch of 1991. Grushko was also Kalugin's neighbor, a fact that is not widely known. At the time in Russia, to be unaware of the profession of your next door neighbor, especially for the highest KGB generals, was virtually impossible. The entire apartment block was reserved for the highest KGB officers.

Moreover, Grushko must have approved the appointment of Kalugin to his last post at the KGB as Deputy Minister of Atomic Industry of the USSR on matters of the regime.

When the film ended, and a list of credits appeared on the screen, I held my breath. It was sad to see how many of the people who worked on the film I knew personally. Not all of them, of course, had become FSB agents, but their supervisors certainly had. Otherwise the FSB would have been disinclined to promote such an openly propagandist film in all the public theaters of Russia.

There are as many FSB agents at Channel Two. The only difference is that if Channel One had agents and eavesdropping technology developed and established over the course of many decades of the Soviet regime, Channel Two had everything created after 1991, after the beginning of democratic reforms in Russia.

Channel Two also belongs to the State and was called "Russian" in 1991, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The FSB began to recruit agents for Russian television in the late fall of 1993, only two years after the creation of the new government, and after the failure of the second Communist putsch in Russia. It was then that Yeltsin began to strengthen the role of the FSB in Russia, thinking that the *chekists* were now on his side, although in reality they still belonged to the Communist past.

In 1991 there were absolutely no KGB agents in Russian television. It was being formed from scratch as an opposition voice to the Communists. All its journalists were young, not yet recruited by the FSB. In previous years, the KGB would have recruited them as students, but the student years of these young journalists were in the latter part of the 1980s, when the KGB had begun to lose its grip.

By 1991, I had already decided to leave the KGB, and was looking around for a new place of employment. Russian

television caught my fancy. Intelligence, where I was still enrolled, was paralyzed, and I was able avoid going to the office. As advisor to the head of the scientific-technological intelligence, I did not need to go.

I therefore decided to take advantage of this position to further my personal interests, and to find out whether there were many agents working for Russian television. I went to the administrative center of RT, which gathers intelligence on this topic in Russia. There is a department there, which administers the operative-agent work in the field of television.

"Alas!" the supervisor of the department sighed. "We still have no agents there. We have not had the chance to recruit anyone. Maybe you would help us?" Undoubtedly he decided that I was looking for a job in television as an intelligence officer, and not as a free journalist who had cut his ties with intelligence forever. But they did not give me the job — they were afraid to have anything to do with a former lieutenant colonel of the KGB.

In the past decade, it seems that the FSB has managed to recruit many of their own journalists. The fact that the Russian government television now is filled with agents is obvious from the tone of their news coverage.

This tone has two characteristic qualities, which always give away FSB presence. First, the coverage lacks any criticism of Communism. And second, it lacks any criticism of the FSB itself. Those are the criteria by which you can ascertain whether a TV anchor is an FSB agent or not, no matter how courageously he might speak out. The third clue is the venom which he expresses toward General Kalugin, even though personally this journalist may have suffered no personal harm from the General.

A favorite FSB *modus operandi* is to befriend journalists who frequently write on intelligence and counter-intelligence topics. A typical example of this is the still quite young journalist Alexander Hinstein, a reviewer for *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* (a Moscow newspaper of the "Union of Young Communists"), and today a deputy of Putin's puppet *Gos Duma* (government parliament).

In the early 1990s he began his journalistic career by writing successful exposés on the KGB. However, Hinstein soon experienced a shortage of material for new articles. Never having worked in the KGB himself, he was forced to appeal to those whom he was attacking.

The press corps supervisors of both the SVR Intelligence and the FSB counter-intelligence met him with open arms. Furrowing their brows, they agreed to give the young journalist exclusive materials. And he, brimming with pride, agreed to write the articles. How could he have known that this KGB tactic was always used in working with foreign journalists?

Under the guise of super secret information, which had just about been lifted from the very desk of the General Secretary of the Communist Party, they would hand over pure fiction, disinformation which the trusting journalists would disseminate throughout the world as fact.

This is what happened to Alexander Hinstein, who very quickly became the spokesperson of the supervisors of the press service of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence.

Chapter 9

HOW RUSSIA CONTROLS THE PRESS

The distinguishing mark of Putin's reign is the coöperation between the FSB and the MVD⁴⁴ in persecuting journalists. In direct contradiction to the Soviet period, there now exists between the FSB and the MVD a spirit of complete understanding. The Brezhnev era is long forgotten, when the CC CPSU⁴⁵ kept fueling contradictions between the KGB and the MVD, fearing that they could unite in a common goal of a governmental coup.

This touching unity between the FSB and the MVD showed up brilliantly in the persecution of Andrei Babitsky, a Radio Free Europe correspondent. In his reporting, beginning with the second Chechen War, he allowed himself to present events in a manner that was inconsistent with the wishes of Russian special services. He reported on the losses of the Russian military, and showed proof of atrocities committed against the civilian population.

In the winter of 1999, Babitsky was arrested; then they staged an exchange of prisoners, supposedly exchanging him for some Russian soldiers who were held by the Chechens. But what happened was that they handed Babitsky not to the Chechens, which is what the official press reported, but to the same Russian special services, among whose agents they also have Chechens. These people took away his passport, forced another passport on

him, a forgery from the labs of the MVD, and then rearrested Babitsky for having forged documents in his possession.

Babitsky's case was veiled in secrecy.

"The FSB is not linked to the arrest of Babitsky," swore General Zdanovich from national television screens, with forced pain in his voice. Just minutes before, everyone saw film clips of the exchange of the journalist to unknown persons. On the bottom of the film clip appeared the giveaway phrase: "filming created by the FSB".

The FSB suffered a defeat here as well. Now it is trying to forget this incident, while the journalist in question continues to work at Radio Free Europe, following his release.

In the 1990s, the FSB also did not have agents in the English-language newspaper, *Moscow Times*, and therefore no one interfered with publishing my articles there. But by the year 2000, my articles were no longer accepted.

On a dark evening of the winter of 1999 in the northern outskirts of Moscow, a group of youngsters attacked a lone woman as she was leaving the Metro. They grabbed her purse and hit her a few times. Despite the fact that there were not many passersby, the assailants were stopped. One of them turned out to be a law student, the son of an NTV journalist, Eleonora Filin.

His journalist-mother was horrified, but reacted critically to the deed of her son, philosophically accepting his fate. It can be said with certainty that she did not beat down the doors of the *militsia* station, nor did she tearfully beg the prosecutor to be lenient toward her silly offspring.

Eleonora Filin was the chief of the literary-artistic program called "Ships Would Sail into Our Port", which was brimming with romanticism. Much poetry was read on this program, and songs about sailors were played. The program was meant as a spiritual respite for its audience.

There were no political overtones to Eleonora Filin's son's criminal case until a *militsia* investigator received a phone call from an officer of the FSB demanding the file be handed over to Lubyanka.

"What for?" asked the *militsia* investigator in surprise.

"That is none of your business!" replied the *chekist*. "Hand the case over to the FSB and that's that! This is an order!"

But the FSB does not have the right to issue orders to the *militsia*. And the *militsia* investigator decided to make this

phone call public knowledge. He contacted the publisher of the independent *Novaya Gazeta* ("New Newspaper"). An exposé article appeared. The *militsia* investigator declared in the article that he does not want a return to the Soviet ways of doing things, where all of society's life issues were secretly decided by the KGB. Alas, a year later this investigator was removed from the police force, *Novaya Gazeta* sadly noted in its follow-up. The FSB retaliates.

But there is more to the story. After the incident involving Eleonora Filin's son, an officer of the FSB came to her apartment. He promised to help soften her son's sentence in return for some services. The word 'services' in FSB language can only mean one thing, to become an informer. Apparently, the FSB was already planning a hostile action against NTV (something that took place soon thereafter). Since they did not have adequate information on the atmosphere within journalists' ranks, they were seeking informers.

Publication of this article in the *Novaya Gazeta* created quite a stir. NTV, naturally, reported the incident from its TV screens. The scandal was so immense, as a matter of fact, that General Zdanovich himself had to become involved. Appearing on the State television station, he declared that all of this was lies and libel directed at the state institutions; that at issue was something entirely different. He claimed that the FSB had planned to hire Filin's son, but after his arrest they had to refuse. And that was why, supposedly, the FSB officer did not hesitate to visit Eleonora Filin at home, to notify her of this rejection.

Now that truly was an outrageous lie. Any retired KGB officer would tell you that that is impossible. Of course it happens that the FSB declines to hire some candidates who failed their test. But collaboration with them does not stop! They will continue to be used as agents, "You will provide us with valuable information, and we will hire you anyway." Often that is exactly what happens. That which did not work out yesterday, today works out beautifully. After all, everything is decided subjectively, by a small group of supervisors in the personnel department.

Officers in the FSB personnel department are forbidden to notify a candidate of his employment rejection, because in that case, the candidate might express an interest in knowing the reason, which cannot be exposed.

This prohibition was instituted after a noisy scandal which took place in the early 1980s. A young graduate of a prestigious Moscow Institute was rejected back then because his mother was Jewish. The USSR was a country of official anti-Semitism. Jews were not accepted for any prestigious employment, first and foremost among which is work in the KGB.

"I was rejected because my mother is a Jew?" asked the unsuccessful spy incredulously.

"Yes," confirmed the personnel officer of Intelligence, lowering his eyes. He himself was young and inexperienced, as it turns out.

The young man told his mother what had taken place, and she wrote a complaint to the CC CPSU. It began with the words: "When I was drafted to the front in 1941, I was not asked whether I was a Jew or not."

A gigantic scandal erupted, but it was limited to within the walls of Lubyanka. The inexperienced personnel officer received a severe reprimand, and all of his colleagues were forever forbidden to talk about reasons for declining a particular candidate when he applied to work in the KGB. More than that, they were prohibited from even mentioning that fact.

There was little need for FSB agents in the Communist mass media, in *Pravda* ("Truth"), in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* ("Soviet Russia") because the political platform of those newspapers was completely in tune with that of the *chekists*. Regarding the FSB, its past and present, Communists write only with exaltation. Besides, during the Soviet years the CC CPSU forbade the KGB from recruiting agents from within the Party Apparatus, which included the Party press. Currently, the only agents in Communist publications are those who previously worked in other sources of mass media information and had been recruited there.

Standing apart from all the others is the ultra-left opposition newspaper called *Zavtra* ("Tomorrow"). They say that in Yeltsin's time, many leading employees of the FSB — those in secret opposition to Yeltsin's government — would publish there under pseudonyms. I believe that there are agents in that newspaper, as well. It would be necessary in order to maintain the secrecy about the close contact of this newspaper with the FSB.

The FSB has its own "pocket" political party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). With its help, the FSB floats political initiatives in the press, always one step ahead of the

authorities in their efforts to return the country to its Communist past. However, with Putin's arrival to power, this floating has conveniently been done by the Kremlin.

An example of the above was demonstrated in the May 15, 2000 speech of Aleksei Mitrofanov, one the leaders of the LDPR, at the meeting of the Government Duma. Unexpectedly and without any connection to the other issues on the agenda, Mitrofanov suggested putting up a monument to Stalin in Moscow. The deputies reacted haphazardly, but undoubtedly this suggestion was inspired by the FSB. Since Vladimir Putin's arrival in power, Stalin's figure is showing up more and more in official propaganda

THE FSB BATTLES AGAINST THE PRESS IN THE HINTERLANDS OF RUSSIA

The free press is disliked in the provinces of Russia. The government itself is the instigator of this dislike, which is mired in corruption. Usually in battling the press, they use the most brutal of forces, the police. The FSB is called in only for the most complicated situations.

It is also important to note that in Russia's backwaters, the FSB is even stronger and more influential than in Moscow. The reason for this is purely psychological. People today are still afraid of the special services, just as they were in Soviet times. And because provincial customs are more conservative than those of city dwellers, they lean toward the more familiar Soviet past.

In the provinces journalists do not elicit the same respect as they do in Moscow. Only in Moscow can the journalists turn to human rights organizations or to foreign correspondents. This opportunity is not available in the countryside, where only a small number of all the incidents of the cruel pressure exerted on the press come to the attention of the public.

The publicity given to such incidents is often championed by the Fund For the Protection of *Glasnost*⁴⁶ ("Publicity"), which is a public organization, protecting freedom of speech and the rights of journalists. Thanks only to this fund, the suffering of the provincial journalists of Russia has become known to Russians. But far too many of these incidents passed without producing any change in the grave danger to journalists who did not toe the party line.

For instance, in April of 1998, the criminal court system of the Volgograd Regional Court heard the Appeals Complaint of policeman Konstantin Solodyashkin against his conviction by the Central Regional Court of Volgograd February 4, 1998. This policeman was accused of the premeditated murder of Alexander Konovalenko, a journalist of the newspaper, *Krestyanskoye Slovo* ("The Peasant Word"). The murder took place on June 6, 1995, and its investigation dragged on for a long three years. The murderer was sentenced to a mere five years of loss of freedom. In Russia this type of sentence is considered more than lenient. The minimum punishment for a murder is considered seven years, and the maximum execution, which in the last few years has been replaced by a life sentence. But the court favored Solodyashkin, the policeman. Not only was his punishment far below the minimum required, but he continued to serve on the police force! For the Western journalists, this episode was something unbelievable, but in Russia it surprised no one.

Still, the policeman Solodyashkin considered even this sentence much too long, and appealed to the Regional Court. The court left the verdict intact. But the irony is in the fact that Solodyashkin was never taken under guard, and continued to work in the police force, performing arrests and demanding that others accept responsibility for their criminal actions.

On April 16, 1998, in Saransk, the capital of Mordovia, a small national republic⁴⁷ in the lower Volga region, there was an attempt on the life of Stanislav Holopov, the chief editor of the weekly independent Mordovian newspaper, *Stolitsa S* ["Capital of S(aransk)"]. In the morning, while the journalist was awaiting the newspaper's car in the entranceway to his house, he was attacked by two unknown persons with a knife, piercing his heart and liver.

It should be noted that the Mordovian population is known for its stern and harsh nature. It was here in the 1930s that Stalin decided to spread his giant net of prison camps, which exist to this day. In Stalin's day, political prisoners were housed here; in Brezhnev's and Andropov's day, this was also true, but in fewer numbers. It is here that the notorious *Yavas* prison camp, which belonged to the KGB, is situated. It is mentioned in secret documents under the code name of *Dubravniy*. There are many beautiful forests in Mordovia, but their beauty does not

soften the nature of the locals, four generations of whom have been raised in the prison system. Many children here have known no other life than the life of the prison camps. Their parents work in them — their fathers, as overseers, their mothers, also, but of the women's prison camps, or else as secretaries, nurses, or telephone "censors".

So for the locals, the murder of a journalist does not cause a big stir. The criminals who inflicted the mortal wounds on Stanislav Holopov managed to slip away. The journalist was taken to a third-rate city hospital, where he underwent an hour and a half-long surgery. He remained in critical condition.

An operative-investigative team of workers from the department of criminal search of the investigative division of the MVD of Mordovia and the Lenin Regional Department of the *Militsia* was created for investigating the circumstances of this crime. (In Mordovia, regional departments have remained to this day, although in most large cities they have been renamed. This speaks to the fact that to this day Communists remain in power in the Mordovian Republic. And they truly hate an independent press!)

According to the opinion of the employees of the publication *Stolitsa S*, the attack on Stanislav Holopov was connected to his professional activity. The *militsia* did not discount this version, but they did not act upon it either. While it is highly improbable that journalists would hire killers to eliminate their colleagues in the world of words, the *militsia* began its search with the editors of the newspaper, assuming that the reason for the attack was some internal conflict between colleagues, and expecting thus to find the party who had ordered the killing.

It is necessary to note that in the previous three years *Stolitsa S* had experienced a number of attempts to influence its content. Pressure came not only from the official authorities, but also from the criminal element. Stanislav Holopov received numerous telephone threats; Edward Retunskiy, a photo correspondent, was beaten up; in May of 1996, the newspaper offices were robbed. Additionally, the publication was suing the MVD of Mordovia, which was trying to bring criminal charges against the newspaper's editor.

On April 21, 1998 the Fund for Protection of Glasnost appealed to N. I. Merkushin, the head of the Republic of Mordovia, and to Y. A. Lyashev, the Minister of Interior of the

Republic with a letter in which they demand a "careful and well-qualified investigation of the attempted murder of Stanislav Holopov" and expressed hope that "in the leadership of the republic and in its law enforcement agencies, there still are people who have enough conscience and energy to bring to justice the criminals and those who stand behind them, regardless of who they might be." However, despite their best efforts, the investigation of the attempted murder of this independent journalist went nowhere.

It appears that the *militia* had the local FSB behind it. Its influence is particularly felt in the neighboring Tatarstan, where the cruel authoritarian regime of President Mintimer Shaimiev has established itself. Being even more authoritarian than today's Moscow leadership, he always tries to underscore his independence from Moscow. But this independence is of a special sort. It symbolizes a movement back to Communism and Stalinism, not forward toward democracy and freedom. It is, therefore, no wonder that the local FSB in Tatarstan is called KGB, just as in Soviet times. No one is surprised by this. Only the few foreign tourists who venture into Kazan seem interested in photographing the KGB sign in front of the offices of the local Counter-intelligence. They are still permitted to do this.

The KGB of Tataria is more influential than the FSB Divisions in other Russian Republics. Although the KGB of Tataria was officially not directly involved in the events I will discuss below, its footprint is evident.

On August 21, 1999 in the city of Ufa,⁴⁸ workers of the militia beat up two journalists, Vera Postnov, a correspondent of the *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* ("Independent Newspaper") who arrived from Kazan, and Victor Shmakov, the editor of the local newspaper *Vmeste* ("Together").

They were going to cover a meeting of the opposition when they happened to witness a skirmish between the local members of law enforcement and demonstrators. They were trying to break through the *militia* line in front of the Palace of the Oil Magnates, where the constituent meeting of the "All Russia" bloc was taking place. Vera Postnov and Victor Shmakov, together with several of the demonstrators, were beaten up, forcefully placed on a bus and sent to the Kirov department of *militia*, where the journalists were beaten up once more and then placed in cells for 12 hours.

That evening, Vera Postnov was returning to Kazan in an automobile with some activists of the Tatar national opposition. Not far from the town of Diurtiuli (Republic of Bashkortostan) their automobile was involved in a crash. Those in the car suffered varying degrees of injuries and were sent to the regional hospital.

Since the *militia* does not typically involve itself in political meetings of the opposition, and since it does not usually hunt down journalists for their political views, was the KGB somehow instrumental in the car accident that the unfortunate journalists and demonstrators were involved in?

More and more frequently, the FSB tries to exert pressure on journalists, indirectly and directly, when they openly interfere with journalists performing their professional duties.

And so, on April 2, 1999 in the town center of Ulyanovsk, the hometown of Lenin, on Leo Tolstoy Street, Mikhail Vyalov, a photojournalist for the newspaper *Simbirskiye gubernskiye vedomosti* ("Simbirsk County News,") was beaten while trying to photograph the local FSB's Working Group on Fighting Terrorism in the process of arresting a criminal. His film in his camera was also exposed, rendering it useless. The FSB press service later notified the publishers of the *Simbirskiye gubernskiye vedomosti* that Mikhail Vyalov had not been beaten up at all. He simply "tripped and fell" at the moment when his documents were being checked.

The FSB acts with impunity and without fear of reprisals in the provinces, as did its predecessor agency, the NKVD in Stalin's time. There in the hinterlands, the FSB does not meet either public scrutiny or resistance.

The impunity and self-confidence of the FSB regarding journalists is also evident not only in Ulyanovsk. In November, 1988, in the city of Voronezh, in southwestern Russia, not far from Ukraine, Boris Vaulin, the head of the department covering Law and Social Problems for the newspaper *Communa* ("Commune"), appealed to Alexander Timashov, the head of the FSB press service for the Voronezh Region with a request to explain why Victor Sytnikov, the deputy head of administration of the Voronezh Region and the supervisor of its financial department, was arrested. The head of the FSB press service refused, saying only that "the leadership of the department does not recommend giving any type of information to journalists."

Even in its style, the reply was a lie. FSB, after all, is a military organization, and its superiors give orders. They do not offer recommendations to their subordinates. But to give an order not to provide journalists with information? Nowadays that sounds anachronistic; it smells of Stalin's days. So let us couch this order as a courteous recommendation!

The story did not end there. That very same day, Vaulin went to the head of the press service of the Directorate of Interior with that same request. But the head of the police press service refused to give any information, under the guise of it being a secret investigation. That evening, the heads of the press services of the FSB and the MVD must have gotten together over a free dinner hosted by a local mafia boss in a restaurant and, dying of laughter, they must have told each other how cunningly they had put a presumptuous journalist in his place.

More and more frequently, the FSB in Moscow acts impudently as well.

According to the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* ("The Communist Youth Organization's Truth"), its employee Olga Bakushinsky was threatened over the phone by people who introduced themselves as officers of the FSB. Bakushinsky contacted the Savelovsk Prosecutor's office in Moscow regarding the telephone threat to which she had been subjected. As one would expect, the complaint led to no arrests.

On March 30, 1999, Andrei Zhdankin, a journalist of the Moscow newspaper, *Versia* ("Version") contacted the Fund for Protection of Glasnost. He reported that after an article, "Chekists Without Limits" was published in its Issue # 11, he was threatened over the phone by some unknown persons. The article contained facts about the FSB protecting criminal groups in the northern Caucasus Republic of Adygeya.

The FSB tries to pressure the press with impunity, a method perfected by its Stalinist predecessors. It is based on the FSB's confidence that most of the people in the country, including journalists, do not know their own basic rights. Using this method against city journalists, the FSB sometimes gets defeated.

In May of 1996 there was an explosion in the Ostankino military administration building in Moscow. As always, the FSB and police were not anticipating anything, and were unable to get

to the bottom of the explosion. As a result, special services immediately began to suppress coverage of it.

And so in June of the following year, 1997, Alexander Podrabinek, a well-known Moscow journalist, published a series of articles on that explosion in a magazine called *Ekspress Khronika* ("Express Chronicle of Events"). Naturally the FSB demanded that he disclose his sources. The semiliterate *chekists* were not even deterred by the fact that Alexander Podrabinek is one of the leaders of a society called "Memorial", which investigates crimes of the NKVD-KGB of the Stalinist era.

Pleading Article 41 of the RF Law on "Mass Media Information", he refused to hand over his materials to the FSB. This law clearly forbids journalists from betraying their sources to the government, if the information was received confidentially. The FSB actively speaks out for re-examination of this law, utilizing its subservient political parties within the Duma, the Communists and the LDPR.

As a result of this pressure, a new draft of the law is ready. According to it, a journalist is compelled to disclose his/her sources even if it is only an investigator and not the court who demands it. It stands to reason that any employee of the FSB can turn into an investigator at the drop of a hat in order to extract information intended to be confidential.

Not only did Alexander Podrabinek not disclose his sources to the FSB, but he used the opportunity to convict the FSB morally using the mass media. He reminded us that "the organs of State law enforcement never showed any repentance for their criminal activity during Socialist rule," and that "within the apparatus of the FSB those people continue to work, who in the past were responsible for political repressions in the USSR." Therefore, he doubted the ability of the FSB investigative organs to lead any initial investigation objectively and within the confines of the legal system.

In the provinces, the FSB holds journalists personally responsible for what they write. Therefore, in December 1997, the newspaper *Moment Istiny* ("Moment of Truth") in Novosibirsk reported that the Central Regional Court of Novosibirsk granted relief to the plaintiff, the UFSB (Directorate of the FSB) of the Novosibirsk Region, in its suit against that newspaper regarding the protection of the plaintiff's business reputation.

The reason for the lawsuit was a publication of a series of

articles, in which the Directorate of the FSB within the Novosibirsk Region was blamed for the economic collapse of the region. The court instructed the newspaper to pay damages of 500,000 rubles to the FSB.

In small provincial towns, as a rule the administration of the mayor's office, the FSB, and the *militsia*, all form the same corrupt governing group. Further, all the local leaders are old and trusted KGB agents from the Soviet days. Therefore, when local journalists report on abuses of one of the branches of the government, inevitably they meet opposition from all the rest.

It has long been said, for example, that organs of the FSB privately support fascists. There has been a multitude of articles published on this topic, but, alas, only in the national press. When such articles appear in the hinterlands, they strongly upset the local leadership since it is here on the regional level, in particular, that the cooperation between the leadership and fascists is most clearly apparent.

The Nizhninovgorod television station *Dialog* reported in November 1998 that the mayor of the tiny town of Kstov, near Volga, suddenly refused to continue with his regular television appearances on the local station *Set NN* ("The Net NN"). The mayor's irritation was caused by a series of programs that had aired on TV relating how he and the regional FSB office were giving patronage to the local branch of the fascist organization *Russkoye nazionalnoye yedinstvo* ("Russian National Unity"). The news by itself was not earth-shattering, because it has long been known that mayors of other towns, and heads of other branches of the FSB and *militsia*, do the same thing. Had they supported democratic organizations, that would have been a surprise.

Vyacheslav Bolyachek, the miffed mayor, declared that the administration of the region did not offer any support to any of the parties, nor to any of the movements. Neither had it ever collaborated with any of its parties, and he demanded that the station offer him and the leadership of the appropriate law enforcement agencies (the FSB) an apology.

Now that is truly remarkable! Russian law does not acknowledge any indirect apologies. To demand an apology, one must be the victim, and the FSB could have demanded such apologies from the television station *Set NN*. But for some reason this was done

through Bolyachek, showing how weak the provincial *chekists'* knowledge of Russian law is.

But that was not the end of the story. Having demanded an apology through a local mayor, the *chekists* openly admitted that the mayor was one of them. Vyacheslav Bolyachek called upon the leadership of the government organs, parties and movements, and also to the entrepreneurs to refuse collaboration with the television station *Set NN*. He also demanded that the FSB and the prosecutor's office of the Nizhni Novgorod region conduct a careful investigation, uncover the authors of the libel, and take measures against the guilty parties.

The mayor of Kstov also appealed to the court regarding some informational disagreements on the RF presidential level. He asked for a moral and legal clarification of events. Thus the FSB uses its loyalists at the local authorities' level to exert pressure on the free press.

Sometimes journalists are murdered in Russian provinces for refusing to become agents. In 1996 in Chechnya, Nadezhda Chaikov, a journalist, was killed under mysterious circumstances. Soon thereafter in the 42nd issue of *Obshchaya Gazeta* ("General newspaper"), there was an article under the heading "Nadezhda Chaikov refused to work for the FSB." The FSB was so upset with this article that it set up a special task force for its investigation.

Three months later the task force announced the results of its work. Using information provided by the FSB agents in Chechnya, the task force insisted that Nadezhda Chaikov was killed by "one of the gangs" there.

A task force for an official investigation is only called when there has been a leakage of undesirable information, not when someone on the outside, even a journalist, has been killed. The response to the question of who killed Nadezhda Chaikov, and why, was clear without any task force, and a file with materials on the murder is definitely in one of the FSB safes. In order to acquaint oneself with its contents, one does not need to form any task forces. All one needs is the permission of the head of the department. The leaking of "undesirable" information must surely have been what concerned the task force. Solving the murder was relatively unimportant compared to that.

Toward the end of 1999, in the final years of Yeltsin's rule, Russia was showing signs of Stalinization of its regime. The

justification for this was Russia's concentration on the second Chechen war. The FSB once again began to feel itself free, especially in the provinces. In its endless war against the press, it returned to slogans of the Soviet epoch regarding the "unsound" articles of journalists disturbing the public peace.

A "trial balloon" was sent up in October 1999. B. Kozinenko, the acting managing head of the FSB Directorate for the Sverdlovsk region in Yekaterinburg, sent a significant letter to the Ural Regional Directorate of Registrations and Control to obey RF laws regarding mass media. In that letter, he maintained that materials considered potentially harmful to the socio-political climate had appeared in several Sverdlovsk region newspapers.

Among them, two articles were specifically mentioned: "The crazy bomber"⁴⁹ and "Mukhin the bomber had the shakes from alcoholism."⁵⁰

These articles addressed the possibility of terrorist acts in Yekaterinburg. Kozinenko reported that after investigating the information with the regional police directorate of the Sverdlovsk region, they had found no confirmation of the facts reported in either of those articles. Therefore, according to the head of the local FSB Directorate, the articles had elicited a negative public response, although there was no proof of that either. As a result of all of this, Kozinenko suggested that the regional directorate take necessary measures under existing laws.

Shortly before this, strange bombings took place in Moscow and other cities. These bombings were attributed to Chechens. They brought about the second Chechen war and Putin's rise to power. The anxiety experienced by the FSB head begins to become clear.

Even then, there was much speculation about the explosions being traced back to special services. In September of 1999, proof surfaced in Ryazan, where the FSB was apparently preparing to blow up an inhabited apartment building. Vigilant dwellers noticed strange preparations underway. They called the police, and the FSB quickly declared the event an exercise. It is reasonable to assume that analogous bombings were being planned in Yekaterinburg, but vigilant journalists revealed that plot, thereby saving thousands of lives.

In St. Petersburg, the FSB is just as unbridled as in any small provincial town, from which complaints might never reach Moscow. St. Petersburg historically is among those cities where there

is no one to whom to complain. In contrast to Moscow, there were no foreign correspondents there during Soviet times, and the local KGB directorate was trained in the brutal traditions of fighting dissidents.

In May of 1998, when Captain Nikitin was accused of espionage, the FSB showed its true face. When he was eventually cleared, he was invited to give an interview on the radio. As soon as Nikitin began to respond to a question by a correspondent, noise and static interfered, followed by voices of some advertisements from a different radio station, thereby completely blocking out Nikitin's press conference.

An investigation followed, showing that the equipment of the radio station *Gardirika*, which had interrupted Nikitin's press conference, was in perfect working order, and the interference was explained by some noisemaking attachment to the cable through which the radio program is transmitted. The investigative materials were handed over to the prosecutor's office of the central region of Saint Petersburg, where they languished, as one would expect. The prosecutor's office, after all, and the FSB are twin brothers. In Russia, there is complete understanding between them.

In recent times, the FSB has begun to act just as openly and crudely in Moscow as in the backwaters of Russia. A clear example of this is the destruction of the only independent privately owned television company, NTV. Sifting through five-year old newspapers, I see that the psychological preparation for this began much earlier, when Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin to become the Prime Minister.

Repressions began after the newspaper *Novaya Gazeta*, the independent mass media source, began reporting the unadorned truth on the FSB, the Chechen war, and on the nature of the ruling elite in Russia. On August 24, 1999 the radio station *Ekho Moskvy* ("Moscow's Echo") reported that *Novaya Gazeta* had its bank accounts frozen.

According to the chief editor, Dmitri Muratov, the "maximum claims of the tax inspectors are the not properly bureaucratically submitted travel vouchers submitted by our correspondents after they went to areas of military action in Chechnya." They were connected to the broadcast of "Forgotten Unit", reporting on how the military mistreats its own soldiers and betrays them in battle.

Dmitri Muratov also stated that in the course of the previous four months, the publication *Novaya Gazeta* had come under numerous examinations by the tax inspectors. Besides the rest, the tax inspectors performed functions not characteristic of them. They appeared as FSB agents. Without any pretenses, the tax inspectors announced to the employees of *Novaya Gazeta*: "You must know whom to befriend and what kind of headlines to print."

Despite such harassment by the tax police, the chief editor made it clear that the newspaper would continue to operate. He assumed that the cause of the current situation was probably the series of articles that had been published on corruption of FSB generals, and the speeches of Yuri Shchekochikhin on this topic.

On August 26, 1999, Dmitri Muratov reported that the newspaper's bank accounts had been released, and the Directorate of Relations with the State Public Tax Service of Russia spread reports that the territorial tax inspection had received instructions to hold off on collecting the fines against the *Novaya Gazeta*.

However, repressions against *Novaya Gazeta* did not end. They only took a more conspiratorial tone. On March 7, 2000, unknown criminals broke into *Novaya Gazeta's* computer system. The issue had not yet been published, but it was to have contained materials relating to financing the pre-election headquarters of Putin. Representatives of the publication noted that recently journalists have been pressured not to publish articles regarding the situation in Chechnya, as well as the ties between the highest level of bureaucrats and the business world.

The publication had received offers of financial support if it would change its political bent. In conducting its own internal investigation, the publication came to the conclusion that there were absolutely no technical errors on their part which could have brought about destruction of that particular issue of the newspaper at press time.

In 2000, when Putin officially became president, pressure on the press began to increase. Regional FSB Directives, sensing the prevailing mood in the Kremlin, began to undertake actions themselves in the area of curtailing the journalists' rights within their local regions.

Thus the FSB Directorate of the Volgograd region forced editors of several newspapers to an agreement regarding collaboration. This collaboration assumed that the newspapers would no

longer publish any sharp criticism of the FSB; in return, the FSB would provide a comfortable working environment and support. However, those who rejected this flawed attempt at cooperation would be labeled "dissidents" and "outcasts".

In April of 2000, Philippe Lanier, Moscow's correspondent of the French-German television company ARTE, decided to interview I. Kuznetsov, the head of the press service of the Volgograd FSB Directorate over the phone on this topic. But Kuznetsov refused to talk to Lanier on the telephone.

The tendency toward curtailment of freedom of the press is especially strong in regions overflowing with mafia and corruption. This is particularly true in the Far East where the implementation of Putin's concept of "informational security" has flourished.

On March 11, 2002, the Council on Informational Security in Vladivostok had its first meeting with the Primorsk regional governor in attendance. The regional governor is Sergei Darkin,⁵¹ a leading local mafia boss whose administration has been rife with corruption from the beginning.

Seventeen people, principally representatives of security agencies, showed up for the meeting. The agencies are headed by Alexander Gromov, FSB Directorate of Primorsk region's former acting manager. At its first meeting, which journalists were not invited to attend, the Council defined its basic issues. The most important among them is the fulfillment of the decisions of the organs of the government authorities regarding the technical protection of government secrets.

But this problem had already been solved. Government organs whose professional duties were to protect the secrets already existed. They were the ubiquitous FSB and the appropriate subdivision of the Defense Ministry. Why create another bureaucratic entity, especially when there are already more than enough representatives of these organs in every part of the vast country?

Nevertheless, two additional institutions for the protection of information in the Primorsk region were created at this meeting: a Department of Informational Security for the region and a Council on Informational Security under the governor. Although military buildup in the Far East has diminished by many times after the threat of war with China and Japan was removed, the Primorsk bureaucrats have become extremely concerned about protecting secrets in their region. In fact, it is not military

information which concerns the Far Eastern bureaucratic élite, but that which is connected to the activity of the local mafia.

With the arrival of Putin to power, the FSB leadership in the entire country wanted to show their loyalty to him, and began to bring lawsuits more frequently against publications which were openly critical of them in the press. And the courts always support the FSB's lawsuits.

The Second Chechen War gave FSB the strong stimulus it needed to attack the free press in Russia. It immediately floated the theory that the United States had illegally brought a large sum of dollars into Russia with which to bribe journalists who criticize the actions of the Russian military in the Chechen war. Their goal was clearly to denounce anyone who could uncover the true nature of the Chechen war as an American spy and a traitor to his homeland.

The FSB's goal was to plant the idea that a journalist is incapable of defending human rights out of human kindness or empathy, but only for money.

In fact, the majority of *chekists* really believe this is so. I remember how, during my years of working in the KGB, I wound up arguing with my colleagues, trying to prove to them that many writers and journalists do not write for money, but in order to help people, even if it means not receiving money for their efforts. Some journalists have even paid with their lives for what they believe. But this idea does not fit into the *chekist* frame of reference because they compare writers and journalists to themselves.

The FSB utilizes its own people in the State Duma to spread these views. They do this, as usual, in an unconvincing manner. Thus, on February 2, 2000 a press conference was held in St. Petersburg, during which Aleksei Alexandrov, the deputy of the State Duma, declared that a giant cache of US dollars had been smuggled into Saint Petersburg for the purpose of bribing Russian journalists.

Everything about this press conference looked set up, most of all, its location, the St. Petersburg branch of ITAR-TASS. This organization, although no longer part of the official State government, remains the mouthpiece of the authorities, as it had always been during the Soviet years. It is noteworthy that the position of ITAR-TASS's deputy president was filled by none other than the head of the foreign intelligence press service, Yuriy Kobaladze,

after he was let go from his previous job. The special service presence in ITAR-TASS remains very strong as in the past. The majority of its correspondents, as in Soviet times, are intelligence officers. It is also clear that, without FSB approval, the Saint Petersburg branch of ITAR-TASS would never have dared to have their hall used for just any press conference.

One journalist asked a question about the information which agencies had already had reported, regarding the lending or receipt of this money. Deputy Alexandrov himself responded, declaring that he did not actually have any information about that. He stated, however, that he was nevertheless convinced of the accuracy of that statement, and he even called on journalists and law enforcement officers to be vigilant. If it were true that he had no information, then it is clear that he must have received this information from the special services, although it is difficult to understand why he, and not the special services, had called the press conference.

On almost the same day, Alexander Zdanovich, the head of the FSB Center for public relations, announced that Russian special services were investigating the accuracy of information that had been received regarding the transfer of \$1.5 billion through Arab and American banks to support the lobbying efforts in the Russian mass media of Chechen freedom fighters' interests. The FSB, as usual, continues to accuse all journalists who uncover the real truth about corruption and the war in Chechnya.

The respected journalist Anna Politkovskaya's articles in *Novaya Gazeta* regarding crimes committed by the Russian military in the Chechen war gave the army's high command and the FSB many a sleepless night. She would travel to the front, risking her life. She met simple Chechens and Russian soldiers, and discovered much of what Moscow's highest leadership of the country truly did not want to hear: reports on torture, executions, and kidnappings of peaceful civilians, all at the hands of the Russian military in Chechnya.

In February of 2002, Ilya Shabalkin, a representative of the Center for Public Relations of the Russian Standing Army in Chechnya, declared that Anna Politkovskaya's travels to Chechnya were really "for resolving her financial problems and disputes with some funds, specifically with the Soros Foundation" which, supposedly, paid her travel expenses. This lie looked

particularly cynical, especially as it applied to Anna Politkovskaya, who was risking life and limb as a journalist working in a war zone. She was subjected to sabotage, and even provocative detention from the Russian military. Then, on October 7, 2006, Anna Politkovskaya was shot to death in the elevator of her apartment building.



**ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA
MURDERED; NO ARRESTS**

In the provinces, it can be the most innocent of criticisms of the FSB, published in the local paper, which provoke the local FSB head to contact the court and start a lawsuit regarding protection of his personal honor and dignity. In March 2002, for instance, Eugene Rodionov, a correspondent of the *Narodnaya Gazeta* ("Newspaper of the People"), published in Kostroma, wrote an article which included just one offending phrase: "The prosecutor and the FSB are mired in political intrigues and are not involved in performing their direct duties."

This was enough for Vladimir Smirnov, the head of the local FSB Directorate, to file a lawsuit demanding a retraction and compensation for damages in the amount of 200,000 rubles (approximately \$7,000). Provincial journalists do not have money like this; their average monthly compensation frequently does not even exceed the equivalent of one hundred dollars. But the court placed the FSB boss' lawsuit into the pipeline, although the above words do not take any stabs at anyone's honor and dignity. Just the same, the suit still remains in the pipeline of the Sverdlovsk regional Court of Kostroma.

Russian courts prefer to be on the side of the special services. In the language of Putin's bureaucracy this is called the "protection of state interests"; what it means is the protection of the interests of the government at the expense of the interests of an individual. Captain Nikitin would never have been acquitted today.

Particularly telling is the lawsuit of Nikolai Patrushev, a director of the FSB, against *Noviye Izvestiya* ("New News"). On August 4, 2001, this newspaper published an article, "Patrushev Remembered Chechnya". Patrushev was insulted by its title, as

well as a couple of phrases, among which was this: "Patrushev had the opportunity to prove himself in all his *chekist* glory in fighting the hotbed of international terrorism. And the director indeed proved himself. Not even a year went by, before he received a promotion to army general."

But all of this was God's honest truth! It truly happened that soon after his assignment to be responsible for the Chechen operations, the FSB director received the highest general's rank, although there were no victories in Chechnya. As though that were not enough, he was given the State's highest award, the Star of Hero of Russia, which the newspaper did not report. The award was presented in secret, and journalists found out about it only indirectly. For Patrushev, the Star of Hero became a prize given before the fact for all the crimes and missteps the Russian soldiers were yet to commit in Chechnya.

Nonetheless, the Moscow city court deemed this phrase, along with several others, as not accurately expressing reality, and penalized the author of the article, Valeriy Yakov, a well-known journalist, with a fine of 5,000 rubles (approximately 160 dollars). Valeriy Yakov appealed to the Supreme Court, but to no avail.

In today's Russia, the courts will act against the FSB only when the FSB is attacking the interests of a personage too high up on the list of high ranking government officials. That is what happened with the UFSB of the Vladimir region, when it brought a lawsuit against Yuri Luzkhov, the mayor of Moscow, regarding the protection of one's business reputation. The details of this story are not well known.

In July of 1999, the mayor's wife, Elena Baturin, began to be the subject of criminal harassment. The case was obviously a 'contract' arrangement, directed against the mayor himself. Most likely the reason for this harassment was a hidden battle within the leadership of the country. Somebody needed to eliminate the Moscow mayor. It is my opinion that the highest levels of leadership surrounding Putin, including the FSB, were involved in this harassment.

Elena Baturin was neither a spy, nor a terrorist. She was simply the owner of a manufacturing company which made plastic items. The crimes of which she was accused were purely financial, and the regular police could easily have solved them without help from the FSB.

Luzkhov argued that bringing a criminal lawsuit in which his wife's firm figured prominently, showed the arbitrariness of the authorities in using law enforcement agencies for political aims. The newspaper *Metro* published two articles, "Over the Abyss of Lies", and "Operation 'Provocation.'" After these articles appeared, the FSB Directorate of the Vladimir region brought a lawsuit against Luzkhov and the newspaper *Metro*, claiming protection of a business reputation, but the Presnenskiy Inter-Municipal court decided to refuse to hear the FSB claim.

The Vladivostok court, however, was not as loyal toward Tatiana Oshchepkov, who was only a journalist. In early 2002 she published articles in the newspaper *Yezhednevniye novosti* ("Daily News"), called "The Amateur KGB" and "There are no State Secrets in Russia," about the lawsuit against Gregory Pasko, the war journalist.

Gregory Pasko's "crime" was reporting on the Russian Navy's illegal dumping of nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan. Gregory Pasko was released by the Russian Pacific Fleet military court in Vladivostok after it found that the prosecution lacked evidence to support the charges of espionage and revealing state secrets against him. The court also noted irregularities committed during the investigation and the gathering of evidence.

Yet instead of acquitting him, the court found him guilty of "abuse of office" under Article 285, part 1, of the Russian Criminal Code. The court sentenced him to the maximum term of three years' imprisonment.

In her articles, the journalist Oshchepkov called Alexander Yegorkin, the FSB investigator, a criminal who falsified the report on the search of Gregory Pasko's apartment. Since the lower court had already declared these reports falsified and even brought down a personal ruling against them, she had every legal right to do so.

In the end, Pasko was condemned by the second court just the same, and Yegorkin, the FSB investigator, felt he was justified in demanding satisfaction from the journalist who had legally called him a criminal. He demanded that the court rule that she repudiate the materials she had published, and be fined 100,000 rubles as damages for the moral suffering he had endured.

Of course the demands of the FSB investigator were illegal and totally unfounded. But in Vladivostok, everyone is afraid of the FSB, including judges. If, despite all the international support the

innocent Pasko had, the FSB had been able to take matters into its own hands with him, then what can a rank and file judge from Vladivostok expect?

The court therefore ordered the newspaper to publish a retraction and pay a penalty of a total of eight thousand rubles — six thousand from the publication, and two thousand from Tatiana Oshchepkov, the journalist. Both the journalist and the publication appealed to the regional court, and seemed to have gained a victory. But the regional court only sent the file to a review, to the same Pervomaiskiy court of the first instance! Thereby the court betrayed Tatiana Oshchepkov, gave her up to the same court about which she had complained.

The Pervomaiskiy regional court, as was expected, ruled its previous decision correct, and only increased the punishment, now demanding from the publication ten thousand rubles, instead of six thousand. For Tatiana Oshchepkov, the fine remained the same, even though she was in the right.

Alas, the Russian courts quite often punish the innocent and let the guilty go, especially in the hinterlands. On this pessimistic note I must end this chapter, although events similar to those noted above repeat themselves and expand daily in Russia.



GREGORY PASKO



PART III

MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH THE FSB

Chapter 10

THE FSB AND RUSSIAN DISSIDENTS ABROAD

There are few journalists in today's Russia who are writing about the FSB. This is not surprising, since the topic is not without risk. It is also understood that to write about this topic, one must have experience within the organization. There were always only a handful of talented writers inside the KGB, but there were also hundreds of security officers posing as journalists in the numerous foreign correspondent offices of the Soviet press.

Occasionally articles would appear in the Russian press written by civilian journalists. Readers would read them with suspicion, understanding that they could only have been created by dictation from the KGB itself. In those cases, the journalist only plays the role of an interpreter, translating the confused speech of the FSB officer to journalistic language. So, many authors amassed a fortune by interpreting the actions of the NKVD, as the KGB was known in Stalin's time. Their lie-filled plays were shown in all the theaters, and many films were based on them. Their gigantic pine log dachas, built on expansive plots of land, allotted to them at a decree of Stalin himself, now are the subject of a myriad of lawsuits, as numerous descendants line up to claim them.

But times have changed, and young, more worldly readers instinctively sense the lies.

Only a few retired colonels dare to touch the subject of the FSB, and their articles are marked by a double standard. On the one hand, they admit that the KGB did in fact commit crimes. But on the other hand, they glorify the KGB as victorious hero.

In Russia, there are at least three former KGB intelligence officers who have taken the path of resolutely exposing its core. They repeatedly subject the KGB and its heir, the FSB, to moral rebuke, exposing the criminal organization that it is. These former KGB officers include General Oleg Kalugin who, fearing retribution, was forced to emigrate to the United States; Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Litvenenko, who fled to London, where he was assassinated; and I, who received political asylum in the United States.

I am still subject to provocations, because the FSB is especially enraged that I held a rather high position in the KGB as Advisor to the Head of Scientific and Technical Intelligence. I always sign my articles, and mention my previous position in the KGB, so that the FSB cannot reproach me for being just "some civilian journalist," in order to unleash tremendous venom at me. In its heart, the FSB cannot understand why I would do this. They would consider it to be much more beneficial for me to sing the praises of the FSB, and reap both material and moral rewards.

To this day the FSB continues to glorify the Soviet Union, which was held up by three pillars: the Communist Party apparatus, the army, and the KGB. Neither the first nor the second held up to the test of bourgeois life. Only the third, the KGB, remained loyal to Communism forever.

According to their philosophy, the Communist party apparatus disgracefully capitulated to Yeltsin's democracy. Yeltsin cynically cut off the Stalinist Old Guard. Some of them committed suicide, with a gun or by jumping out a window; others became indigent pensioners. Being true Communists, they could never have imagined that Communism would one day collapse in Russia.

These people sincerely believed Communism would last forever, and therefore kept no savings. Even Victor Grishin, the former First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party, died while waiting in line to see someone at the social security office, where he had come to ask for an increase of his tiny monthly pension. Just a few short years prior, all of Moscow had trembled before him, the former master of the city.

The majority of the Communist Party apparatus officers went into business and bonded with the underworld. Their participation in the Communist Party apparatus decades before had been hypocritical, dictated solely by career aspirations. Many people in Russia today still ponder the fate of the Communist Party's gold bullion, which formed a significant part of the national budget. It is known that a portion of the gold went toward establishing the corrupt Communist Party businesses in the newly democratic Russia.

For the Soviet Army, the disintegration of the USSR came as a shock. The Soviet Army attracted a different type of individual than the Communist Party apparatus. For the most part, they were village lads, raised as all Russian peasants, in the spirit of

blind worship of the authorities. Living conditions and study in military schools were quite difficult; therefore, youths from large cities would, instead, choose civilian professions, preferring their relative freedom. To be accepted into a Russian military school, all one needs is a strong physique.

Russian peasantry inherently accepts the word of its leaders without question. That is why the naïve village boys firmly believed the army's political tutors, the professional liars. They blindly believed in Communism, and were taught to hate the West. Army officers with whom I was acquainted would boast: "We are fanatics!"

The fall of Communism, therefore, demoralized the army and caused a wave of suicides. The Communist military, famous for its ideological inflexibility, struggled with religion, but many officers began to believe in God and became pious Christians, something which, in the past, had been categorically prohibited. Formerly, if a new army base was established, the commander would immediately insist on closing any remaining churches in the area. Following 1991, in many military towns, after seventy years of Communism, churches were being erected. Soldiers and officers prayed openly, without fear.

Only the FSB has not experienced anything similar. Its officers have proven to be the staunchest of Communists. At intelligence and counter-intelligence headquarters, not a single church has been built. Until recently, the FSB was the owner of record of a 17th century church, a unique historical monument on Lubyanka Street. In the 1920s, its icons and frescoes were destroyed by the KGB. As with all churches expropriated by the KGB, this church was converted to a prison and torture chamber. Then, during the course of some seventy years, it became the garage for special KGB vehicles.

In Stalin's day, the notorious black cars would leave at night from here to pick up their victims. The KGB officers using those cars would storm into homes of the townspeople and would arrest unarmed and innocent people. Among them were both representatives of the highest Party elite, and mere laborers. They were noblemen and priests.

The local population called these cars the "black ravens", the harbingers of death. By daybreak, thousands of arrested people would be brought to the basement of this former church, many of whom would be executed on the spot.

In 2002, the garage building was returned to the Church, and now church services have resumed. This was done under the pressure of public opinion. In the very heart of Moscow, on Lubyanka Street, a church being used as a garage today is unacceptable! There really is a church revival in Russia.

The re-opening of the church on Lubyanka was not dictated by the repentance of KGB officers for their past and present crimes. On the contrary, this subject was never broached during the celebratory speeches, as though this church were being opened on a university campus or on factory grounds. It was not mentioned that the walls and floor of this re-opened church were soaked in the blood of martyrs, murdered or tortured to death.

When Putin came to power, this hypocritical position in evaluating the historical past of the KGB was officially sanctioned.

The FSB exhibits the chief characteristics of anti-Christian behavior — persistence in sin, and refusal to repent. The FSB has never admitted that the mass repression of innocent people, their torture and murder, committed by its predecessor KGB officers during the course of seventy years of Communist rule, were crimes. The FSB keeps silent, yet at the same time persists in repeating that its whole KGB life, beginning in 1917, was dedicated to serving the Homeland. In truth, the KGB served Communist ideals, which were opposed to the national interests of Russia.

I appealed to my former colleagues, KGB officers, on Russian television to repent their sins and to renounce the devil's ideology of Communism. Afterwards, my phone rang nonstop. Veteran old-timers and my peers of forty years would call. "We have nothing to repent!" they would scream into the phone. "We only served our Homeland!"

"Are the Homeland and Communism one and the same?" I would ask.

"They are the same," the old men would hiss, oozing with hatred. They must have participated in Stalin's repressions.

"Then why has the population turned its back on Communism?" I would ask. The old-timers could not reply. Many former KGB officers were laden with many sins over their years of service.

After Putin came to power, my television appearances ceased.

Hatred toward Christianity is what characterizes the worldview of today's Russian counter-intelligence officers. It portrays that the FSB is not a security service as most countries have. It is an entity

with an insatiable sense of having been insulted, a stronghold of a Communist revenge. The FSB is a political power. Leading a spiritual war against it, I am fulfilling my Christian duty of fighting the Devil. I differ from my colleagues who write about the counter-intelligence service as a government agency, and not an armed detachment of the local Communist Party.

After the collapse of the USSR, the pro-Communist orientation of the FSB did not weaken but it gathered strength. The FSB became much more Communist than it had been during the Soviet years. On the cusp of the 1980s and 90s, officers who had democratic tendencies left the FSB, leaving behind only the staunch Communists. They knew nothing except how to write boring work papers. Their salaries dropped immediately, as well as their image in society. As a result, FSB employees were filled with envy and a thirst for revenge toward their luckier former colleagues. To this day they suffer from a nagging nostalgia for Communist days.

Chapter 11

MY LIFE AFTER THE KGB

When I worked in the KGB, I longed to tell the truth about the most secret of government agencies in the Soviet Union. I did not believe that day would ever come. Fortunately, the KGB fell in 1991.

On one of my final days before my resignation, my boss Gennady Zakharov called me in. He was a Soviet spy arrested in New York for espionage in August of 1986.

In retaliation, the KGB quickly arrested Nicholas Daniloff, an American journalist in Moscow, a descendant of Russian émigrés. One of his acquaintances, a KGB agent, had handed him a package containing secret documents, after which he was arrested. It did not help Daniloff that he was a descendant of a Decembrist, which would have caused the Soviet authorities to treat him with great respect. In the end, Daniloff was exchanged for Zakharov, who was returned to Moscow. He was promoted to head a group of Advisors to the Head of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence, of which I was a part.

When he called me in, Zakharov's face looked stern. With a nod he pointed to a chair. "I want to warn you in advance," he said. "If

you are planning to write any books on the KGB, you must first run them by us.”

“That is one thing I’ll never do! I will write as I consider it necessary, and I will coördinate it only with my own conscience!” I answered him with a feeling of vengeful joy.

“You’ll be sorry!” Zakharov glanced at me with dull eyes.

“No, you will be sorry!” I countered. Both of our prophecies were to come true.

When I crossed the threshold of the Intelligence building in the Moscow district of Yasenevo for the last time, I happily breathed the air of freedom. For the first time in my life I felt myself to be simply a journalist. That same day I began writing my book exposing the KGB.

Since I had worked in Japan, I appealed to the Japanese journalists stationed in Moscow. Japanese readers, I reasoned, would certainly find my book interesting.

Back then many foreigners thought that Russia had broken all ties with Communism, therefore with the FSB as well. “Your book,” journalists would tell me, “It is outdated. It is behind the times. The KGB no longer exists!”

“That is not so, and you will soon realize it yourselves!” I objected. But, fortunately, in *Jiji*, a Japanese news agency, there were people who understood the situation in Russia. They promised to publish my book.

At their request, I wrote several new chapters. I remember sneaking into the Moscow correspondent’s office of *Jiji* on dark winter evenings to write them. There, Mrs. Yoko Nagoshi, a translator and wife of the correspondent, Kenro Nagoshi, would immediately translate them into Japanese, and send them by fax to Tokyo.

In 1994 the book, *The Spy Who Loved Japan*, was published. Its effect was like a bomb going off. A tale of Russian espionage had never been previously published in Japan. The book revealed the hidden world of the Tokyo KGB station, full of denunciations of one agent against another, bureaucracy, and servility. It showed that in reality, the espionage work, for which the agents had come to Japan, took a back seat to other activities.

“This is the KGB we all feared?” asked the TV commentators with a sarcastic grin from their screens, flashing my book in front of them. I have to admit, it made me feel good.

My book brought a powerful blow to Russian Intelligence. It paralyzed its work in Japan for a full six months. Now, as soon as a Russian Intelligence officer was introduced to Japanese, he would get asked a question similar to this:

“You will try to recruit me in the same manner that Preobrazhensky describes in his book, *The Spy Who Loved Japan*? And he would pull my book out of his briefcase.

The Russian Intelligence could not tolerate such humiliation. It decided to seek revenge.

“You had a phone call from the Intelligence today,” my wife told me anxiously one evening.

“What did they do, forget I do not work for them anymore?” I put on a false note of gaiety. But my inner peace had been disturbed. I understood my book had gotten them angry, and that I would be subjected to some type of provocation.

Soon they called again. Picking up the telephone, I recognized the voice of the spy hero Gennady Zakharov, my former boss who had warned me to coördinate all my articles with the KGB after my resignation.

“We have way too many questions for you!” he said with a triumphant note in his voice. “Come by tomorrow morning for a talk!”

“As soon as I walk into the KGB intelligence building in Yasenevo, you will photograph me. And then you will pass the photograph to some Japanese correspondents, who will recognize where I was photographed, and will think that I still work in intelligence. This is a provocation, and I will not fall for it!” I answered.

“Well, then let’s meet on neutral territory!” suggested Zakharov.

“No, I will not do that either because it will look like I am meeting with an agent, and who knows what kind of surprise you’ll have in store for me. If you want to, come to my apartment. But remember one thing — I will not make our meeting a secret. I will tell foreign journalists, and I will publish an article about our meeting in the newspapers.”

“But then you’ll have to expose my name. And that is a crime!” Zakharov reminded me.

“That’s OK. I’ll manage to do it without naming you!” I said. Zakharov agreed with a sigh. Apparently the leadership of the

KGB Intelligence, headed by Evgeny Primakov, was demanding that he have a personal meeting with me. But I could not understand why the meeting needed to be face to face. I agreed just to find out what type of revenge the KGB was planning for me.

A trip to my home was humiliating for Zakharov. I was, after all, his junior in the hierarchy, and retired at that. For me, however, meeting him at my apartment was safest. At home, even the walls could help me.

Formally, I had not broken any laws. I had not revealed any names of KGB agents nor of operating Intelligence officers in my book. That meant they could only get back at me by cunningly finding fault with something else.

It is exactly what happened. Sitting in my living room, sipping tea and glancing around guardedly trying to ascertain whether any Japanese journalists were hiding in the adjoining rooms, Zakharov suddenly said in a friendly tone:

"Give me the manuscript to your book! The higher-ups want to familiarize themselves with it."

"I do not have it. I gave it to the Japanese and did not keep a copy for myself," I lied.

"What a shame!" Zakharov sighed, rising. "It could have clarified some questions."

Exactly one hour later, the phone rang. The voice was familiar. It was Sergei Semiletov, my only Japan-specialist friend who remained working for intelligence. The rest had all resigned. In the 1970s we were both working in Japan at Tokai University. Then we both joined the KGB. I became an Intelligence Officer, and he became a civilian instructor of Japanese at the Academy of Foreign Intelligence. At that time, it was called "Andropov's Red-Bannered Institute of the KGB." The friend's status was lower than mine. Being only an instructor and not an intelligence officer, he was considered a member of office staff. An office worker and a civilian, Semiletov did not engage in intelligence-operative activities. He did not study in the intelligence or counter-intelligence schools. Nevertheless, at the order of his bosses, he attempted to deceive me into parting with the Russian text of my book. Understandably, he gave himself away.

"I heard that your book came out in Japan," Sergei Semiletov said to me. "Could you give me its Russian text?"

"What for?" I acted surprised. "You read Japanese just as easily!"

"But you see," he stuttered, "I so want to read it in Russian, to understand your literary thoughts." My school buddy faltered, obviously embarrassed.

"I can tell you about them orally," I answered. "And now, imagine for a moment that you read a book of another writer. And then you called him at home and said: 'And now, give me your rough drafts!' How convincing is that?"

Semiletov, embarrassed, said no more. A moment later he began to mutter about the text as if nothing had happened. This type of shameless behavior is the norm in the military. They try to obey an order at any cost. But my friend was not even officially in the military.

After consulting with attorneys, I found out why intelligence needed the manuscript of my book. They wanted to criminally alter it somehow, to insert names of intelligence officers, so they could then accuse me of attempting to reveal state secrets. An attempt to commit a crime is also a crime, for which it is easy to be convicted.

The Russian text was hidden under my bed. I thought the FSB would come to search my apartment illegally, in order to take the text or to make a copy of it, finding a moment when no one was at home.

After the phone call from the traitor-classmate, the phone rang again. But the ring tone was unusual, uncharacteristic. Regular telephones never sound like that. It was a continuous trill-sound lasting for seven minutes. I consciously waited for it to end. Then I picked up the receiver and answered in a polite voice: "Hello".

"Can you hear me?" answered a gruff female voice, the typical rude voice of a telephone operator throughout Russia. But my professional sense told me that this woman was my colleague. She was from the KGB, I felt certain, where until recently I, too, had worked. She had that certain trust and casualness in her tone, which signaled to me that she was speaking to one of her fellow-KGB workers.

The KGB phone operator was checking to make sure that the eavesdropping equipment on my telephone was working properly.

She probably was not calling me, but her colleague on the other end of the line. It just happened that my phone rang.

In the KGB, this happens quite often, because their technology does not work very well. It probably dates back to the traditions of the Stalinist days, when the NKVD had no need to mask its activities. No one would have dared to say anything out of fear for his life

Frankly, this is understandable. Intelligence is an agency which deals with top secrets. That is why each of us, using the telephone to call home, would never speak longer than five minutes. If the call lasted longer, and the Service of Internal Security got bored with listening, the call would be cut off. You would be left listening to a series of piercing, menacing and intermittent signals. Hearing them, we would be paralyzed from fear that this could somehow prove damaging to our careers.

At times similar signals were heard even in the telephones of the bosses. They would tell us about this, feeling humiliated and insulted. It meant that rank meant nothing; all are under surveillance. Hearing this gave us a sense of satisfaction.

But in the Intelligence office the technology failed too. Sometimes abrupt male voices of those who were doing the eavesdropping were overheard over our own conversations. The voices were always male. This meant that the intelligence offices were only entrusted to men, to avoid publicity. It was believed that women would gossip about what they heard.

"I've got them under surveillance!" a stern voice would suddenly come through on the receiver. "Connect to number 27-23; there is no surveillance there, and a conversation is already underway!"

Once I was aware that my home phone was under surveillance, I understood the rest. FSB rarely limits itself to control just over the telephone. The wiretapping of my home phone signifies that I am a target of the FSB; I can fall prey to its arsenal of forces and means at its disposal.

As they taught in the counter-intelligence school texts, these forces and means are as follows: the counter-intelligence officers (no wonder one of them came to my home), civilian collaborators (this included Sergei Semiletov, who begged me to give him the Russian text of my book), and also operative technology. This means control over the phone, over correspondence, as well as physical surveillance, or shadowing a person in the streets.

I decided to check whether other means were being used against me. I asked my wife to watch from the windows of our apartment as I approached the bus stop. In intelligence this is called "counter-surveillance". The bus stop is visible from our windows.

When I was a Soviet spy in Tokyo, my wife would frequently employ "counter-surveillance" for me. Her experienced eye immediately recognized that I was being followed. At a distance from me a man followed, observing me boarding the bus. He probably wore a hidden microphone in his coat collar, and notified someone of my destination. He was probably posted nearby in a car, near the entrance to my building.

The bus goes to a Metro station called *Vernadsky's Prospekt*. Not far are several secret institutes. There, in one of the inconspicuous buildings, stood hidden an observation post of FSB's external supervision. That meant that another detective would be waiting to follow me as soon as I got off the bus.

That told me that the FSB was prepared for something serious, specifically, to come to my apartment with an unauthorized search and extract the Russian text of my book; or perhaps to plant something compromising, such as a weapon or drugs, and then confiscate them officially, with lots of fanfare and many witnesses.

How could I stand up to such an attack? It was pointless to call the police. If there were an official inquiry, the FSB would feign self-righteous anger at my allegations. There was only one way. Maybe it was stupid, but effective. It was using irreverence and scandal.

Whenever I would receive a phone call, I would tell the caller that I am under surveillance of the FSB. The FSB is trying to secretly enter my apartment and take the Russian text of my book. My elderly relatives, whom I also told this, thought I was off my rocker. My wife's girlfriends were intrigued and did not understand why I would tell them this. But I was not, in fact, telling them, it was for the ears of the FSB.

Among those who called me were also foreign correspondents. They understood everything perfectly well.

To an untrained eye, this looked stupid. However, it worked perfectly to rescue me. I knew that those who shadowed me were not the ones who were eavesdropping on me. They worked for a

different division. That meant that they were not tied by corporate solidarity, and that my antics on the phone would eventually reach their bosses. The leadership would understand that to conduct a secret search under such conditions could facilitate exposure and would therefore be useless; it could only lead to a scandal.

A month later I felt that the surveillance had ceased. The telephone, too, stopped ringing out its odd trills. As to the manuscript of my book, *The Spy Who Loved Japan*, I managed to transport it to trusted acquaintances. I was not worried whether the FSB was watching me at that moment or not. I knew they would never detain me in the street. They did not have any criminal investigations against me, and I could easily have appealed to attorneys and human rights organizations.

A month following these events, I published an article in the newspaper *Moscow News*, where I described the visit of my former boss and his demands to give him the Russian manuscript of my book.

As I learned later, there was no end to the indignation of Intelligence generals with my impudence. My former boss, Gennady Zakharov, even received a reprimand. He was scolded for not being able to explain to me the importance of keeping one's mouth shut — as though I myself had not been a lieutenant colonel of the KGB. After this, the FSB would not have dared to surprise me with a secret search of my apartment.

PASSPORT CONTROL

But the FSB's revenge was not long in coming. After the fall of the Communist regime in 1991, Russians were allowed to go abroad freely. For that, you only needed a foreign passport. Foreign passports are not given automatically. Your application for a foreign passport could be denied. Obstacles to receiving a foreign passport could be a criminal conviction or access to State secrets.

However, criminal convictions are treated quite selectively by the Russian authorities. A big mafia boss, who spent more than a decade in prison, receives a foreign passport without any problems. But a regular person, whom they may want to get back at, can be accused of nonexistent crimes.

It is what happened to my wife, for whom I ordered a passport at a travel company. I received a phone call from them asking me whether my wife had ever been hauled off to the police station for misconduct.

I laughed so hard I couldn't speak. The travel agent waited until I stopped laughing to ask me the following question. Her voice sounded confused.

"And you yourself, did you ever have access to government secrets?"

"Now you're on to something!" I answered her. "Yes, I did, when I worked in the KGB. But my wife was never an intelligence officer, and had never been to the police station. If she is refused a foreign passport, I will sue. Not you, of course, but the director of the FSB who seeks revenge in this manner."

My threat had its intended result. I knew that the FSB, more than anything, is afraid of publicity. A couple months later, my wife received the cherished foreign passport.

If you ever fall into the hands of the FSB, immediately raise a ruckus. Try to involve as many people as you possibly can. The main thing is, never agree to a settlement, or to a compromise, or agreement with the FSB. The FSB will inevitably recruit you or something worse yet.

As to my own foreign passport, I, as expected, was denied immediately. The official reason: "provided false biographical data." Meanwhile these data filled only one line: "Service in the military unit number 13157, 1976-1991." The military unit number is a code name for the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, in other words, Intelligence. I entered upon graduating from the Institute of Asia and Africa at the Moscow State University. I had no other employment.

I ordered this passport, not at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where I would have never received it, but from a travel company. There are many such agencies in Russia now. They have their own employees in the Visa Registration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, closely connected to the FSB, and push through their clients' applications without the usual wait. It is how it began with me, too.

Each person who wishes to receive a foreign passport is checked against the card files of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB. The first card files show whether the individual is a

convicted criminal. The second reveals a politically unreliable individual, or even a spy. Data on all such individuals were stored for decades at the 10th Department of the KGB, which has now been renamed the Directorate of Registration and Archival Documents of the FSB.

When I worked in the KGB, I used this facility many times to check out new acquaintances, both Russian and foreign. It was required of us by the rules. The rules forbade us to come into contact with an individual without having checked his background. He might turn out to be an active KGB agent, and in an inadvertent meeting with him, I might expose him. Or, on the contrary, he might be an agent of a foreign intelligence service, and, by befriending him, I could compromise myself in the eyes of my own bosses.

These requirements only concerned those people with whom we planned to work together for the KGB. They did not apply to our private relationships.

But even among social contacts, there were many KGB agents. We did not know, of course, who these people were. Contact with an unknown agent is always dangerous. Taking advantage of our position at work, we would send off our inquiries to the 10th department of the KGB, portraying our personal contacts as work-related. We found many KGB informers among our closest friends, classmates, school and institute teachers, relatives and even parents. They all supplied the FSB with information on us.

This continues to this day, which is why the sons of many successful businessmen enroll in the FSB Academy to gain access to its archives. There they can find information with which to compromise the rivals of their parents. And if they find none, then they themselves will find a way to compromise the rivals.

Working in the 10th department of the KGB was not considered prestigious. It was explained that at that time, two KGB concentration camps for political prisoners were under it. At that time, I only knew them by their pseudonyms — *Dubravniy* (Oak Place) in Mordovia and a higher security one, *Skalniy* (of the rock) in the cold northern Republic of Komi, among the naked rock cliffs.

And so, the mechanism which I had used so many times before for my own benefit worked against me this time. An inquiry was

sent to the archival department of the FSB. After the allotted time, two days, a reply was received: "Preobrazhensky is a retired lieutenant colonel of the KGB of the USSR."

But this answer did not come to the tourist company but to the officer of the FSB in charge of the area of Moscow where that company was located. The FSB officer, following the accepted protocol, phoned the personnel department of the SBVR, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and asked whether a foreign passport could be issued.

Unfortunately in Russia, the question of whether a foreign passport can be issued to a former KGB employee is decided by his former bosses. Thus they try to guarantee loyalty to themselves even after officers have retired.

Certainly the bosses noted about me thus: "Preobrazhensky was the advisor to the head of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence and had access to secrets of special importance. Now he writes articles about us which are utter nonsense. Therefore he must never go abroad until the end of his life!"

Employees of the tourist agency received a different version of the reply: "Preobrazhensky had access to secrets, and therefore cannot go abroad. Further, there are other points against him."

The "access to State secrets" theme did not hold water. All of my friends, all of whom held the same job title of "advisors to the head of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence" within the KGB, had received foreign passports and traveled the entire world, as businessmen.

"We understand that the FSB is persecuting you for something. We have had several precedents like this. But usually retired KGB officers receive foreign passports without problems. We do not want the FSB to use our company as an instrument for revenge. Therefore we've decided to give you a foreign passport," they informed me at the tourist company.

This was truly remarkable. The FSB wanted to prevent me, even though there was no legal basis for it, from obtaining a foreign passport, for I had not broken any law. Nevertheless, Russian tourist companies usually, out of fear, comply with orders from the FSB. But this particular tourist company displayed a courageous face and did not yield to KGB pressure.

In the meantime, I had decided to publish some chapters of the book *The Spy Who Loved Japan* in Russia. I contacted the newspaper *Moscow News* for this. They seemed the most democratic of all, and not tied to the KGB. In the 1990s there were many exposé articles published in that newspaper regarding the KGB.

The head of the newspaper's department dealing with military issues, Alexander Zhilin, gladly met me. Glancing over the list of articles I was proposing, he chose the juiciest one of all, "The War of the Twins."

This article dealt with the struggle between the USSR and Chinese KGBs. Both countries competed in the battle for domination in the Communist world. The Intelligence services also participated in this struggle. But the trouble was that both grew out of one root, the Stalinist NKVD, and were as identical as twin-brothers. Everything was the same, from the methods of work to the number of departments. Consequently their battle was at times senseless, because they each guessed the plans of the other.

The article was a success, and soon the editor's computer of the *Moscow News* was downloading more of my articles. One talked of the difficult fate of an Intelligence-journalist of the KGB, where they treat journalists with distrust and caution. The second article would have been a sensation, to report on the collaboration between the NKVD and the Gestapo during the Second World War. Zhilin was already rubbing his hands in glee, foretasting the effect which would be created by these two articles. The staff artist had already drawn some funny caricatures for them.

But on the appointed day, these articles did not appear.

"Well, it happens in the press quite frequently. Who knows what could have delayed the publication!" I thought.

Not suspecting a thing, I phoned Zhilin and said that I wanted to come to his office to discuss a new article.

"We have nothing to discuss with you," Zhilin answered me sharply. His voice was crude in a military way. His intonation had changed so much from the former conversations I had had with him just yesterday, that I still remember his words:

"If you write something new, you can bring it, but there will be no more conversations with you!" he screamed into the phone and hung up.

I was overwhelmed by a feeling of deep hurt. Just yesterday Zhilin was so kind. He listened with interest to my funny stories of service in the KGB, and we discussed possible future articles.

Logic suggested to me that someone from the FSB had talked to him and suggested he not have any contact with me.

To check out Zhilin's reaction, I decided to act as though nothing had happened. He allowed me to bring new articles, so I brought them.

But here again a disappointment awaited me. Since Zhilin is the head of the department, his phone is answered by a secretary. In the past, she would immediately connect me with her boss; but now, after a moment's pause she announced:

"The manager is out at the moment."

"It is OK that Zhilin is not here." I said. "My new article is ready. Please order me a pass to the office, and I will personally deliver it to his desk, as I have previously done." I offered.

"No, I can not order a pass" she cut me off sharply. "Bring the article. Phone me from the lobby, and I will come down to get it."

This happened several times. Finally I understood that Zhilin needed to prove to someone that I truly no longer came to the editorial offices of the *Moscow News*, and that no one would give me a pass to go there. This meant that he, to whom Zhilin wants to prove this, has the authority to check the files of the passes issued....

Needless to say, *Moscow News* stopped publishing my articles. The secretary came down to the lobby to meet me a couple of more times. With triumph in her voice, she would announce that my article would not be published.

"Which one exactly?" I would ask her. "The editor has several of my articles in his files."

The secretary did not know.

And soon the main reviewer of intelligence articles in *Moscow News* was a young girl who knew next to nothing about it. Her only frame of reference was information from detective novels. All of her articles were dictated by the head of the press service of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Juriy Kobaladze.

FSB oppression, however, is not eternal. Five years later I again started to get published in *Moscow News*. It was not in the newspaper itself, but in one of its offspring, *Vremya Novostei* [News Time] and *Vremya MN*. I did not experience any vindictive

pleasure. I was filled with another joy, now I would once again tell the public what I think and know about the FSB!

Understandably, the press service of the FSB was not happy with my commentaries. Just the same, however, newspapers did periodically publish my work, almost to spite the FSB. But once Putin came to power, these publications ceased. At first, I still tried to phone the newspapers and offered them my articles on the FSB, but now on the other end of the line I was greeted with laughter.

"Do you not understand that the times have changed?" they said to me.

In 1999 my foreign passport expired and I had to order a new one. I was very worried, since by that time I had become a well-known reporter on intelligence issues, and a passionate exposé of the FSB. My books, articles and interviews angered the former KGB community to no end. And now it was payback time.

Strange as it may seem, however, I received my new passport without any problems. Ten years had passed since the day I resigned from the KGB, and the statute of limitations on State secrets had expired. There were no formal reasons to deny me. Had they denied my request for a new foreign passport, I would have had an opportunity to sue the FSB. Knowing my scandal-causing nature, the FSB apparently preferred not to bother me this time.

I used this passport to visit the US in May of 1999, and to meet with my like-minded friend, General Oleg Kalugin. I gave many interviews, and appeared on television. This did not, of course, remain unnoticed by the FSB. The name of Oleg Kalugin for the FSB is like a red flag for an enraged bull. Once again, the FSB got its revenge, not directly, but through my children, as is the norm in the KGB since Stalin's day.

RUSSIAN RETRIBUTION — FAMILY STYLE

When I returned from the U.S., strange scandals began erupting around my son, George. In June, he was supposed to graduate from the Institute of Asia and Africa. His concentration was Japan, just as mine had been. He had always been a good student. He was considered one of the best Japanese language students in his group. This was no coincidence, since he had spent his preschool years in Japan and fallen passionately in love with

her people, history and culture. He especially likes Japanese cartoons, which he remembers from childhood.

When he became a university student, he would ask acquaintances visiting Japan to bring back videotapes of Japanese cartoons. He would watch them with pleasurable nostalgia, remembering his Japanese childhood. After he graduated from the Institute of Asia and Africa, he was looking forward to a ten-month internship at the University Tokai. It is easy to imagine how he dreamt of going back to Japan after thirteen years. Back in 1985, after the spy scandal in Japan, he too, had to leave Japan. He always longed to go back.

Immediately upon my return from America, his graduation paper was sharply criticized, although previously it had been considered adequate. Its title was "Bullying in Japanese schools." His graduation paper was declared not written on the topic given. But there was no time to argue — the last days of school were fast approaching. He had to quickly rewrite it. Those awful days of feverish work at the computer the whole night through, as well as the sense of hopelessness, will forever remain in my memory.

But the paper was rewritten. It had to be handed in to the instructor, who seemed to have disappeared from the face of the earth. No matter when she was called during those last days, she was never available. It appeared that she was intentionally unavailable so that the paper would have to be handed in late. And that is exactly what happened.

In the end, the graduation paper was handed in just before the deadline, and counted. But it was especially strange that this paper, which was handed in at the eleventh hour, still elicited indignation from several leaders within the department. It was strange because prior to this my son had received high grades.

Then another vengeful attack was prepared. The chairman of the department, Professor Deopik, decided to give my son the State Examination on History of Asia and Africa personally. He did not even try to conceal his intent to bury him, to give him an unsatisfactory grade. Why?

"Your son does not know history at all! You're a good father of a bad son!" replied Deopik to my inquiry.

But why did the chairman of the department not talk this way even a month before?

Later I found out that they were planning to deny my son his university diploma. Had he failed his final examination in history, instead of receiving a diploma of the Moscow University, he would have received a notice which would have said: "Audited lectures". This is not proof of higher education. Having such a notice, he would not be able to get a job as a Japan-specialist.

The fate of people with such lack of accreditation is to work in simple professions, those not requiring university degrees. Immediately upon receiving such a notice, these individuals are drafted into the army for two years, as regular high school graduates. In the Russian army, one can do what one likes with a soldier. His demise is not considered to be a noteworthy event, and not a single commander would be held responsible for it.

Such notices received in lieu of diploma occur rarely, only after a series of loud scandals or many failed examinations. They are handed only to the worst of the worst, to drunkards and to those who are incorrigible. My son was an excellent student — that was the problem. Never before had there been any problems with his studies. During my stay in the United States, absolutely nothing had occurred. This showed that the problem stemmed from me.

George's situation again became more complicated. No matter how well he knew the history of the East, the chairman of the department, wizened by his experience as professor, obviously knew it better. He could easily give George several questions which he would be unable to answer. The battle was definitely not between equals.

But luckily, I too have friends in the department. Professor N., who thirty years earlier had been my teacher, grabbed a moment, when the chairman was deep in conversation with dean of the university, and accepted the examination from George. She gave him an "excellent", the highest grade. And so, my son once again became a top student.

"Oh, how they scolded me in the department!" she admitted to me later. "I said to them: 'Explain to me what I did wrong? Preobrazhensky was always an excellent student!' But everyone just lowered his eyes and mumbled. They could not explain the reason to me. I had to guess at it, just like in the Soviet days."

The cult of omission, mysterious half-words and grimaces, are all symptoms of FSB involvement. George however, despite everything, passed all the exams and received the well-earned diploma.

Then, one more retaliation was undertaken. In the office of the head of the university, they held a meeting of the leadership of the Institute of Asia and Africa, dedicated to only one question: would my son go for a one-year term to Japan or not. All of his classmates were going to go to University of Tokai. It was amazing that this meeting was held in secrecy. There had not been any secret meetings in this open humanitarian institute since Soviet times.

"We cannot reward students who hand in their graduation papers late with trips to Japan!" said some of the attendees at the meeting. Present, too, were the leading department professors of Japanese philology, who considered George to be one of their best Japanese language students. But they did not speak up on his behalf.

As a result, the University of Tokai, where thirty years earlier I had received my language training, and where my son was supposed to go as well, received a letter stating that Trainee Preobrazhensky was being removed from the roster of attendees due to his lack of dedication. It is easy to imagine how my son suffered for the undeserved persecution. But at the same time, he was proud of suffering for his father.

THE SHINRIKO AFFAIR

A year prior to this, other events occurred which disturbed me deeply. They seriously intended to do me in. The FSB decided to punish me for a series of publications regarding the connection between the Japanese pseudo-religious sect AUM Shinrikyo and Russian Intelligence.

Much of the information which follows, concerning the *Shinriko* sect, was given to me by my friend, retired KGB Colonel Boris N., who was an eyewitness to the KGB activities concerning the sect. I may not disclose his real name.

In 1991, after the fall of the Communist regime, an ideological vacuum occurred in Russia. The Russian people, after all, were accustomed to being led, to obediently fulfill the wishes of the authorities, and to have before them a precise political aim in life. The majority of people who had exhibited a tendency toward independent thinking had been destroyed during the mass repressions. The government ideology of Communism played an enormous role in the country. It had replaced Christian morals.

Finding themselves without any ideology which would regulate their every step, millions of Russian people lost their spiritual bearings. They did not know why they should continue living, since the goal of continuing every life had been the achievement of the mythical Communism.

Quick to take advantage of this fertile ground, a myriad of totalitarian sects poured into Russia. All of them were under the watchful eye of the FSB. The security services were not planning to counteract them at all. On the contrary, the FSB was planning to find in them a substitute for Communist ideology. The descendants of the KGB were searching for a sect which would most closely resemble Communist ideology, containing within it not only the principle of absolute submission to its leader, but also elements of militarism.

As it turns out, it was not difficult to find a sect with a militaristic bent. This was the Japanese sect *Shinrikyo*. It was funded by a prominent individual, a mafia leader, who made his fortune in the underground economy.

He was also involved in the helicopter business. He liked to buy Soviet helicopters, many of which are manufactured at military factories and are made to serve double applications — in other words, they can be converted for military purposes.

He was not a KGB agent, but he had many acquaintances among the Soviet trade representatives in Tokyo. Among them there were more than a few KGB officers, or Intelligence officers of the Ministry of Defense, known as the GRU. Officially they were civilian employees. But he certainly knew who they were. All of our spies are well known to the Japanese counter-intelligence.

Officers of the GRU are known for their crude military manner. He apparently was a bit apprehensive about getting involved with them. But the KGB officers, on the other hand, are more agreeable.

In 1990, he told his Russian acquaintances that he had created a new religious sect called *Shinrikyo*, "the Doctrine of Truth", and wanted it to have the opportunity to work in Russia. The respectable old man's request was complied with, especially since *Shinrikyo* fully fit the FSB's needs. He portrayed it as a passionate peace fighter and an activist for voluntary aid to Russia. *Shinrikyo* was both militarized and inclined to espionage. At its head he placed the half-crazed blind man Shyoko Asahara,

but he himself was its real leader. As is characteristic of espionage organizations, *Shinrikyo* had its own network of secret collaborators, and not just anywhere, but among the Japanese army and police. Both of them are highly prized objects of penetration by Russian Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Its chief goal was to receive information from the Japanese army and police.

Moscow immediately received a confidential telegram at its intelligence headquarters in Yasenevo, saying that the sect *Shinrikyo*, which was founded by a friend of our country, wants to work in Russia, in return for which it promises to provide us with valuable data. In a personal letter sent just prior to this report, it was said that the sect *Shinrikyo* would be able to play an important role in "political upbringing" of the Russian population. This meant that it was capable of becoming the successor to Communist ideology, especially if you consider that it would operate in Russia under the full control of the FSB.

The confidential telegram and the secret personal letter were handed to Vice President Alexander Rutskoy. He was the closest associate of the new, democratically elected President Yeltsin, and enjoyed his unlimited trust. In reality, Rutskoy was a secret agent of the Communists. In 1993 he headed the Communist putsch. The putsch failed and Rutskoy was placed in prison. He was rehabilitated and returned to political activity. Making peace with Yeltsin, Rutskoy was elected governor of the Kursk region, where he got caught up in corruption.

Rutskoy gave *Shinrikyo* the green light. He personally received in the Kremlin the titular head of the sect, Asahara, after which all the Moscow leadership followed suit. *Shinrikyo*, the sect, received an enormous tract of land and tens of houses in Moscow. It started to utilize them to store weapons and poison gasses.⁵² Vile acts, characteristic of every totalitarian sect, began to surface. People who joined *Shinrikyo* began to renounce their children and their parents, transferring their property, instead, to *Shinrikyo*. Among the Russian members of the sect, mental illness appeared. Upon investigation, it was found that they were forced to take psychotropic medicines and wear helmets connected to electric wires. There was a series of unexplained deaths. One member of the sect, who decided to leave, was found dead in the woods. The police, however, did everything they could to cover this up.⁵³

An Association of Victims of *Shinrikyo* was formed. It contacted the Moscow city leadership with its complaints. The response was always the same:

"Leave *Shinrikyo* alone. It is an organization of peace fighters. Besides, it helps our country in a very important matter. Which matter? You are not supposed to know!"

The number of *Shinrikyo* victims in Russia would have continued to grow, had it not been for the poison gas attack in the Tokyo subway station in March of 1995.⁵⁴ After this *Shinrikyo* was forbidden to operate in Russia by a court ruling in Moscow.

In March of 1998 the criminal case brought by the victims of *Shinrikyo* was dismissed. It had moved along slowly, languishing. The Office of the General Prosecutor tried to avoid touching on the subject of how the sect had penetrated into Russia. Without this, the investigation lost its meaning. The prosecutor's office tried to delay the proceedings, and then to dismiss it altogether.

I studied the activity of the sect, not only as a specialist on Japan, but also as a believing Christian. A few days after the case was dismissed, I published an angry article in the national newspaper *Izvestia*.⁵⁵ I wrote, in particular, that *Shinrikyo* penetrated Russia with the aid of the FSB. I did not have any documentary evidence to support this thesis, but its activity took place under the protection of the FSB. I claimed that terrorists of the sect trained on the military ranges of the Taman Division of the Russian army.

A visit by a foreigner to our military installations is only permitted with approval of the military counter-intelligence of the FSB. A commander of a regiment or division would not allow a foreigner onto his territory. He would be punished for such an act. The military counter-intelligence of the FSB knew that the fighters of *Shinrikyo*, whose psyche had been altered with the psychotropic medicines, were training on official bases of the Russian army, and did not counteract it. It turns out that the FSB itself needed this for some reason.

A PERSONAL VENDETTA COMES TO MY DOOR

Several days following the publication of the article, I repeated everything on TV in a program called "Man and Law". That must have overfilled the FSB's proverbial cup. My witnessing to its involvement with *Shinrikyo* dealt a moral blow. It deprived the FSB

of the heroic aura which still surrounded it in the eyes of many people in Russia.

Soon thereafter my home phone rang. "This is the Senior Investigator Nikolayev for important cases of the General Prosecutor's Office," the caller introduced himself.

His last name was familiar to me. It was he who had been in charge of the *Shinrikyo* case during the last year. He had done everything to derail the case. He had made the decision to dismiss the case. My article in *Izvestiya* had been aimed directly at him. Nonetheless, the voice of Nikolayev oozed pleasantness.

"I am most pleased to make your acquaintance, Konstantin Georgievich!" he said. "I am happy to notify you that your article in *Izvestiya* was personally read by the General Prosecutor, Mr. Skuratov. He set aside his decision regarding dismissing the case. I will once again be charged with handling it."

I could hardly restrain my exclamation of surprise. How could that be? It was Nikolayev who had sabotaged the investigation, had derailed the case — and now he again will be prosecuting it. At the same time, I was pleased that it was my article which had been the reason for renewing the investigation of *Shinrikyo*. One cannot imagine a greater sense of satisfaction for a journalist than when he sees that his activity is bearing fruit, especially when one sees heads of State getting involved.

"Come to my office at the prosecutor's office tomorrow. We'll discuss your article!" Nikolayev continued with a probing tone, and I did not have the strength to refuse him. A discussion of an article! Old hat for a journalist!

But something in Nikolayev's voice alerted me. Whether it was his extreme solicitude, in which I could detect a threatening note, or his warning that our conversation could take approximately three hours. How could one discuss an article so long?

I decided to consult with a famous Moscow attorney, Natalia Moukhina.

"Absolutely not. Under no circumstances should you go there!" She became anxious. "This will not be a friendly discussion, but an interrogation! It will be recorded. The General Prosecutor's Office cooperates most closely with the FSB, and during the interrogation, there will be members of the FSB, who will try to intimidate you, will try to convince you to stop writing articles about their agency."

"Besides, this interrogation will automatically make you a witness to the criminal case regarding *Shinrikyo*, to which you have absolutely no relationship. A witness is obligated to give his signature not to speak publicly about the confidential nature of the investigation. This will deprive you of the possibility of speaking out or publishing articles about *Shinrikyo* in the future. If you publish even one article on this topic, you will be held criminally liable for disclosing the secrets of an investigation, even though you did not release any confidential information. Nikolayev wants to shut you up by inviting you for a talk...."

It goes without saying that I did not go to the prosecutor's office. Nikolayev phoned me again, but this time his voice was haughty and rough.

"Why did you not appear for the interrogation?" he asked, thereby admitting that his intent was not an innocent journalistic chat.

"Because I have no relationship to the *Shinrikyo* sect, except that I am its passionate opponent. If I am dragged into the case as a witness, it will place me in the same row with its leadership. It will open up opportunities for those who would want to see me compromised," I told him.

"In that case, we will use legal means!" he threatened me and hung up the phone. I immediately called back the attorney.

"Now just wait for the police," laughed Natalia Moukhina. "Let your wife tell them that you're not home. They will not dare come in past your foyer. You are only a witness, after all, not the criminal. It is certain that they would break into a regular citizen's apartment. But with you, they'd be afraid to, knowing that you have an attorney and many foreign journalists among your acquaintances. Then we'll create an enormous scandal for them!"

"They did not, after all, send you a summons to appear for the interrogation. This summons must be served by a policeman, and he must get your signature as proof of your being served with it. Only then are you required by law to appear at the interrogation. They are just provoking you.

"Had you come to them, after listening to the trick phone call from Investigator Nikolayev, the prosecutor's office would have recorded it as though you appeared of your own will, in the role of an informer. This would have allowed the FSB to compromise you, by publishing an article in a pro-Communist newspaper under the

heading, "Preobrazhensky supplied some valuable information regarding *Shinrikyo* to the General Prosecutor's Office."

Further events took place exactly as predicted by the attorney, Natalia Moukhina. On a July evening, around 11 pm, the doorbell rang in my apartment. My family's nerves were on edge. It was unbearably hot and we did not immediately realize that the fateful and critical day had arrived. We assumed that one of our neighbors came by.

My daughter Maria opened the door, and before her were three policemen. This is the usual entourage sent to arrest a criminal. Two policemen lead the criminal by the arms, the third, the boss, walks ahead. They demanded that I come out.

"My husband is not home!" replied my wife and closed the door.

"We think he's home. Open up!" said the policemen and started to knock. Soon, five armed Special Forces policemen came to their aid. They started to break down the door.

"What do you need?" asked my wife who had been watching them through the peephole.

"We were called by a neighboring old woman. She said that you are making a lot of noise and that there is a fight going on," declared the policemen, never checking to see if there is one old woman among our neighbors.

This was my first encounter with the police. I had always been a law-abiding citizen. Now with my first contact I was able to ascertain that the police are not too concerned about the legal basis for their actions. Policemen always lie. And that is dangerous for society.

In the meantime, the special forces got to work. They turned off the electricity in our apartment, and then the air was filled with the stench of something burning. We thought that something was burning in the neighboring apartment, but then we noticed white smoke coming from under our entrance door. The policemen were using a special tool to melt our door locks.

These actions were taken to deal with a journalist, not because he had committed some crime, but because he was performing his duty as a journalist. The policemen came to forcefully deliver me to the General Prosecutor's office for questioning as a witness, yet the prosecutor's office does not work at night! This meant that I was supposed to spend the night in the police station, in a

"monkey-cage" where hooligans and bandits, specifically placed there by the FSB, could do anything they liked with me. I must have really gotten under their skin for the FSB to have taken such an aggressive stance toward me!

In the meantime, the door started burning for real, and my wife had no choice but to open it. She held the phone in her hands and on the line was the attorney, Natalia Moukhina. My wife gave her a blow-by-blow report of everything the police did. Seeing this, they did not dare to enter past the foyer. It is extremely difficult for those who do not have such a highly qualified attorney! That includes the majority of the population of Russia. There is a catastrophic deficiency of attorneys in our country.

"Call your husband just for a second! We will only say one word to him and we'll leave!" finally the police implored.

"My husband is not home," repeated my wife.

Upon this, the Inspector of the local regional office of the General Prosecutor, who was also taking part in this raid on my apartment, phoned someone. For fairness' sake, I have to note that he asked permission from my wife to use our phone.

It was rather funny: first they burn the door, they try to tear it down, and then they ask courteously: "May I use your telephone?"

Reporting to someone that I, according to my wife, truly am not at home, he barked at the policemen: "We're leaving!"

The next day my wife sent a complaint to the Central Administrative Board of Internal Affairs of Moscow, to which the police reports, as well as to the General Prosecutor's office. A week later came the replies, stunning in their cynicism.

"The conclusions expressed in your application, during our investigation, have been found to have no confirmation," wrote the Senior Advisor of Justice, V. A. Ponevezhskiy, the Prosecutor of the Moscow area, Nikulino.

"Police officers acted strictly within the framework of executing the decision to bring a witness. The decision in question was reached on June 2, 1998 by the Senior Inspector for especially important cases of the General Prosecutor's Office of the RF, State advisor of Justice of the third rank, Nikolayev, V. D., regarding your husband, Preobrazhensky K. G., who evaded appearing to the investigator for unimportant reasons."

The decision has all the necessary requisites (date, signature of official). The investigation found the actions of the police officers

to be "lawful and well-founded," emphasized the Prosecutor Ponevezhskiy.

It turns out that their burning of my door, switching off the electricity in my apartment, and their lies about the appearance of the police was all lawful. I imagine how simple folks suffer in our country, those who find themselves in more serious conflicts with the police.

I was shocked by the reply from the General Prosecutor's Office. It contradicted that which the regional prosecutor wrote to my wife. His reply insisted that the police had not planned on forcefully delivering me to the interrogation.

"The police officers did not have the intention of delivering your husband anywhere on that day," wrote the Head of the Department of Supervision over Investigation of Especially Important Cases, D. Novosadov. Then why did so many of them come?

I understood then that Russian justice is saturated with lies all the way to the top. To drag oneself through that quagmire is impossible for a regular person. It is why there are so many innocent people here, languishing in prison.

I, on the other hand, appealed for help to the human rights activist, Sergey Grigoriants, Chairman of the *Glasnost* Foundation. This foundation exposed KGB crimes. It holds conferences of the democratic community "KGB: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow." These conferences elicit an intense hatred from the FSB, which tries to disrupt them with provocations, scandals, and other measures in order to break them up. (In 2003, when it became clear that political repressions in Russia had begun again in earnest, the FSB grew brave and destroyed *Glasnost*.)

During Soviet times, Sergey Grigoriants was himself persecuted for his political views. He spent many years in prison. In 1995 his son was killed. There was no doubt that the special services were behind the killing. The official investigation did not uncover the murderer, and was constantly delayed and hampered, apparently by someone influential.

Sergey Grigoriants helped me appeal to the Duma. He introduced me to Sergey Mitrokhin, the deputy head of the *Yabloko* ["Apple"] party, the democratic faction in the Duma. He sent a deputy inquiry to the General Prosecutor Skuratov regarding the lawless actions against the journalist Preobrazhensky.

"This might help you!" Mitrokhin said to me, with a broad, approving smile. And truly it did. The phone calls from the prosecutor's office ceased.

I gave many interviews regarding these events. I did not bother to replace the charred door to my apartment. Each time a foreign journalist would come to see me, I would proudly show him this door.

Chapter 12

GENERAL KALUGIN'S OPEN LETTER TO PUTIN

Two years after these events, Inspector Nikolayev made a name for himself when he became the main character in the drama to destroy the only privately owned and independent broadcasting company, NTV. I have described those events earlier in the book.

People ask me why I have made exposing the FSB the goal of my journalistic activity. There are certainly other more interesting topics, which would also be less dangerous. Moreover, analogous security services exist in other countries, making the activities of the FSB less important.

However, this is a mistake in logic made by my opponents. To be sure, most countries in the world have counter-intelligence services, but they do actual counter-intelligence work. They do not concentrate all their efforts on building a foundation for a return to Communism. Our FSB is the successor of Stalin's NKVD on whom lies the moral brunt of the weight of the sin for annihilating many millions of innocent people.

The FSB has not repented for the crimes of its Communist predecessors. The FSB even celebrates its professional feast day on the day established by Stalin, December 20. This is equivalent to today's German Counter-Intelligence celebrating the day Hitler established the Gestapo.

After the end of the Second World War in Germany, fascism received a moral condemnation. We, however, did not manage to conduct our own Nuremberg trials. A trial against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was planned after the fall of the Communist regime, was stopped under pressure of the powerful Communist lobby, which had retained a voice in all of the governmental branches of the new Russia. Communism in Russia was not

condemned and continues to exert its influence on the politics of the country. The anti-West and anti-American tendencies in Russian diplomacy are the direct result of Communist influence.

FSB expresses Communist ideology most vividly. The weight of the sins of its Stalinist predecessors has shifted to it. I am engaged in its exposure, to show the FSB's extreme danger to democracy in Russia.

General Oleg Kalugin serves as an example of courage and bravery. He was the first to begin exposing the KGB in his publications in the Soviet press in the late 1980s, thus drawing fire to himself. At that time I was not acquainted with General Kalugin, although I lived in the same apartment complex. Our upscale 11-storied house was built specifically for the KGB leadership. Many high-ranking generals, including my father, the Deputy Head of the Frontier Troops of the KGB, received apartments here.

Almost every morning I met General Kalugin in the elevator, but I never spoke to him. Kalugin was head of the Directorate "K", the internal Counter-intelligence within the Intelligence, whose responsibility it was to spy on the spies. To have any personal contact with the head of this department would not have been safe; who knows what kind of question he could have asked me.

We became acquainted years later, when both of us had left the KGB and we were both involved in exposing its criminal activities. We met in the editorial offices of the newspaper *Moskovskiy Novosti* ("Moscow News"), which soon eliminated me from its roster of contributors.

We were introduced by a well-known journalist, Natalia Gevorkian. She was interviewing us for her article, "KGB has strong ties with the people." This article talked about the methods of recruitment used by the KGB on Russian citizens. Soon thereafter, Oleg Kalugin departed for the United States. I frequently published my articles on the FSB in the English-language Moscow newspaper, *Moscow Times*. Kalugin, living in the U.S. read my articles and came to the conclusion that I am of one mind with him.

In May of 1999, I visited him in Washington, DC, appeared there at an international conference as an independent expert on issues of intelligence, and gave several interviews. This created an angry stir in Moscow, which I have discussed earlier.

In early 2000, the presidential election campaign began in Russia. No one doubted that Vladimir Putin, the country's former FSB director, would win the election.

The FSB placed great hopes on Putin. Together with the SVR, the Foreign Intelligence Service, they strove to give Putin the romantic image of a super spy, an image seen as attractive in the provinces. The FSB hoped that Putin, once elected, would begin to suppress freedom of speech and would increase the role of the FSB in the life of Russian society. Alas, this is exactly what happened.

Since Putin is from Leningrad (today's Saint Petersburg), where General Kalugin was the First Deputy Head of the KGB Directorate for a long time, many foreign and Russian correspondents began to ask General Kalugin for interviews regarding Putin — who in his youth had been General Kalugin's direct subordinate.

General Kalugin recalled that Putin was not an extraordinary spy. More than that, his work was considered inadequate. That was why, after completing his stint in Eastern Germany, he was not enlisted into the central apparatus of the KGB, but in contrast to the majority of his colleagues from the provinces, he was shamefully sent back to Leningrad. There, due to his poor job referrals, the KGB leadership placed him in the least promising position, one which was not expected to create any career growth, as Assistant to the Dean of the Leningrad University on International Affairs. General Kalugin emphasized that Putin left the KGB not because of political considerations, but as many other *chekists*, because he saw no career opportunities.

"Putin has nothing to brag about," declared Oleg Kalugin in an interview to the weekly, *Sobesednik* ("Conversationalist").

"If an officer who served in an overseas intelligence position is sent to the KGB Reserves, and not to some ministry of national importance, but to a university, and to a position of assistant dean of international affairs, this says a lot about how our personnel department, for reasons of its own, has decided him to be professionally unfit. That is what happened to Putin who, at 37 years of age, was sent to the university post, and, in 1991 left it, with a clear understanding that he would never get promoted within that organization."

When Putin read Kalugin's statements, he was furious. His

presidential campaign was in danger! In retaliation, Putin called General Kalugin a traitor in his interview with the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* ("Businessman"). Yet only a court can declare a person a traitor. Thus, Putin declared Kalugin a traitor without a trial, totally ignoring the presumption of innocence doctrine. For an attorney by schooling, which Putin is, this is unforgivable.

Then Kalugin addressed Putin with an open letter in the press. All the world media, except in Russia, published it. Each word hit its target:

Mr. Putin:

I have had a dubious honor recently of being mentioned by you in an interview with Russian journalists: you called me "traitor".

Were you not the highest official of a state of which I am a citizen, I would have ignored this insult. I'm used to it. Since 1990, when I publicly denounced the KGB of the USSR and spoke out in favor of radical reforms in my country, I was damned by the Soviet State. I was stripped of my rank, decorations, and pension. Criminal charges were thrown at me.

To my aid came 1.2 million people of the Krasnodar region who, in the face of furious resistance from the Communist Party officials and the provocations of the KGB, elected me People's Deputy of the USSR.

In the spring of 1992, President Yeltsin discussed the possibility of my appointment as the head of the Russian Intelligence Service, but he remarked then that my former KGB colleagues would most likely not agree to accept me back in their ranks. Yeltsin was probably right, for the subsequent events left no doubts that the spirit of Chekism, totalitarianism, and the Bolshevik mentality with its inherent hatred and intolerance toward dissent, has not only remained in fact, but ultimately prevailed in the organs of the Russian intelligence and security. With Primakov's appointment as the Prime Minister this chekist spirit penetrated many corridors of power in Russia. Today, it has triumphed in the Kremlin.

Quite a few people in Russia and in the West have entertained hopes that your judicial education would facilitate the creation of a state ruled by law in our country. But obviously, your

lengthy service in the KGB and in the German Democratic Republic dulled your legal consciousness.

One cannot otherwise interpret your typically Soviet, selective approach to the principle of presumption of innocence, the cornerstone of law and order in a democratic state.

Without due process of law, pending investigation, or any court action, you throw accusations of treason at people unpalatable to your taste.

Even your predecessor, the man of old formation, with all known weakness, did not allow himself such an unpardonable boorishness in regard to the citizens of his country.

If I were of your frame of mind, I could very well brand you as a thief, bribe-taker and even war criminal, the more so as you have left behind in Leningrad a foul smell of corruption, and some of your former associates are now on the run outside Russia's borders. But I'm averse to such treatment of people, even my offenders. Unless there is proof, solid evidence, nothing has legal power, and for that reason nobody can be accused without being guilty.

However, you have already taken the bit in your teeth without realizing yet that in your capacity of the acting president it is not befitting to label people and behave like your current admirers from the newspaper *Zavtra* (an ultra-radical Communist newspaper). However paradoxical it may be, between you and the so-called "irreconcilable opposition" there exists an innate bond.

Unlike you who in the past analyzed the problems of NATO in Dresden, I put together more simple facts related to your bio and life style, available to anyone.

Last December you returned to the walls of Lubyanka the memorial plaque in honor of Y. Andropov, spiritual heir of Felix Dzerzhinsky, "the knight of the revolution", who symbolizes Communist despotism.

Together with your comrades in arms from the Russian Communist party and Zhirinovskiy's "liberal democrats" you toasted the blessed memory of dictator Joseph Stalin. Earlier you paid a friendly visit to the inglorious KGB veteran and state criminal Kryuchkov. And before that you rendered an invaluable service to your Kremlin sponsors by unlawfully framing the Prosecutor General of Russia for his timid attempts to tackle corruption crimes in the highest echelons of power.

Occasionally making reverences to the West and even to

NATO, you are simultaneously tightening the screws inside the country. You denounced the environmentalists as "tools of foreign special services." You have been cultivating the amenable media, but are afraid to face journalists who are not on the short leash of the state.

You authorized the harassment for more than a month of Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky and branded him as a traitor only because he wanted to tell the bitter truth about the Chechen war to all who wanted to know the truth.

Finally, the bloodiest war since Stalin's death against your own people is on your conscience. Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, you have virtually leveled to the ground an entire country as if it were not part of Russia, murdered thousands of innocent elderly people, women and children, sent to slaughter barely feathered Russian fledging soldiers.

You accused the Chechens as the perpetrators of the terrorist acts in Moscow and Volgograd without producing so far any evidence of their involvement in these crimes.

You appear to be utterly unaware of notions such as a national liberation movement or the right of nations to self-determination. In justification of your acts, you discourse about the territorial integrity of Russia, but Russia — not the Russian Federation, a Bolshevik invention — has lost Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Central Asia, and the Trans-Caucasus. Once you've lost your head you do not cry about your hair.

As a native Leningrader, I feel ashamed listening to your speeches heavily interspersed with Bolshevik-gulag jargon: "hit your mugs," "waste in the outhouse," "eliminate as a class," "reduce to the animal state," etc.

Artem Borovic, who died mysteriously in a plane crash, in his latest issue of *Top Secret* magazine quoted you as having said to the people who know you, "There are three ways to influence people: blackmail, vodka and the threat to kill."

You are a dangerous, unpredictable man, Mr. Putin. Dangerous not only to the people you pointed at by your commanding finger, but also to the cause of democracy in Russia, to the young generation of our citizens.

In 1990, I sued in court leaders of the USSR for their unlawful acts against me. In August of 1991, I was fully rehabilitated by President M.S. Gorbachev and ever since I have been a

retired, not disgraced, general, with all ensuing civil rights, pension etc. At the end of 1995, I left for the USA under a contract and did not plan to remain there for more than three years. Since then, the situation in Russia has changed substantially. The forces of revenge have mounted an offensive. Smearing honest people's reputation is becoming a norm.

In the Russia of V. V. Putin, criminalized and corrupt, with pocket justice and legal proceedings, I have no faith.

In the circumstances, I'll have to ask for political asylum in the free world in the hope that as a political refugee, I shall be able to live outside Russia with dignity and in safety.

You can take pride, Mr. Putin, in the fact that you are opening a new page in the history of Russia's political emigration.

Oleg D. Kalugin
Washington, DC

March 20, 2000 (According to: *Intercon International USA, Inc. News Release, 03-20-2000*).

Reading this letter, you have to give to Oleg Kalugin his due in the area of political insight. Everything of which he warned in his letter is now taking place in the political life of Russia.

After this letter came to light, Oleg Kalugin sent it via fax to me and a couple of other like-minded individuals in Russia. In a phone conversation he asked me to publish this letter in newspapers with democratic bents. Alas, in the Russia of 2000 there were almost no such newspapers left!

At Kalugin's request, I sent his letter to *Izvestia*, contacting them as a former contributor, since I had in the past published in that newspaper.

When I called later, the phone was answered by an employee of the international department, Alan Kachmazov, with whom I was not acquainted.

He reacted to my phone call strangely, not as a journalist, but rather as an officer of a state security service.

"Do you share the views of General Kalugin?" he asked me with a stern voice.

"Yes, I do, 100%!" I hastened to ease his anxiety.

"Really?" Kachmazov expressed haughty surprise, adding that

he would report everything to his editor, and that I could call back in a couple of days.

But I received a call back from *Izvestiya* within five minutes.

"Is this Konstantin Georgievich?" asked Alan Kachmazov. His voice expressed barely-controlled laughter. "Tell me in detail about your relations with Oleg Kalugin."

This phone call surprised me. I had told Kachmazov neither my patronymic, nor my phone number.

He must have gotten them from the card file of correspondents working in *Izvestiya*. I calmed myself. But he would not be able to get access to them so quickly, I knew.

As it turns out, he received them from a totally different place, from the press service of the FSB. That became clear in two days, when the *Izvestiya* article about Kalugin was published. It was written in the best of KGB tradition. In other words, it tried to lead the reader as far away from the truth as possible.

Kalugin's open letter was only mentioned in passing, and its essence was distorted. It was referred to as an "address", with no mention of to whom it was addressed. In this "address" Kalugin supposedly announces his decision to accept political asylum, and that is all! From the entire letter, only one partial phrase had been taken, and that was out of context: "I will seek political asylum in the free world...." What are the reasons for his sudden desire to seek it? No explanations. There was no mention in the article that this open letter was addressed to the future president Putin. This article was titled, "Defector", a humiliating epitaph.

The article spoke of everything but the contents of Kalugin's open letter. Secondary issues were addressed. The manner, for example, in which this letter came to *Izvestiya*. In today's electronic world, how can this even be of interest?

The article was verbose in its coverage of the fact that it was I who had given the newspaper the open letter. I was called Kalugin's representative. But the word "representative" was written in quotation marks, which in the Russian language gives the word a derisive and insulting meaning.

But for some reason, the newspaper went on and on discussing this. It asked whether General Kalugin is entitled to have a representative in Moscow, which had nothing to do with his open letter to Putin!

I was surprised to read the following about myself: "Mr. Preobrazhensky, as *Izvestiya* managed to find out, lives in the southwestern part of the capital in an apartment complex which, during Soviet times, belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Apartments there were also given to officers of the intelligence services, under diplomatic cover."

All of this was a lie except for the fact that I do, in fact, live in the southwestern part of Moscow. But the apartment complex never belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It used to belong to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. As a spy, I worked under cover as a journalist, not as a diplomat. They know that perfectly well in *Izvestiya*. I often talked to their journalists about my espionage past. Even my exact address is in the *Izvestiya* filing cabinet.

The following paragraph, however, clarified the situation for me. "The FSB," it said, "does not know whether Oleg Kalugin has a "representative" in Moscow who is actively involved in journalistic endeavors. The FSB officer, who preferred to remain anonymous, declared that, number one, the entire officer corps of the FSB is extremely negative toward Oleg Kalugin, and, number two, he can not have an official representation in Moscow. He is a nobody."

Thus, from a "representative" I turned into a "representation". Nonsense! I did not send General Kalugin's open letter to the editors of *Izvestiya* in order to discuss what my relationship is with him.

The article continued on with issues having absolutely no connection to Kalugin's open letter to Putin. It is how the Devil does his work, subtly whisking people away from the truth.

This article in *Izvestiya* was clearly dictated by the FSB. That is where the journalists of the newspaper retrieved my patronymic and my phone number. They were taken from my personnel file at Intelligence. Another thing caused me greater bitterness, that the journalists from *Izvestiya*, who formerly had the reputation of having a democratic outlook, now, upon hearing General Kalugin's name, immediately phoned the FSB.

I finally did manage to get the entire text of Kalugin's open letter to Putin published! The popular newspaper *Versiya* ("Version") did that. In its editorial commentary, it wrote the following:

"The opinion expressed by General Oleg Kalugin in his letter does not necessarily express the point of view of those of this newspaper. Nonetheless, the editorial staff of *Versiya* considers it possible to give voice to an individual who has publicly been called a "traitor."

These words proved that not all of the Russian press was under the control of the FSB. They also showed that the FSB was not omnipotent. The publication of Kalugin's open letter by *Versiya* elicited great irritation within the FSB, and Putin's anger. This anger was aimed at the FSB, which had not been able to fulfill its assignment, which had been quite simple: not to allow the publication of Kalugin's open letter in Russia. This open letter provoked an enormous response among *Versiya's* readership. And I celebrated victory.

Soon, *Versiya* began to experience problems. In the winter of 2001, a group of FSB officers stormed the offices of *Versiya*. They searched the premises and interrogated employees. The official pretext was that *Versiya* had published a photograph of the spot where the submarine Kursk went down. The photograph was taken from a foreign satellite, and published around the world. However, the FSB determined that this information was considered confidential, even though it was already been published throughout the world and had come from abroad.

Today they are quick to fabricate false accusations of espionage. The investigation of *Versiya* was conducted by the military counter-intelligence, which is known for its flagrant disregard for any laws or decorum in the methods it uses. It is accustomed to working among Russian soldiers and officers, devoid of any civil rights, who have no recourse.

"We do not like your negative press of the FSB!" said some of the military counter-intelligence officers to *Versiya* employees in private. Their comment was accentuated meaningfully. Undoubtedly, the "negative press" included also General Kalugin's open letter to Putin.

A noisy investigation was conducted in the offices of *Versiya*, which was only an artful KGB game. The journalists were called for interrogations, although there really was not anything to discuss. Nonetheless, the journalists were interrogated many times in the course of tens of hours.

They were not permitted to disclose the contents of those interrogations. But it is easy to guess at the methods used during those interrogations. The discussions were really recruitments. That is why so many journalists were called for "talks" — so that later one could never guess exactly which one of the journalists has been recruited and is now secretly working with the FSB. It is the only way of explaining why the FSB demanded all the personnel files of the journalists. There you can find some compromising materials, which would make it easier to recruit.

Soon the investigation was closed without any tangible result. However, it only seems that way. It appears that the FSB has managed to take *Versiya* under its control.

It is as though the newspaper had a transformation. The tone of its articles has become a bit more flaccid and conciliatory. Even though they still publish materials critical of FSB activity, I cannot shake the feeling that they write it at someone else's dictation.

In 2000 my book, *KGB in Japan*, was finally published by Tsentrpoligraf Publishers. This was the Russian version of the book, *The Spy Who Loved Japan*, published in Tokyo in 1994. It was the Russian text which I had protected, hidden under my bed. This was what the FSB had tried to get a hold of at any cost. Now that it is published, they can read the book.

The Russian version is larger than the one published in Japan. I wrote a couple of additional chapters especially for it, recounting the activity of the KGB and the FSB on Russian territory, which brings direct damage to the civil rights of Russians.

Seven leading Russian publishers refused my manuscript, not wishing to ruin their relationship with the FSB. The eighth, however, Tsentrpoligraf, agreed to publish my book. This indicated that in the year 2000, freedom of speech had not yet been totally suppressed. A journalist wishing to overcome obstacles erected by the FSB in 2000 could still do it. But with each passing day, this has become more difficult, and today it would be impossible.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

KONSTANTIN PREOBRAZHENSKY

Konstantin Preobrazhensky is an internationally respected intelligence expert and specialist on Japan. He was born in 1953 in Moscow, Russia. In 1976, he graduated from the Institute of Asia and Africa of the Moscow University with an M.A. In 1975-76 was an intern at Tokai University, Tokyo, Japan.

From 1976-91 he served as an officer in KGB Intelligence. His last position was as personal advisor on China, Japan and Korea to Major General Leonid Zaitsev, the Head of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence (Directorate "T"), Deputy Head of the KGB Intelligence (The First Chief Directorate).

From 1980-85 Mr. Preobrazhensky was the senior officer at the KGB station in Tokyo, Japan. He was ostensibly the correspondent of TASS, Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union. But for him it was not just a cover, as he is a born writer. He wrote many literary pieces about Japan, some of which were later considered masterpieces.

As a KGB officer he concentrated on the recruitment of Chinese scholars for Soviet Scientific and Technical Intelligence. He reported directly to Victor Chebrikov, KGB Chairman, and Vladimir Kryuchkov, Head of KGB Intelligence. Mr. Preobrazhensky was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel as a young officer.

In July 1985, Mr. Preobrazhensky became the center of a sensational spy scandal. The Japanese police caught him at a meeting with his Chinese agent, whom he had previously recruited. He was released in a couple of hours, but the KGB forcibly returned him to Moscow. Though the reason of this failure was unknown, the KGB accused Mr. Preobrazhensky of it solely. He suffered much undeserved humiliation, which he later described in his book "The Spy Who Loved Japan" (Tokyo, 1994). This book caused another spy scandal and became a best seller.

He is the author of seven books on the KGB and Japan; *The Spy Who Loved Japan*, published in Tokyo in 1994, was a best seller. He also wrote *KGB in Japan* (Moscow, 2000), *Unknown Japan* (Moscow, 1993), *How to Become a Japanese* (Moscow, 1989), *Sport Kimono* (Moscow, 1985), and *Bamboo Sword* (Moscow, 1982).

His most recent book, *KGB in Russian Emigration*, is a success. Published by Liberty Publishing House, New York, in January, 2007, it has opened eyes of Russian Americans to the KGB activities among them.

In 1991 Mr. Preobrazhensky left the KGB and became its harshest critic. His books and articles unmask its inhumane and illegal activities.

From 1993-2002 he was a security issues columnist for the *Moscow Times*, a Moscow based English language newspaper. His articles, disclosing the activities of the KGB, made him world famous.

His activities have irritated the KGB greatly. Mr. Preobrazhensky suffered many provocations including attempted illegal arrest, but managed to escape thanks to his lawyers. But after President Putin's coming to power, it has become impossible. KGB dissidents and critics are jailed and murdered in Russia now. That is why in January 2003 Mr. Preobrazhensky fled to the U.S.A. In March 2006 he was granted political asylum.

Here he continues to unmask the KGB. He is a regular speaker on the Voice of America, has given lectures at: Columbia, Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, where he also has given a seminar "Asian Security".

Mr. Preobrazhensky has been quoted and published by: The Associated Press, Association of Former Intelligence Officers Weekly - Intelligence Notes, BBC, Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor, East-Asia-Intel.com, Financial Times, Japanese media, Los Angeles Times, Spy Tech Agency Intel Bulletin, Russia Reform Monitor, American Foreign Policy Council, Newsweek, London Observer, NewsMax.com, The New American, Reuters, The Russia Journal, SKY News, The Weekly Standard, The Washington Post, etc.

¹ Peter Earley, *Comrade J*, G.P. Putnam & Sons; New York, 2008, p. 193

² Sasha is a common Russian nickname for Alexander.

³ *Blowing up Russia: The Secret Plot to Bring Back KGB Terror* by Alexander Litvenenko, Yuri Felshinsky, Geoffrey Andrews and Co (Translator), Geoffrey Andrews and Co. (Translator); Encounter Books, April 2007, ISBN-13: 9781594032011

⁴ "Book Accuses FSB of Killings," by Yevgenia Borisova, *Moscow Times*, 28 August 2001. The article was posted on *Johnson's Russia List* on the same date.

⁵ "Russian Intelligence Behind Chechen War: Former Agent" [*Islam Online & News Agencies*, 28 July 2002

⁶ A member of the Cheka, or secret police

⁷ The Department of Scientific and Technical Intelligence of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, SVR

⁸ Russian Orthodox Church Outside Of Russia

⁹ Felix Dzerzhinsky was a predominant Russian revolutionary and founder of the KGB. Still revered by Putin and the FSB, he was a Polish Communist revolutionary, famous as the founder of the Bolshevik secret police, the Cheka, later known by many names during the history of the Soviet Union. The agency became notorious for large-scale human rights abuses, including torture and mass summary executions, carried out during the Red Terror and the Russian Civil War.

¹⁰ Lubyanka is the FSB headquarters and the prison that is associated with it on Lubyanka Square.

¹¹ The leading Soviet secret police organization founded in 1934 and a precursor of the KGB. It was responsible for political repression during the Stalinist era.

¹² Citation from an article of V. Merzlyakov, "KRO OGPU: people and fates" in the newspaper *Novosti razvedki i kontrrazvedki* No. 24, Moscow, 1997

¹³ Sergey Mikhailovich Izvekov (July 23, 1910 - May 3, 1990), was the 15th Patriarch of Moscow and the head of the Russian Orthodox Church from 1971 to 1990. Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and All Russia was the first patriarch of the church to be educated under the Soviet system. He was widely regarded as a compliant supporter of the Kremlin line. He echoed Soviet pronouncements on international relations, and was chosen to fill one of the places in the Parliament reserved for the official Soviet Peace Committee. His official biography leaves a gap from 1932 until the end of World War II, and Primate Pimen's own accounts of how he spent those years are contradictory.

¹⁴ Quotation marks indicate that this is an agency code name.

¹⁵ *Nasha Strana*, #2741

¹⁶ The officers of (East Germany) are trained at military schools and at a military academy named after Friedrich Engels - "National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic" (<http://www/gsvg.ru/nna.html>).

¹⁷ George Trofimoff Affidavit, Indictment, United States District Court, Central District of Florida, Tampa Division. Case# 8:00-CR-197-T-24C (http://cicentre.com/documents/DOC_Trofimoff_Affidavit.html)

- ¹⁸ M., "Tsentrpoligraph", 2000
- ¹⁹ See: Konstantin Preobrazhensky, "Metropolitan Laurus Lulls Vengeance (<http://portal-credo.ru>, March 6, 2006; and Dmitry Simakin, "The Case 'Mitvol Against Golembiovsky' Went to Court", Moscow, *Nezavisimaya gazeta* newspaper, August 13, 2004
- ²⁰ A voluntary unity of individuals into a group on the basis of love for God and fellow man
- ²¹ A metropolitan is a high ranking bishop, by definition a monk.
- ²² *The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia*, By Dimitry Pospelovsky, Published by St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998
- ²³ Here and going forward are citations from the Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin book, *The Sword and the Shield. The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, New York, Basic Books. 1999, pp. 495-496.
- ²⁴ *podvorye*: a city church which belongs to a monastery and is situated in a location different from the monastery associated with it
- ²⁵ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield*, New York: Basic Books, 1999, p. 498]
- ²⁶ A monarchist Russian émigré newspaper published in Argentina
- ²⁷ Ridiger is the family name of "Patriarch" Aleksey II.
- ²⁸ Patriarch Sergius was the first Soviet Patriarch, and he proclaimed that the Church should serve the Communist state.
- ²⁹ "White Church Loses Monastery to Red Church" by correspondent Jerrold Kessel, CNN, July 9, 1997, Hebron
- ³⁰ "Police Intervenes in Church Property Dispute in Hebron", by Haim Shapiro, Jerusalem Post, July 9, 1997, Hebron
- ³¹ *Church Vestnik* ("Church Messenger")
- ³² A brutal tradition of bullying of new conscripts by older conscripts. The custom of *dedovshchina* has led to a high level of suicide among the young soldiers, a situation exacerbated by sordid living conditions and officers powerless or unwilling to stop the custom.
- ³³ Decree
- ³⁴ Quotation marks indicate that this is an agency code name.
- ³⁵ A seasonal or year-round second home, a country house or villa
- ³⁶ Foreign Service Intelligence, formerly a part of the KGB, now a "separate" service
- ³⁷ *batushka* - the diminutive form of an obsolete word meaning "father," and is usually applied to local priests
- ³⁸ "The Cheboskary Mother: Patroness or Tempter?"; portal-credo.ru; July 29, 2003. Cheboskary is a capitol city in the Chuvash Republic, Russia.
- ³⁹ *panikhida* — a memorial service for the departed
- ⁴⁰ A designation given to Muslims in the Soviet Union in the late 19th century. They collectively numbered more than 10 million in the late 20th century.
- ⁴¹ Suzanne Massie, *Land of the Firebird—The Beauty of Old Russia* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc.) 1980, p. 37

- ⁴² FPN (Agency Presse Novosti) was the official news agency of the Soviet Union, created after World War II. This agency is now called RIA Novosti.
- ⁴³ Andrey Kamakin & Sergey Mulin, "Kremlin's TV Program"; newspaper *Seven Days*, #11, January 11, 2001
- ⁴⁴ MVD is the Ministry of Interior, which included the police.
- ⁴⁵ Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- ⁴⁶ *Glastnost* was the policy of publicity, openness, and transparency in the activities of government institutions in the Soviet Union, together with freedom of information, introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev during the 1980s, when there was less censorship and greater freedom of information in the Soviet Union.
- ⁴⁷ The Russian Federation is divided into 83 federal subjects units, of which twenty-one are republics.
- ⁴⁸ Ufa is the capital of Bashkortostan, the neighboring republic, where the traditionally eastern despotic regime of Rakhimov rules.
- ⁴⁹ *Vecherniye vedomosti iz Yekaterinburga* ("Evening chronicles from Yekaterinburg"), September 7, 1999
- ⁵⁰ *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, September 16
- ⁵¹ In the 1990s, Darkin successfully weathered a struggle for control over Vladivostok's underground economy, particularly in the fish and automobile trade. Part of his success may have been the result of the murder of his two chief rivals. After the 2004 constitutional reform, Darkin was elected governor, the first in Russia to have his job reconfirmed by Putin. ("Putin and 'United Russia'", Spiegel 11/29/2007
- ⁵² AUM Shinriko, www.orthodox.lviv.narod.ru/nhtm/vostok/aum.htm
- ⁵³ "Russian Psychiatrist Told How AUM Shinriko Affects Psyche"; <http://www.regions.ru/article/any/id/1427955.html>; March 12, 2004
- ⁵⁴ On March 20, 1995, members of the AUM Shinrikyo cult entered the Tokyo subway system and released sarin, a deadly nerve agent. The subway attack was the most deadly assault in an ongoing campaign of terror waged by this mysterious cult.
- ⁵⁵ AUM Shinrikyo is Alive!; in part: "How did Ashara, the Shinrikyo head, wind up in Moscow? What was the role of our intelligence, without whose permission he would not have been accepted for so high a position? Who allowed the Shinrikyo leaders to conduct the military drills on our military bases? And, finally, why did Shinrikyo open a department in Vladikavkaz on the eve of the Chechen war?"

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